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ABSTRACT
This dissertation deals with the evolution of manpower management in the
Canadian Expeditionary Force from 1914 to 1918: recruiting, entry-level training and the
provision o f reinforcements from Canada to England and England to France. The central
theme is the increasing professionalism in the Canadian Forces with the development of
an efficient and comprehensive system of recruiting, training and reinforcing units at the
'front.This work argues that from first to last, the government did not appreciate the
need to husband manpower although the Canadian Forces made continual efforts to
manage the pool by altering recruiting criteria and seeking alternative sources for
recruits.
Training was based on British army programs that were well-suited to conditions
on the Western Front. However, training in Canada was largely a waste of time because
of obsolete equipment and by the end of the war, depot units were responsible only for
recruiting and forwarding men to the reserve units. Initially the reinforcement structure
was based on British army policies but these did not accommodate the structure of the
Canadian Forces. However, with the creation of the Ministry of the Overseas Military
Forces of Canada, was rationalized and modified to suit Canada’s needs.
This dissertation relies on extensive primary sources in both Canada and Great
Britain to conclude that by 1918, Canada had developed an efficient and comprehensive
system for managing the national manpower pool. The dissertation also notes profound
changes in both the state and society.
Key words: Canadian Expeditionary Force, manpower, training, reinforcements
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Manpower is the lifeblood of armies regardless of time or place. The importance
of this resource has been emphasized by Charles Messenger, a British historian, who has
concluded that “irrespective of what happened on the battlefield, the [British] army’s
greatest struggle during 1914-1918 was obtaining and maintaining the necessary strength
to meet increasing commitments.” 1 As with the British army, much of Canada’s military
effort in the First World War was engaged in the struggle to provide the trained soldiers
necessary to sustain the Canadian Expeditionary Force in France and Belgium - not just
the Canadian Corps, but the Canadian Cavalry Brigade and the legions of administrative
units in the rear areas as well. However, the struggle to do this has been largely
overlooked by Canadian historians, a surprising omission considering that, all things
being equal, success on the battlefield ultimately depended on the supply of manpower.
This is an organizational study and is therefore impersonal..This is not to say that
the experiences o f individual soldiers are not important; clearly they were, and Canadian
historians have devoted considerable effort to examining their hopes, fears and
\

experiences. But, military life as experienced by these soldiers was shaped not only by
organizations created by the Canadian Forces throughout the war but also by personnel
policies that dictated their terms o f service. Understanding the experiences o f the private
soldier, therefore, demands some knowledge of the administrative and bureaucratic
environment in which the soldier lived, worked and fought.
The Canadian Expeditionary Force was a wartime creation, but had its roots in the
peacetime army, both the Permanent Force and the Active Militia. While the influence of
peacetime army diminished as the war ground on, the attitudes, beliefs and outlooks at all

c

2

levels from Militia HQ to individual units were shaped in varying degrees by prewar
customs and policies. Chapter 1 is therefore devoted to a discussion of the prewar
Canadian military, the organization, recruiting and training. War is very much a ‘come as
you are’ affair, and for that reason Chapter 1 also discusses not only the training state of
the militia, but also the weapons and equipment on which the training was based.
! A recent study of Germany’s Panzer arm by Dennis Showalter discusses
philosophical approaches to war and notes that military planners who view war as an
exercise in management believe that “Military effectiveness depends on the rational
mobilization and application of human and material resources.”2 God may be on the side
of the big battalions, as Napoleon is said to have remarked, but the men for these
battalions were drawn from the manpower pool of the nation and the extent to which they
were available depended very much on the nation’s manpower policies. Chapter 2 is
therefore devoted to a discussion of how Canada and the Canadian military managed
manpower. The failure of the Borden Government to balance the competing interests of
industry, agriculture and the military is considered as well as the inability of the Canadian
Expeditionary Force to husband its most important asset - manpower.
Recruiting, with its monster rallies, strident newspaper stories, public
demonstrations and recruiting sergeants equipped with white feathers on every street.
comer, was a highly visible process that has been studied by a wide variety of historians.
Their conclusions have varied, but in general, they have regarded recruiting, at least in
1915-1916, as patriotic chaos with Militia and District HQ assigning quotas, but
otherwise providing little in the way of direction or assistance.3 But, this overlooks the
role of the military hierarchy in formulating and disseminating policy as well as

3
monitoring and coordinating recruiting efforts at all levels in the chain of command.
District commanders, for example, enjoyed substantial powers and could be ruthless with
unit commanders and others who did not toe the line. The obituary for,Major-General
Logie o f Military District 2 in Toronto, an outstanding district commander, said in part:
“Although stem with his officers and frowning upon battalion commanders who
considered their appointments as social adornments, General Logie was ever considerate
of the shortcomings o f raw recruits.”4 In short, Logie must have been a holy terror to
commanding officers who had difficulties meeting his expectations. Brigadier-General
Cruikshank o f Military District 13 in Alberta was equally impatient with commanding
officers who crossed him. In July 1915, for example, he discovered that the 63rd Battalion
was not recruiting in Calgary as directed. His letter to the offending commanding officer
was couched in no uncertain terms: “This to say the least is very extraordinary and would
indicate a desire to evade my instructions.”5Brigadier-General Hemming of Military
District 3 in Eastern Ontario was even more direct and in January 1917 sent a blood
curdling letter to the commanding officer of the 252nd Battalion and other units that had
failed to meet their recruiting quotas. “It is pointed out,” Hemming wrote, “that the
present progress of recruiting will take some four years to recruit to the required strength,
and it is regretted that this length of time cannot be allowed. I wish to inform you
personally that unless immediate improvement is made I shall recommend the removal of
the majority o f the Officers of the 252nd and replace them with others who will show
some initiative and action.”6. With district commanders such as these, it is clear,
notwithstanding the public manifestations of the recruiting effort, that the military, not

4
the community, controlled recruiting. Chapter 3 discusses the extent to which this control
was exercised as well as the growth of the various recruiting organizations in Canada.
Chapter 4 examines recruiting criteria: the standards that had to be met by those
who joined. Not surprisingly, these standards changed continually as the war went on.
Height, age, vision and citizenship requirements were all revised while groups
marginalized by society, including natives, Asians, Orientals and blacks, became
increasingly welcome. Militia Headquarters was not a passive participant in this process
of change but actively sought to modify criteria to suit changing circumstances. Chapter 4
concludes that recruiting criteria were dynamic, evolving to meet perceived needs, and
were, by and large, firmly controlled by the military,
Chapter 5 discusses the application of recruiting criteria and its impact on the
number o f potential recruits in the national manpower pool. The need of key industries
for manpower is reviewed and an estimate is made of the number of men that could
reasonably be expected to be available for military service. Efforts to augment the
manpower pool by enlisting criminals and recruiting outside of Canada are also
v

discussed. O f particular interest is the British-Canadian Recruiting Mission, an agency
that established recruiting offices across the United States and enlisted more than 33,000
men for the Canadian Expeditionary Force - about 6% of all enlistments. Also considered
is the use o f women to replace able-bodied men for service at the front and the half
hearted attempt in 1918 to create the Canadian Women’s Auxiliary Army Corps.
Chapter 6 concerns entry-level training. Critical issues dealt with include control
- directing the training,: setting the standards, and implementing administrative:
procedures. Little is known of the subjects taught to the new recruits and for that reason

the chapter contains a detailed discussion of training programs and their evolution. The
difficulties o f training in Canada because of equipment shortages, administrative policies
and obsolete weapons are examined at length, as are the effects of the inefficient training
structure in England. These difficulties, at least in England, were finally resolved w hen:
the Ministry o f the Overseas Military Forces o f Canada was created in December 1916,
although the effect was to create two armies, one in Canada and the other overseas.
Coordinating these two armies was difficult since neither controlled the other and it was
notuntil Militia Headquarters acquiesced to the Overseas Forces in December 1917 that
some measure o f unity was achieved.

: ^

Little has been written of the policies and procedures for providing
y
reinforcements from England to units at the front and Chapter 7, therefore, discusses this
at length. Also considered in this chapter is the nature of the wastage which dictated the
need for reinforcements: battle losses, sickness and postings to other units. Even when
this wastage was promptly replaced, battalions were still short o f men because of those
on command, on course or left out of battle. All in all, the average battalion, even when
fully manned, could put only two-thirds o f its strength into the trenches, a manning
shortfall that was of deep concern to the units at the front.

;:

Chapter 8 discusses the evolution of the reinforcement system in Canada from
regional depots in 1914 to territorial depot battalions in 1918. This chapter argues that no
long-lasting coherent reinforcement structure could be created because o f manning
decisions made by Sam Hughes, the Minister o f Militia and Defence, and Sir Robert
Borden, the Prime Minister. Arguably it was not until Hughes resigned that Militia
Headquarters, after an ill-fated experiment with militia depot companies, was able to

6

create territorial depot battalions affiliated with reserve battalions in England, an

.

organization that stood up well under the unprecedented demands of the Hundred Days.
Chapter 9 argues that at the beginning of the war, the reinforcement system was
based on prewar doctrine with training units in England and base depots in France along
the Channel coast. These two components were neither well-organized nor coordinated,
with the result that units were either starved o f men or provided with reinforcements who
only partially trained. By late 1917, however, the prewar, system had been largely
discarded arid the reinforcement structures in England and France were well-organized
and coordinated. Within the limitations imposed by external factors such as the irregular
flow of men from Canada, this system was able to provide sufficient numbers of well/

trained reinforcements in a timely manner. Moreover, part of this system, the Canadian
Corps Reinforcement Camp, was largely designed by Canadians to suit Canadian .•
requirements.
A number o f Canadian historians have dealt with the Canadian Expeditionary
Force, but, with the exception of Desmond Morton, most have viewed Canadians in
isolation without considering if the experiences of other dominions were similar.7:
Canadian Forces overseas were treated as an integral part of the British army and were
governed by British policies and instructions. To put developments in Canadian policies
and organizations into context, therefore, parallel developments elsewhere in the British
Expeditionary Force have been considered. In a few instances, developments in the
Australian Imperial Force have also been considered since the Australians were governed
by British instructions as well.

7
. Some o f what has been written about the Canadian Corps in particular not only
views the Corps in isolation but relies on numbers and is tinged with patriotic
chauvinism. Canadian historian Shane Schreiber, for example, has attributed much of the
success of the Corps in 1918 to the fact that, unlike the British Expeditionary Force that
reduced infantry divisions to nine battalions, Canadian divisions retained twelve infantry
battalions each.8 This claim does not stand up to scrutiny. The New Zealand Division also
maintained twelve infantry battalions throughout the war.9 Moreover, these battalions
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were maintained at full strength and the average monthly strength of the New Zealand
Division during the Hundred Days was 11,496 infantrymen as compared to the average
Canadian division with 10,027 infantrymen.10 But, it appears that the New Zealand
. .
f
.
Division was not as effective during the Hundred Days as the Canadian Corps. It seems
clear, therefore, that the size o f the Canadian divisions was not the decisive factor that
made them superior to other divisions.
Peter Simkins, a British historian, has analyzed battles fought by British,
Canadian, Australian and New Zealand divisions during the Hundred Days and has
concluded that the average success rate in opposed attacks by British divisions in the
Fourth Army was “70.7 percent - identical to the average success rate of the five
Australian divisions (70.7 percent), only slightly lower than the average for the four
Canadian divisions (72.5 percent) and higher than that o f the New Zealand Division (64.5
per cent).” 11 While other analysts may arrive at different conclusions, the fact remains
that some o f the British divisions were virtually as effective as the Canadians. This in no
way detracts from the outstanding achievements of the Corps during the Hundred Days,
but it does indicate that by 1918, it was not only the Canadians who had developed hard
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hitting, professional assault divisions. The level of competency in the Canadian Corps
needs to be firmly situated within developments elsewhere in the British Expeditionary
Force to put matters into context.
To date, there has been no comprehensive study o f administration in the Canadian
Expeditionary Force or the British Expeditionary Force, apart from Ian Brown’s ground
breaking study of British logistics in France and Belgium.12 However, Brown was
concerned only with the organization of transportation and the supply o f materiel and did
not touch on the vital question o f reinforcements.
Seldom considered by historians is the development of Canadian staffs, both in
Canada and overseas, as well as the subordination of military interests to civil direction.
Stephen Harris’s book Canadian Brass provides a good overview of the development of a
professional army in both peace and war and is essential to understanding the functions of
the Minister ,of Militia and Defence, the Militia Council and Militia Headquarters itself.13
Canadian Brass includes the development of staff functions in Canada and overseas, but
given the chronological scope (1860-1939), only the broad outline of developments in the
Great War are discussed. Richard Walker’s dissertation'on Canadian military and
political relations also provides some useful insights, but is concerned with developments
from 1898 to 1945 and discussion on the Canadian Expeditionary Force is therefore
limited.14
Both official histories are indispensible. The Official History of the Canadian
Forces in the Great War 1914-1919 and the accompanying volume o f appendices and
maps contain a wealth of information.15 However, the sole volume of the projected eightvolume series covers only the period up to the arrival of the 2nd Canadian Division in
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Belgium in September 1915 and is therefore limited. Colonel Nicholson’s Canadian
Expeditionary Force 1914-1919 , on the other hand, is concerned with matters in Canada,
England, France and Siberia from the creation of the 1st Canadian Division in 1914 to
demobilization in 1919.16 The book is a ‘must’ for any serious historian, but much of Í
what is discussed concerns Canadian Corps operations on the battlefield and as Nicholson
himself admitted, the scope was such that events could be covered “only in broad outline,
for the limitations imposed by the covers of a single book have ruled out the inclusion of
much detail.” 17 There is also a one-volume history of Canadian medical services
produced by Sir Andrew Macphail in 1925.18 While the book contains some valuable
information and background, it is by no means clear if Macphail had complete access to :
.
/
the relevant documents. Moreover, in the case of Canadian Command Depots, it has not
been possible to reconcile Macphail’s account with the archival evidence.
Desmond Morton’s book A Peculiar Kind of Politics discusses the Ministry o f the
Overseas Military Forces of Canada at length and is the only comprehensive history of
the development, structure and impact of this Ministry, unique in Canadian military
history. Broad in scope, the book offers a sweeping, definitive summary of the Ministry
and its operations; However, Morton’s approach is top-down and does not include the
effect o f the Ministry on training or the provision of reinforcements at the individual or
unit level.
There are several divisional histories that deal with training. Shoestring Soldiers
by Andrew Iarocci is concerned with the 1st Canadian Division: mobilization, training
and operations in France and Belgium in 1915.19 But the.book is an operational history
and the discussion o f mobilization and training is used only to put the performance of the
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division in battle into context. Despite this. Shoestring Soldiers is a useful introduction to
the issues o f individual and collective training in the early stages of the war. We Lead.
Others Follow by Kenneth Radley is also concerned with the 1st Canadian Division.20:
Unlike Iarocci, Radley discusses developments in the division from mobilization in 1914
to the Armistice in 1918. Radley is one of the few Canadian historians to acknowledge
that the Canadian Corps was but one of twenty-three corps in the British Expeditionary
Force and he has considered the effects of some British policies and direction. We Lead.;
Others Follow, however, is limited since it deals only with the 1st Canadian Division and
not the Canadian Corps or the Canadian Expeditionary Force as a whole. No academic
studies o f the remaining three divisions in the Corps have been published, although David
Campbell of the University of Calgary produced a dissertation in 2003 on the 2
\

Canadian Division.21 The dissertation offers some useful insights into the way in which
the division handled untrained reinforcements in December 1916 and briefly considers
the role of the base depots but his terminology is questionable. Campbell considers
‘wastage’, for example, but it appears that he refers to battle casualties only and not the
V

overall losses, all o f which had to be replaced.
Training depended to a very great extent on the availability and use of both:
equipment and weapons. Both Tim Cook’s No Place to Run and Bill Rawling’s Surviving
Trench Warfare contain useful insights into gas warfare as well as technology and its
impact on operations.

Unfortunately both deal with the Canadian Corps in France and

not to the Canadian Expeditionary Force as a whole. A useful summary of Canadian
infantry equipment is contained in Jack Summers’s Tangled Web.23 There is, however,
no authoritative account of the types, characteristics and limitations of Canadian weapons
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used in the First World War apart from Roger Phillips’s and Francis Chadwick’s The
Ross Rifle Story.24 The book is useful, but is concerned mainly with the Ross Rifle
Factory and not the use of the Ross rifle by the Canadian Expeditionary Force. Although
dated, Major Reynolds’s The Lee-Enfield Rifle contains some useful information on what
became the standard Canadian rifle in 1916.25
Several historians have produced statistical analyses of recruiting and manpower
in the Canadian Expeditionary Force. Robert Craig Brown and Donald Loveridge in 1982
examined regional variations in recruiting, the role of the militia and local organizers and
the factors which forced the government to adopt conscription in 1917.26 Their article
contains some useful insights, but their analysis is confined to the infantry only and
ignores the many battalions allowed to recruit outside of their parent district. Census data
of males age 15 and older is also used, although The Canada Year Book 1918 contains a
summary by province of all males of military age (18-45).27 Nor is any allowance made
for immigrants from enemy countries who, for the most part, were unable to join in 19141917, but were freely conscripted in 1918 provided they had been naturalized. No attempt
has been made to account for American residents who trekked north to enlist nor do the
authors differentiate between those enlisted in Canada and those enlisted in Bermuda,
Britain, France, Belgium and the United States.
. Chris Sharpe has produced a regional analysis of enlistments in the Canadian
Expeditionary Force from 1914 to 1918.28 Like Brown and Loveridge, his article offers
some food for thought. However, his analysis suffers from the same shortcomings. As
well, he makes no attempt to reconcile census figures with the summary of enlistments,
presumably prepared by military districts whose boundaries did not always coincide with

t
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provincial boundaries. Nor does he consider the fact that two districts were not created
until 1917: Military District 7 in New Brunswick and Military District 12 in
Saskatchewan.

This dissertation deals with recruiting, training and the provision of
reinforcements as separate, although closely related, functions. However, in some cases,
the same agency was responsible for two or more of these functions. The creation of
Headquarters Overseas Military Forces of Canada, for example, is discussed in both
Chapters 6 and 9. However, the former discusses the influence of the Headquarters on
training while the latter is concerned with the impact of the Headquarters on the
reinforcement structure. Similarly, the same agencies in Canada appear in both Chapters
3 and 8. But, one chapter deals with recruiting while the other is concerned with
reinforcements. The emphasis, then, is on the function and not the entity. :
The dissertation is lengthy although efforts have been made to reduce the length.
However, manpower has not been examined in depth by Canadian historians and there is
no body o f published works to draw from. For that reason it has been necessary to discuss
various aspects o f personnel administration in detail.
Prior to 1916, Canada was organized into six divisional areas and three military
districts. To avoid confusion with divisions of the Canadian Expeditionary Force, the
term ‘military district’ is used in place of ‘divisional area’ from Chapter 2 onward
although, strictly speaking, the term is inaccurate in discussing developments in 19141915.
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This dissertation deals -with non-commissioned reinforcements and ignores the
complex issues of training and providing officer reinforcements. Similarly, the discussion
is restricted to entry-level training only. It is acknowledged that there was considerable
specialist training as well as training conducted in the forward area by the Canadian
Corps, but these are separate subjects best dealt with elsewhere.

As noted earlier, all things being equal, success in battle depends on an ample
supply o f well-trained reinforcements. However, providing these reinforcements meant
the creation o f an efficient system o f recruiting, training and forwarding men to replace
wastage at the front. Developing this system was not easy. In the early years,
arrangements were ad hoc and inefficient. By 1918, however, Canada had created an
efficient system o f providing reinforcements that stood the test of battle. In the process,
the Canadian Forces moved from an amateur militia force to a professional army. There
were broader aspects as well that touched on both the state and society. This dissertation
is the story of how Canada’s wartime military manpower policies marked these changes.
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Chapt er 1 ■
Militia Roots
From first to last, the Canadian Expeditionary Force (CEF) was a product of the

peacetime militia. Admittedly militia influence diminished as the war ground on, but
nonetheless it persisted throughout. The growth and development of the CEF was
influenced by a wide variety of factors, but most of it was shaped by its peacetime roots the Permanent Active Militia (known as the Permanent Force or PF), Canada’s tiny full
time army and the part-time soldiers in the Active and Reserve Militia.
The PF was small and, in the case of technical corps, inexperienced in field
operations. Despite the linguistic duality of the nation, the PF had little or no French
language organizational or instructional capability, a shortcoming that persisted
throughout the war. Command was difficult and co-ordination by Militia Headquarters
was limited. The staff, both in Ottawa and at the various divisions and districts, was small
and devoted mainly to administration. The upshot was a considerable degree of
decentralization and a sense of autonomy on the part of subordinate units and formations,
characteristics that were later evident in the CEF.

\

Militia regiments were not simply military units, but social organizations that
provided diversions for members. In many cases, the need to prepare for war was
overlooked and considerable emphasis was placed on public ceremony, which did much
in the minds o f the participants to justify the existence of the unit. The bonds forged in
peacetime were carried over into war, and there was considerable confusion and
inefficiency as regiments tried to maintain their corporate identity. Because of these
bonds, loyalty to members took precedence over regulations, and men who were overage
or physically unfit were enrolled or retained.
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. Training was severely limited by funding and ceremonial activities together with

a lack o f equipment served only to reduce the standard further. The high absentee rate at
summer camps and the annual turnover in units also played a part. The training standard
in many cases was poor, but there were also conscientious and dedicated officers who
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tried to make training as comprehensive and realistic as possible.
Although logistics is vital in wartime, there were few technical units and little or
no training for specialists in administration. In many cases, accommodation for militia
units was inadequate and there was also a lack of central training camps. Mobilization for
war demanded both equipment and training facilities; in 1914; Canada had neither.
:

Unlike the CEF, which in the early stages of the war, was predominantly British-

bom, the militia was more representative of the nation in terms of ethnicity. Moreover,
ethnicity was not necessarily a bar to enrolment, and a handful of visible minorities and
Aboriginals were able to enlist. This does not mean that racism did not exist; obviously it
did, but, for some units, the colour line was not a barrier. The militia was also much more
youthful than the CEF, and was also prepared to accept recruits who were manifestly
underage. There was the paradox of 1914-1918: the militia that provided the foundation
for the CEF was not the force that went to war.

In 1914, Canada’s army was known as the Canadian Militia and was divided into
an Active and a Reserve Militia. The former consisted of volunteers between the ages of
18 and 45 and paraded either on a part-time basis (Militia) or was embodied on a full
time basis (PF). Both the Militia and the PF were armed, equipped and paid. The Reserve
Militia was the vestige o f the nineteenth-century Sedentary Militia, and consisted of all
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males between the ages o f 18 and 60 who were British subjects and capable of bearing
arms in the event o f a l e v é e

e n

m a ss e .

The Reserve Militia, with no arms or equipment,

was for all intents and purposes defunct by 1914, although a number of units were
authorized during the First World War. These war-time units received littlé or no support
from the Department o f Militia and Defence, but their existence diverted local
enthusiasm for the CEF and added to the workload o f the small, over-stretched staff at
Militia Headquarters. 1 Rifle clubs and associations were not part of the Canadian Militia,
but were provided with weapons and ammunition, and, in an emergency, could be drafted
into the Militia. Men could also be balloted under the Militia Act although this was
rejected in 1917 in favor of selective conscription.

<

The PF was the logical base for mobilization, but was hampered by its dual role
and limited size. Intended to provide instructors for the Militia and garrisons for Halifax,
Québec, and Esquimalt, the PF had only 247 officers and 2,656 men in scattered
•J

garrisons across the country. PF units consisted o f an under-strength infantry battalion,
the Royal Canadian Regiment (RCR), two small cavalry regiments, the Royal Canadian
Dragoons (RCD) and Lord Strathcona’s Horse (LdSH), two Royal Canadian Horse
Artillery (RCHA) batteries at Kingston, and companies of the Royal Canadian Garrison
Artillery (RCGA) at Halifax, Québec and Esquimalt. There were also small detachments
from the technical corps attached to each division and district.4 The PF should have been
an invaluable source o f expertise for the Militia but in practice, the high turnover rate
limited the number o f instructors that could be provided. In 1912, “the percentage of men
discharged [from the PF] was greatly in excess of enlistments.”5 As well, service in the
PF did not appéal to most Canadians; between 1905 and 1913,458 volunteers from the
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British Army joined the RCGA and RCR which had a combined establishment of about
900 men .6

:
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r PF technical corps were limited because they had to spend much of their time on
house-keeping duties. In the case of the Canadian Engineers (CE), the routine
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maintenance o f works and buildings prevented any training in field engineering, their
primary raison d’être in war. The Canadian Army Service Corps (usually referred to as
the CPASC, or Canadian Permanent Army Service Corps) had the same problems. More
than half of the corps supported the Halifax garrison and the CPASC was neither trained
nor equipped for field operations. The Inspector-General considered individual members
of the CPASC to be proficient, but British Army instructors were needed if the Corps was
to progress beyond a basic level.

m
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While Militia units were responsible for their own training, the PF Instructional
Cadre provided assistance and staffed central schools to train officers and NCOs. The

.

Cadre was small, however, and in 1913 there were only 115 infantry and cavalry NCOs
available for the whole of the Militia, not even one NCO per unit.8 Despite this, PF
Instructors could be vital to unit efficiency. In St Catharines, for example, the 7th Field
Battery was issued with the new 18-pounder field gun on 3 May 1912 and simultaneously
warned o f an artillery concentration at Camp Petawawa starting 8 June 1912. But thanks
to Sergeant-Instructor W. Hopkins from the RCHA who taught gun drill three nights a
week, the battery, was able to master the new equipment and perform creditably at camp .9
The virtues o f the PF Instructor were also celebrated in fiction, such as a short story about
an anonymous RCR drill-sergeant published in 1910 by Lieutenant Frederick Curry o f ,
the 41st Brockville Rifles .10
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. Apart from the limited number of instructors available, there were other problems.
The PF was an English-speaking force with no room for unilingual francophones, and
few members of the Instructional Cadre could speak French . 11 As a result, Englishspeaking NCOs were sometimes detailed to francophone units. 12 The RCR maintained
eight francophone instructors at No. 5 Regimental Depot in Québec City, but this
benefited infantry units in the 5th Divisional Area only, and ignored French-speaking
units elsewhere, such as the 65th Carabiniers Mont-Royal in the 4th Divisional Area. 13 The
language problem was exacerbated by the lack of training manuals. Only Regulations et
Ordonnances à l’usage de la Milice du Canada. Manual d’infanterie à
l’usage de la Milice Canadienne. Traite de tactiques à l’usage des Trois Armes: traduit du
Combinëd Training 1905. and an English translation of the standard pre-war reference,
Infantry Training 1911 were available before 1914.14
The Canadian Militia had seen tremendous changes in the decade before 1914, in
part because of deficiencies exposed during the Boer War, a need to curb the powers of
the General Officer Commanding the Canadian Militia, a British officer frequently at
loggerheads with the Canadian government, and a desire to modernize the Militia .15 The
most important of these changes was embodied in a new Militia Act introduced in 1904
by Sir Frederick Borden and based on recent reforms in the British Army prompted by
Lord Esher’s War Office (Reconstitution) Committee. In brief, the British reforms did
away with the position of Commander-in-Chief and created a general staff, with four
branches headed by the Chief of the Imperial General Staff (CIGS), the Adjutant-General
(AG), the Quartermaster-General (QMG), and the Master-General of Ordnance (MGO).
None of these branches had primacy, although the CIGS was considered p r i m
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p a r e s .

Coordination and general guidance was provided by an Army Council headed by

the Secretary of State for War as chairman, with the CIGS, AG, QMG and MGO as
military members and two civilian appointees who cared for financial matters and civil
matters .16
■In Canada, the new Militia Act followed the British model with a Militia Council
broadly similar to the Army Council.17 The Minister of Militia and Defence was
President, while the Deputy Minister acted as Vice-President. The Accountant and
Paymaster General (a civilian appointment) was the Finance Member and the Assistant
Deputy Minister was secretary. Military members consisted of the Chief of the General
Staff (CGS) who was responsible for operations and training, the AG who was
responsible for personnel policies, medical services and cadets, the QMG who handled
supply and transport, and the MGO who looked after surveys, engineer services, works,
and buildings. 18 Like his British counterpart, the CGS did not have primacy and each
military member was responsible to the Minister for his particular branch .19 Unlike the
Army Council which had some executive authority, however, the Militia Council was
restricted to advising the Minister “on all matters relating to the Militia which are referred
to the Council by the Minister.”20
In principle, the new organization was sound, with the Minister and his staff
meeting frequently on a weekly or fortnightly basis. Although the Council was advisory
in nature and (in theory at least) restricted to discussing only those issues raised by the
Minister, Borden adopted a collegial approach and under his direction, “the Militia
Council met often [and] produced serious political-military consultation .”21 But the
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success of the system depended entirely on the personality o f the Minister and his
willingness to meet with his Council.

AM

The collegial atmosphere established by Borden abruptly changed in 1911 with
the appointment o f Sam Hughes, a forty-five-year-old newspaper proprietor and long
standing militia officer, as Minister of Militia and Defence. Under Hughes, the Militia
Council was reduced to impotence, and after a clash with the CGS, Major-General Colin
Mackenzie, Hughes either disregarded the Council or used it simply to implement his
orders. The upshot was that staff branches at Militia HQ operated in isolation and there
was no effective consideration of problems or coordination o f effort, a situation that
continued to exist as long as Hughes was in office.

;

Hughes was a controversial figure, although his biographer has described him as
“popular, dynamic, progressive and decisive.”24 This may have been true to some extent,
but Hughes was impulsive, eccentric, and ruthless, and did much to bring about chaos,
particularly after the war broke out. Some of what he did had a positive effect on the
Militia but, as Sir George Foster wrote in 1915, his methods brought about “widespread
feelings of bitterness and insecurity induced by the continuous displays of strong and
insulting language and indiscretions.”25 From first to last, Hughes did not understand the
nature o f his position. As one historian has commented, “the opportunities for damage
were incalculable when the minister of defence happened to be impetuous, imperious,
and unable to understand the peculiar complexities of managing armed forces in a
democratic polity.”

After the war, W.A. Griesbach, a prominent Edmonton lawyer and

Conservative Party organizer, acknowledged Hughes’s accomplishments, but added that
“He had little or no idea of the proper functioning of the staff and was despotic, if not
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tyrannical. How the wretched staff at National Defence Headquarters carried on,'I do not
know. I suspect that they did not carry on at all .”27
The “wretched staff’ at Militia HQ staff was small in relation to their
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responsibility for a large and complex organization that stretched from one coast to the
other. In March, 1914, on the eve of war, there were only thirty-five staff officers at V
Militia HQ, including the Director of Cadet Services in the AG Branch. Surprisingly, the
largest was the MGO Branch with thirteen staff officers, although this included eight
officers employed on survey and inspection duties. The CGS Branch had seven officers
employed in Operations, Training, Musketry, Intelligence, and Signalling. Significantly,
there was no staff officer with responsibility for mobilization, although in practice this
was handled by Major G.C.W. Gordon-Hall, the Director of Military Operations.28
Command and control with such a small staff was difficult, and responsibility for
training had to be delegated to subordinate Headquarters. Militia HQ issued annual
instructions outlining the conduct of training, but these were not mandatory and were
“merely a guide to officers, in the training of those units under their command ;”29 T o'
compensate for this, there was an Inspector-General charged with general supervision,
but the sheer number o f units meant that most o f the inspections had to be carried out by
local commanders.30
Decentralization of training meant that Divisional and District Commanders .
enjoyed a considerable degree o f autonomy, which in turn was passed on to units. At
Camp Sewell in 1914, for example, “Every effort was made to decentralize the work of
training, and to make the Officers o f the Militia responsible for the training of their
Units.” Under the circumstances, decentralization with its attendant autonomy may
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have been inevitable, but it meant that uniformity was difficult to achieve. This was not
an issue in peacetime, when units operated only within the bounds of their particular
division or district, but later became a major problem during the war, when units from
across Canada arrived in England with varying standards of training.
The need for a larger staff was recognized during the war; as summarized in Table
1, there were eighty-nine staff officers at Militia HQ by July 1918. But at this point in the
war, responsibilities had shifted. The M

ilita r y S e r v ic e A c t

(MSA) which provided

draftees was administered by the Military Service Branch of the Department of Justice
and responsibility for training had been largely handed over to Headquarters Overseas
Military Forces o f Canada (OMFC) in England.

The revised HQ organization reflected

the new division of responsibilities, and most o f the increase (forty-two officers) was in
the AG Branch and the newly created Judge Advocate General Branch. Only four officers
were added to the General Staff Branch, which indicates that Militia HQ had become an
administrative body only. Despite the increase during the war, the HQ remained
understaffed in relation to its responsibilities. The CGS, Major-General Sir Willoughby
Gwatkin, routinely worked until well after midnight and shouldered a workload that
brought him to the verge of a nervous breakdown.

Others suffered as well. In 1920, the

AG wrote to Brigadier-General R.J. Gwynne, who was forced to leave because of illhealth, to express his regrets “that your unremitting devotion to your duties during the
war made it necessary for you to retire .”34 Under the circumstances it is, perhaps, no
surprise that coordination o f specific issues was sometimes fumbled.

\
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Table 1
Militia HO Staff Appointments 1914 and 191835
' Branch
cgs

;

31 March 1914
; 1,

1 July 1918

7
7
4
13
4

11

Difference
■.+4 ■■■•■
+33

AG
40
QMG
6
+2
MGO
12
-1
; . .-1 '
Finance
3
Inspectors-General
.
0
,
8
+8
Judge Advocate
9
+9
o
General
Totals
35
89
+54
Notes: (1) In 1914, the Inspector-General was part of the CGS Branch.
(2) In 1915 the War Purchasing Committee assumed responsibilities for
equipment procurement from the MGO.
Militia HQ did not exercise command directly, but through divisions and military
districts, each with specific boundaries. Divisions, located in the Maritime provinces,
Québec, and Ontario, were intended to counter the threat of an invasion by fielding
formed bodies of troops. Each division was divided into brigades and, on paper, had the
requisite number o f arms units .36 But the structure was not balanced and the divisions
were administrative and not operational entities. Units such as cavalry regiments were
therefore allocated to divisions other than their own. This seems to have been a paper
exercise, however; there is no record, for example, of the 24 th Grey’s Horse, from the 1st
Divisional area, training with the 3rd Division.37 Districts, on the other hand, were
intended to be geographic entities responsible for training and administering units.38

;
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; Table 2
District and Divisional Organization
:
.
31 March 191439
Division of District
1st Divisional Area
2nd Divisional Area

Headquarters
London
Toronto

Province
Ontario
Ontario

3rd Divisional Area

Kingston

Ontario

4tn Divisional Area
5“ Divisional Area
6 th Divisional Area

Montréal
Québec
Halifax

Military District 10

Winnipeg

■

Remarks
South-west Ontario
Central and northern
Ontario
Eastern Ontario and
western Québec

Québec
Québec
Nova Scotia, New
Brunswick and
Prince Edward
Island
Manitoba and
Saskatchewan
/

Military District 11

Victoria

Military District 13

Edmonton

British Colum bia'
and Yukon Territory
Alberta

Included Districts of
Thunder Bay and
Rainy River in
Ontario

Included the
Territory of
Mackenzie

Notes: (1) Divisions were redesignated as districts in 1916.
(2) Military District 12 (Saskatchewan) was created in 1916.
(3) Military District 7 (New Brunswick) was created in 1917.
The structure o f each Divisional or District HQ was similar to Militia HQ, with a
small staff that reflected the emphasis on administration rather than operations and
*L

training. HQ 6 Division in Halifax, responsible for the Maritime provinces, was perhaps
typical, with three staff officers handling operations, training, signals, and intelligence
with eleven other officers employed in administrative positions. Like Militia HQ, the
ability o f the 6 th Division HQ to plan and conduct operations or training was limited, and
much o f this responsibility had to be delegated to units. Most o f the units in the 6 th
Division were grouped into three infantry brigades (16th, 17th and 18th), but the brigade
commanders were part-time militia officers, had no HQ staff beyond a part-time brigade-
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major,.and, like their subordinate commanding officers, were lieutenant-colonels;
depending on the personalities involved, this could turn command into an exercise in tact
and diplomacy .40 Under the circumstances, close supervision was impossible, and units
had a substantial amount of discretion and autonomy.
In 1914, there were 235 Militia units scattered across the country. The force was
dominated by the arms, the 163 artillery, cavalry and infantry units. The remaining
seventy-two units were provided by the Canadian Army Medical Corps (CAMC), CASC,
Canadian Engineers (CE), and the Canadian Signal Corps. Although small Militia
detachments of the Canadian Ordnance Corps (COC) and Canadian Army Veterinary
Corps (CAVC) were in the process o f being formed by 1914, most of the technical corps
./

existed in the PF only. Units were predominantly English-speaking and there were only
seventeen infantry battalions, one regiment of garrison artillery, and one field battery
with French as the working language .41
..
A

’
Table 3
Militia Units 31 March 191442

Corps
Artillery
Cavalry
Field Engineer
Infantry
Canadian Signal
Corps
CAMC
CASC
Total

;

Num ber
32
35
22

96
6

23
21

-y,.

235

Apart from these units which actually existed, a further seventy-four units had

been authorized but not organized .43 For the most part, these were technical and
administrative units without the glamour attached to the infantry, cavalry, and artillery,
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an important consideration in a volunteer force with few material benefits. Still, they
were necessary if the Militia ever mobilized and took to the field for more than a few
days.

•

■. ■' ;

Table 4
Authorized Units Not Formed
As of 31 March 1914
Unit Type

Artillery
Ammunition
Columns
Artillery Division
HO
Artillery Brigade
HQ
Engineer Field
Companies
CE Telegraph
Detachments
Wireless
Detachments
CAMC Units
CASC
Companies
Mounted
Company Corps
of Guides
Divisional Train
HQ
Total

Number
Authorized and
Not Formed
14

Number Authorized
and Formed

Total

3

17

6

0

6

9

17

26
/

7
.

’.

13

20
12

4

;

8

5

:

T-T-

■■■ '5

;

21

6

12

21

26
33

6

0

6

6

■ ■■ o

74

' 84

-

;

6

158

:

For practical reasons, some o f these units could not be fully organized in
peacetime. The six CASC Divisional Trains, for example, had a combined establishment
of 1080 vehicles and 1,920 draught horses .44 The cost of purchasing and housing all of
these animals and vehicles would have been prohibitive. A reduced establishment could
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have been adopted for training purposes, but there is no evidence that this was ever
considered.
Most Militia units had a high annual turnover, which affected both administration
and training. There is an abundance of anecdotal evidence, but statistics are available for
only a few units, such as the 7th Fusiliers of London, 22nd Oxford Rifles of Woodstock,
and the 13th Royal Regiment in Hamilton. The 13th seems to have had the highest

■

turnover. Based on a sample of 897 men who j oined between 1899 and 1909, the
Regiment took in 75 recruits annually to replace its losses. However, this is only a partial
sample o f men with surnames between ‘A’ and ‘E ’, and it is probable that, on average,
about 200 recruits joined every year.45 In the 7th Fusiliers, which had six companies and
an establishment of about 400 all ranks, 1,563 recruits were enrolled between 1899 and
1909 - an average o f 142 every year.46 Lastly, in the 22nd Regiment, with a smaller
establishment of only four companies, 301 men joined between 1910 and 1913.47
: The poor retention rate, and the pressure on units to attend camps with as many
men as possible, meant that recruiting was geared to the collective training cycle. In the
7 Fusiliers, there were two distinct intakes every year. The spring draft averaged 108
recruits and was intended to bring the unit up to strength for summer camp, while the fall
draft, which averaged 34 men, served to reinforce the unit for the annual Thanksgiving
sham battle .48 The 13th Regiment had a similar routine, with intakes in spring and
autumn. Both units paraded from March to October only, and the two intakes meant a
proportion of the unit’s NCOs were permanently devoted to recruit training. As well,
recruits tended to join over a two- or three-month period. Those who joined in March, for
example, were reasonably well trained for the summer camp at the end of June, while
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those who were enrolled in May were virtually raw. recruits. Units spent a
disproportionate amount of their time and energy on recruiting and basic training at the
expense o f refresher training for the trained soldiers. More importantly, the large numbers
of inexperienced soldiers effectively prevented the unit from conducting advanced
training in a meaningful way.
- Not all recruits were untrained; In the 13th Regiment, 185 (or 21%) of the 897
men who joined between 1897 and 1909 were re-enlistments (177) or serving militiamen
re-engaging after their three-year term of enlistment (8 ).The high proportion of recruits
with former service suggests that, in the 13th at least, militia service had some attractions,
but whether these were economic, patriotic or militaristic is not clear. This is an isolated
example, however, and further research into other regiments may present a substantially
different picture.
The voluntary nature o f the Militia called for a considerable degree of consensus
on the part o f those involved. Commanding officers might have had substantial
autonomy, but they were not omnipotent and could be forced to resign if there was no
consensus among the officers. Lieutenant-Colonel R.B. Hamilton, for example, was
removed from command of the 2nd Regiment (Queen’s Own Rifles of Canada) in 1896,
largely because he did not enjoy the support of the officers and senior NCOs .49 In 1915,
disagreements arose between Lieutenant-Colonel F.B. Ross and the officers of the 13th
Regiment which led Ross to resign, “believing it to be in the best interests of my old
regiment.” 50 The need for collegiality and consensus within units was generally ;
recognized, and inspection reports frequently commented on this aspect. Comments made
in 1913 by the AAG 2nd Division about the 48th Highlanders were typical: “An excellent
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Esprit de corps prevails throughout all ranks and the Commanding Officer [J.A. Currie;
MP] is well supported by his officers in all matters affecting the welfare of the
Regiment.”51
But there were drawbacks to Militia collegiality and consensus, especially in rural
units, as Lieutenant-Colonel A.W. Currie noted in 1913: the 104th Regiment was “largely
recruited from small towns and rural districts where the officer and private are often
intimately associated in civil life. Too often the officer fears that insisting on things being
done in a regimental way may interfere with his relations with his men in civil life.”52
The same trend was evident in other corps: In Winnipeg, the 79th Cameron Highlanders
was perhaps more fraternal than military. Recruits were charged a five dollar enrolment
fee, while officers, who contributed their pay to Regimental funds, had to pay $12.87 per
soldier to make up the difference between the actual cost of highland uniforms and the
Government grant.

The 79 was an exclusive unit: “The selection process for

candidates closely paralleled that of such men’s organizations as the St. Andrew’s
Society; no outside man was permitted to join companies without the approval of the
members of that particular company. Each name was put before a committee, voted on by
the company, and finally approved by the officers of that company .”54
Most units insisted on financial contributions from members. The 7th Fusiliers
demanded that all ranks, with the exception of bandsmen, contribute their pay to
Regimental Funds. But in compensation, all Fusiliers were able to take advantage of the
Regimental Rifle Association and the Men’s Recreation Room, while the Athletic
Association organized a series of sporting events.55 Regimental institutes such as these
were an important part o f unit life, as Lieutenant-Colonel Campbell emphasized in 1911:
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“the Officers were unanimously of the opinion that a man’s reading and recreation room
was absolutely necessary in order that the Regiment might be able to compete in some
measure at least with the numerous outside attractions.”56,In Kamloops, A Squadron of
the 30th British Columbia Horse, presumably using funds donated by members of the, .
squadron, “rented rooms to establish a mess and club room, and although the men were to
sponsor frequent dances in the drill hall, it was at the mess where the riflemen and their
friends had their ‘smokers’ and more intimate entertainment.” 57 Elsewhere, the 63rd,
Halifax Rifles not only fielded a baseball team, but leased the Reform Club Hall in ■
Dartmouth and fitted up a gymnasium and club room “where the men have been able to
get physical instruction and to spend many a social hour.”

co

;

;
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The recreational side of the Militia not only encouraged retention, but helped
bring in recruits. A study of the 22nd Oxford Rifles in Woodstock, Ontario, suggests that
organized sports broadened the appeal of militia service by allowing workingmen to
participate in activities normally reserved for non-manual workers. With the camaraderie
of the mess and canteen, the 2 2 nd was, in effect, “a male social club, without the dues of
\
a fraternal order.”59 In military terms, militia recreational activities were thought to
benefit the unit directly. The Commanding Officer of the 7 Fusiliers believed that the
low rates of pay at summer camps discouraged recruiting, and that city corps should “be
provided with reading-rooms, gymnasiums and swimming baths for the men in order to
offset the attractions which are being offered them in other directions and, thereby,
preventing them from enlisting .”60

• ¡

Recreational activities and messes were necessary in a chronically under-funded
volunteer organization that paraded from March to October only, and units organized a
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wide variety of activities for the benefit of their members. In Toronto, each unit fielded
an officers’ baseball team which competed for the Toronto Garrison Championship at the
University Avenue Armoury, while in London, the 7th Fusiliers stood down after
Thanksgiving and spent “a few months of relaxation and pleasure in the form of athletic
contests, basketball and baseball, on the floor o f the Armouries, shooting competitions in
the gallery [indoor range], and Company dinners.”61 Rural units without armouries made
a valiant effort to find facilities. In 1912, the 12th York Rangers (a rural unit) was allowed
to use unheated municipal buildings in Toronto, although it was not “easy to enjoy club
and gymnasium privileges in a room without heating or lighting, and the reek of horse
manure from the city stables below .”62 The 12th, however, was better off than other rural
d
/
units, such as the 23 Northern Pioneers which borrowed agricultural halls for drill and
had no recreational facilities to keep the units together.63
Who were these militiamen? Few memoirs exist, and those that do were written
by officers. Archival holdings are scanty and most units appear to have destroyed their
personnel records. Still, enough has survived that some general observations can be
made. Records o f the 22nd Oxford Rifles indicate that 63% of those who joined between
!

1910 and 1913 were British-born, but this may have been an anomaly .64 The
Commanding Officer o f the 7 Fusiliers complained that 75% of the recruits in 19101911 and 60% o f the recruits in 1912 were British-born, but this is at odds with earlier
¿ r

recruiting patterns.

it

In the 7 Fusiliers, 85% o f a sample of 157 men enrolled between

1900 and 1902 had been bom in Canada while 4% were bom in the United States and
11% in Great Britain. The 13th Royal Regiment had a similar pattern, with 79% of those
joining between 1894 and 1909 bom in Canada and 18.5% in Britain. There was also a

c
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small number from Germany and Russia .66 The birthplace o f recruits in the 7th and 13th is
roughly consistent with the 1901 Census which showed that London was 18% Britishborn and Hamilton 19.6% British-born .67

r

The peacetime militia was a youthful force. The age o f recruits in the 13th Royal
Regiment between 1894 and 1909 ranged from thirteen to fifty-eight, with an average of
23.2 years or 22.5, if men over forty-five are discounted. In the 7th Fusiliers, ages ranged
from sixteen to forty-four with an average of 21.4. However, the 157 Fusilier recruits
found inthe 1901 Census present a somewhat different picture. Ages varied from .
fourteen to forty-three, with an average of 20.6. Forty-four of the recruits, or 28%, were
under the minimum enrolment age of eighteen, a trend that continued during the war.68
Regulations specified that recruits had to be between the ages of eighteen and
forty-five, but boys of good character aged fourteen to seventeen (or in special cases
thirteen) could be enrolled as musicians with the consent of their parent or guardian.69
While no doubt some of these youthful soldiers had their parents’ consent, it seems
unlikely that the 7th Fusiliers needed forty-four bandsmen in a three-year period. ;
Why were these boys enrolled? Many of them must have been obviously
underage. Neither the unit history nor surviving unit records refer to a shortage o f
recruits, nor is there any apparent correlation between ages and enrolment dates. The
simplest explanation may lie in the fact that units saw no harm in using enthusiastic
juveniles, either in or out of uniform. At the Thanksgiving maneuvers in 1912, for
example, Colonel Logie’s brigade from Hamilton employed boy scouts as messengers on
the battlefield.

There was also a contradiction between the minimum enrolment age of

eighteen and the school-leaving age, which in Ontario was fourteen .71 Perhaps recruiting
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sergeants (and others) felt that if a boy could legally make his own way in the world at
fourteen, there was no reason why he could not serve with the militia.
Although Canada has been regarded as an intrinsically racist nation, there was a
small number of visible minorities in the militia. ‘B. Devisie’ from India joined the 13th
Royal Regiment in Hamilton in 1905, while the 23rd Alberta Rangers took Privates Chang
Soo and Wong Hung as cooks to summer camp in 1907, and Privates Quan Quam and
Lee Sing-in 1909.

The enrolment of Chinese Canadians did not violate any regulations

or orders. Militia HQ were well aware the men were Chinese, and were only concerned
that they were British subjects who had been properly enrolled .73
Blacks had been part of the Canadian Militia as early as 1793, when a number
enrolled in the Kent County Militia in Ontario. A Coloured Company fought at
Queenston Heights in 1812 and the Coloured Corps of the Incorporated Militia was
stationed along the Ontario border from 1838 to 1850.74 In British Columbia, blacks
formed the Colony’s first militia unit, the Victoria Pioneer Rifle Corps, in 1860.75;
Although it has been argued that this tradition was not continued after Confederation,
blacks served in the militia as individuals, although the names o f only a few are known:
Willard Taylor o f the 7th Fusiliers, Joseph Madden of the 19th Lincoln Regiment, Edward
Murree o f the 29th (Yarmouth) Field Battery and William Robinson of the 56th Grenville
Regiment, to name a few. There was at least one black in the PF: Ernest Smyth, from
Antigua, who enlisted in the RCR at Three Rivers in 1913.76 No doubt there were others
but, given the relatively small number of blacks in Canada at that time, there could n o t .
have been very many.

.
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In the case of the First Nations, much has been made of a supposed national
policy issued in 1914 prohibiting Indians from enlisting in the CEF. However, very little
has been said about First Nations military service before the war, a tradition that extended
back to the American Revolution. The 37th Haldimand Rifles, in particular, had a very
strong Native component and by 1913, six of the eight companies were recruited
exclusively on the Six Nations Reserve .77 In the 26th Middlesex Light Infantry, four
companies were based on Reserves at Moraviantown, Muncey, and Sarnia. Aboriginals
also served in the regimental band .78 Further north, the 32nd Bruce Regiment band was
drawn from the Cape Croker Reserve while C, F and G Companies recruited at the Cape
Croker and Chippewa Hill Reserves .79 Other units recruited native soldiers as well. E
Company o f the 49 Hastings Rifles, based in Tyendinaga, recruited men from
Deseronto, while B Company of the 18th Franc Tireurs de Saguenay recruited from the
Roberval Reserve .80
'

:

First Nations militiamen were regarded as good soldiers who took their training

seriously and showed an aptitude for scouting and night operations. In 1912, the Six
Nations companies o f the 37th were regarded as very good, while the “White Companies
[were] young & not up to the others .” 81 Native soldiers were regarded as a valuable,

k

commodity, and in Québec, the 18 Franc Tireurs de Saguenay were pressured by the
Division Commander to raise at least one company of Montagnais.82
First Nations militiamen were not only soldiers; some were commissioned as
officers in the 37th Haldimand Rifles, such as A.G.E. Smith (joined later by his brother,
'

C.D. Smith), T.P. Galbraith, J. Cronk, and C.D. Brant.

0 *1

Inspecting Officers considered

them to be capable officers, and in 1908 A.G.E. Smith was singled out as a “Clever
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officer with good judgment & tact, even temper and self-reliant.”84 Native soldiers were
also employed as NCOs and specialists. In the 32nd Bruce Regiment, Color-Sergeant
Walter Shawbedees, of the Chippewa Hill Reserve, was responsible for discipline in C
Company, while Corporal Alex Johnston of Cape Croker commanded a section in G
o C

Company.

iL

In the 26 Middlesex Light Infantry, First Nations militiamen were also

employed as NCOs, with most, if not all, of the Stretcher Bearer section being native as
well.86

;.
Training in the peacetime militia depended on a number of factors, of which the'

most important was whether the unit was urban (a city corps) or rural. The former were
concentrated entirely in cities, while the latter were dispersed in small towns, villages,
and townships in companies, batteries, or squadrons of about fifty men each. The 102nd
Rocky Mountain Rangers was based entirely in Kamloops, while the 26th Middlesex
Light Infantry, a rural unit, had isolated companies scattered throughout Middlesex
County in Ontario .87

■ '

City Corps were able to train throughout the year using dedicated armouries. Most
\
of the rural units, however, were usually able to gather only for the annual or bi-annual
twelve-day summer camp. Some of the rural companies had drill halls but for many, this
was a luxury. In Lethbridge, the 25th Independent Field Battery had “no building in which
to house the guns, for these were lean years for the Militia. [Major] Stewart [Battery
Commander] stowed them in the open behind his house, protected only by muzzle and
breech covers. The full establishment of harness he kept in his bam, which thus became
the first artillery armoury on the western prairies .”88 In Central Ontario, the 12th York
Rangers approached the City o f Toronto and was able to scrounge “various odd comers

t
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in its buildings where the captains [company commanders] can store their forty-two rifles
and their stocks of coats, overcoats, canteens, water bottles, and all other the pomp of
glorious war entrusted to their charge .”89
To a great extent, training was dependent on whether or not the unit was
concentrated in an armoury with offices, a drill hall, lecture rooms, and Quartermaster
Stores. General Sir Ian Hamilton noted in 1913 that, ideally, city corps would have access
to drill halls, rifle ranges, miniature ranges,90 and “a site where week-end camps can be
held .”91 Most city armouries offered these facilities but, as Sir John French noted in 1910,
only Ottawa and Halifax had a nearby maneuver area.

Considerable use was therefore
til

made of private property at both the unit and District level. The 30 British Columbia
Horse, for example, built a rifle range on private property near Vernon .93 In the 1st.
Divisional Area, use was made of “leased ground known as the Attrill Farm near
Goderich which lacks area for maneuver notwithstanding the use of 2 farms nearby.”94
Private property was a useful stopgap, but field firing could not be conducted, trenches
could not be dug, and the need to avoid damage inhibited training.
\

Central training camps were limited and not all provinces had adequate training
facilities. In Prince Edward Island, the Charlottetown Camp Commandant wrote in 1914
that the Prince Edward Island Light Horse had made average progress in their training,
although “there is not a sufficiently large training area available .”95 Camps at Barriefield,
Famham, Levis, and Sussex were too small for brigade-level training, while others such
as Carling Heights in London and Sarcee near Calgary were slowly being engulfed by
development.96 In 1914, Major-General F.L. Lessard reported that “The restricted area of
this training ground [Niagara-on-the-Lake] is well known, and has been fully reported

38
upon in the past. Nevertheless, with the kind co-operation of the inhabitants, and the
appointment o f a committee of adjustment, it has been found possible to maneuver and
practice Field Training within an area of some 20 miles from Niagara-on-the-Lake.”97
Large camps with artillery ranges and maneuver areas suitable for brigades existed only
at Camp Sewell, Manitoba, and Petawawa, Ontario, although these were usable only in
the summer.

/•..■■■■■ *

Militia training comprised local Headquarters [LHQ] training (at least for the city
corps) and central summer camps. In general, artillery units were authorized to train for
sixteen days at summer camps and all other corps for twelve days. But there were
exceptions. In 1913, the 3rd, 4th, and 11th Brigades Canadian Field Artillery, the 3rd

‘

Regiment Canadian Garrison Artillery, and the Prince Edward Island Heavy Brigade,
Canadian Garrison Artillery, had to demonstrate their efficiency by training for four days
at local headquarters before going to camp for twelve days. City corps were allowed to
combine LHQ and central training, provided that the total did not exceed sixteen days,
but rural units were given only twelve days in total.98
\
In 1913, for example, the 57 Peterborough Rangers trained for eleven days at
home and five days at camp .99 The eleven days spent at LHQ were not calendar days, but
rather evenings, each of which counted for a half day. The unit training schedule could be
fairly intense, considering that the majority of militiamen worked during the day. In
1914, the 57th recruit course started in Peterborough in April 1914 and ran three nights a
week for twenty-two evenings until mid-June, when the Regiment went to a five-day
camp at Barriefield, near Kingston. Other units followed a similar routine. In 1904, the
41st Brockville Rifles trained for twenty-four evenings before attending summer camp at
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Rockcliffe, while in 1912-13, the 7th Battery in St Catharines recruited in March and
April and trained three evenings a week in preparation for summer camp at the end of
June.100:
Spring training for experienced militiamen was intended to cover as much ground
as possible to gain the maximum benefit from summer camp. In the 1st Division, units
were advised that “In order that the best value may be obtained from the period spent in
Camp, efforts should be made to perform some of the preliminary training at Company,
Squadron or Regimental Headquarters before June .” 101 At Edmonton, Major Griesbach of
the 19 Alberta Dragoons wrote that, in 1914, “Although only twelve days were spent in
camp, we endeavored to bring our troops into camp with a good deal of the syllabus of
training completed before arrival. Therefore, we were able to get on with maneuvers in
the field without loss of time .” 102
But the 19 ¡was fortunate. Rural units were usually unable to train throughout the
year, and during their twelve-day stint at summer camp, recruits had to be trained,
musketry practices fired and collective skills exercised with a one- or two-day sham fight
- a tall order considering that the twelve-day camp did not represent twelve training days.
Sunday was a day o f rest and traveling time (usually two days) was also included. 103 In
the case o f city corps, this effectively reduced their training to three days or less. In 1913,
the Governor General’s Foot Guards arrived at Petawawa on a Saturday, rested Sunday,
trained Monday and Tuesday, and returned to Ottawa on Wednesday. The unit had “no
knowledge of field work and it was quite impossible to [sic] in two training days to carry
out tactical or field training with any profit. It seems questionable whether it is worth
while to pay a unit for five days in order to do two days training .” 104 The combination of
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training in drill and ceremonial at LHQ and five days at camp, in most cases, did not
produce either trained soldiers or trained units.
Training problems were exacerbated not only by the high proportion of new
recruits, but also by a high absentee rate from summer camp. At Barriefield in 1913, only
60% of the militia turned out for camp, although the 3rd Divisional Commander thought
that “excellent progress was made considering that a very large proportion of those
trained, probably 80%, were recruits without previous training .” 105 The problem existed;
elsewhere. In 1912, the 5 Division found only a small proportion of the men attended
more than one camp , 106 while at Halifax, the Inspecting Officer despaired of any progress
in Number 2 (Montreal) Siege Company : “Given each year a large proportion of green
y*
.
men of but little education it is obviously impossible to make any steady and continuous
progress in raising the standard of training to what is required for Siege Artillery.” 107
Absenteeism from summer camp varied between units. The 12th York Rangers
historian thought that the turnout in rural units was higher than in city corps, because “the
night drilling population and the camp going population are two rather distinct
classes.” 108 There was some truth in this statement. At the Nova Scotia camp in 1912, two
city corps (63rd and 6 6 th Regiments) paraded 386 all ranks with 708 absent. The
remaining fourteen units, all rural, had 2,652 with only 369 absent.109 On the other hand,
in 1912, only 65% o f the troops of eight rural units in the 1st Division turned up at
Goderich as opposed to 72% in the five city corps. At Lévis, Québec, the same year, 69%
of the rural militia appeared at camp, while at Barriefield in 1913, rural units were able to
field only 59% o f their establishment. In Military District Number 10, only 283 all ranks
from the newly-organized 52nd Prince Albert Volunteers, a city corps, attended Camp

J
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Sewell out o f an establishment of 540. In Calgary, 2,635 men attended.summer camp
with only 674 absent. It is striking, however, that 466 of the absentees, or 69%, came
from two city corps, the 101st Edmonton Fusiliers and the 103rd Calgary Rifles. 110 The
strength o f Militia units tended to vary widely because o f personalities and local
circumstances, but it appears that city corps, generally considered to be more efficient,
had lower attendance rates at summer camps. Since summer camps were intended.;
primarily for collective training in the field, the general standard within these units could
not have been very high.

: :

The apparent reluctance of city dwellers to attend camps may have been due to
other factors. In 1908, a company of the 28th Perth Regiment refused to attend “on
s

account o f prohibition o f sale of beer. The men of it were mostly Germans.”

111

Camps

were traditionally held at the same time every year and rural units, in particular, had
difficulties in adapting to changes. F Company of the 23rd Northern Pioneers, for
example, could not attend summer camp in 1908 when the date was changed from July to
June, because the men were absent on ‘river drives’ and could not be contacted.
th
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Similarly, the 4 Chasseurs Canadien complained in 1912 that attendance was low
because the camp was held before the lumber drives and seeding had been completed.113
Militia pay was low in comparison to civilian wages. In 1911, Lieutenant-Colonel
A. A. Campbell o f the 7th Fusiliers in London thought “It is unreasonable to expect a
mechanic, or a man, who is earning, at least, from $3 to $4 a day to give up his work and
go out to camp for twelve days and receive the magnificent sum of 50 cents per day” and
“it is unreasonable to expect that you can get first class men to make such a sacrifice even
for the honour and. integrity o f their country .” 114 At Lévis, Québec, in 1913, attendance
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was thought to have dropped because men working as unskilled labourers on construction
projects were paid up to $3 a day. The same year, at Barriefield, the 46th Regiment
paraded with only 224 all ranks, an abysmal turnout attributed by Lieutenant-Colonel *
John Hughes to high wages for all classes of labourers. 115 A year later, the high absentee
rate in the 103rd Calgary Rifles was attributed to an ‘unusual’ speculation in oil stocks. 116
These were not merely peacetime problems; both occupational and economic factors
would hinder recruiting for the CEF.

.

City Corps tended to emphasize the ceremonial aspects of the military in contrast
to less glamorous field work. The 48th Highlanders managed to avoid summer camp
altogether in 1913, and the AAG 2nd Division wrote a damning report on the unit, saying
y'/

that morale was high but the Regiment had not taken the time to conduct field firing:
“There is a tendency to indulge in too much ceremonial which I hope in time will give
place to more Infantry training.”

The tendency is, perhaps, understandable. With no

immediate threat on the horizon, a club-like atmosphere and a desire for public parades to
bolster self-confidence, it was difficult to avoid spending training days on ceremony and
\
drill. The emphasis on drill was reinforced by Sam Hughes, who directed the CGS to
notify Divisions and Districts that “Officers will be judged by their bearing on parade,
and their powers of command and leadership will be tested by the number of different
movements their units can complete, in rapid succession but without confusion, in a
given space o f time .” 118
The last annual Militia training plan issued in February 1914 directed that training
was to be “systematic and progressive; [with] that at local headquarters leading up to the
training in camp, which will be devoted entirely to tactical instruction .” 119 The LHQ *
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schedule for infantry battalions was a mixture o f individual and collective training and
emphasized basic drill from squad to battalion level, with and without arms.
obscure reason, funeral drill was also included.

For some

Units were directed to fire their annual

musketry practice prior to camp, but weapons handling was not included in the schedule.
The field portion o f the prescribed syllabus covered a variety o f topics including,
scouting, minor tactics, entrenching, and construction of obstacles, all of which
demanded a convenient maneuver area, which most city corps did not possess. .. The
actual routine likely varied, but most units probably divided their preparatory evenings at
LHQ between drill and lectures on tactical subjects, leaving the actual practice to summer
camp. Field training was a practical and not a theoretical subject. The more experienced
and receptive militiamen may have benefited from LHQ training, but not the newly
enrolled men from remote areas, such as those at Levis Camp in 1913, who thought the
newly-installed shower baths were latrines.
Other corps were required to complete refresher training as well. In the 1st
Division, CASC companies were expected to parade twice a week for two months to
review both musketry and corps training. The evening parades, which lasted for two
hours, were evenly divided between drill and lectures on judging meat, flour, hay and
oats, ration accounting, care of horses, and fitting of harness. In addition, NCOs were
expected to master wagon drill.124 The scope of training did not cover CASC
responsibilities in the field, but was rather an accurate reflection o f the peacetime role of
the Corps at summer camps.
Specialist training was a problem in general, not only because of the limited
training time available but also because many o f the men attended only one camp. In
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1912, the CGS asked the QMG for recommendations on farrier training because “The
Farrier Sergeants who go to camp have, as a rule, no knowledge of farrier work and I do
not consider it is worth while trying to instruct them in camps, especially if it is realized
that the same men are not likely to turn up year after year.” 125 Farrier training at summer
camp continued however and in Calgary at least, short courses were conducted by
officers from the newly-organized Canadian Army Veterinary Corps.126
There were no cooks’ courses in the Militia, although the CASC ran a Cookery
School for'unit Cook-Sergeants in Kingston .127 For the most part, units had to rely on
men who were cooks in civil life. In general these men did well although some had
difficulties coping with such esoteric subjects as portion control and ration scales. In
./

1908, an Inspecting Officer wrote a scathing report on cooks at the Three Rivers Camp:
“I found the cooks at Three Rivers were very stupid. It is true enough some of them were
old bushmen and seemed to be fairly good cooks, but when asked if they knew whether
or not they had the right quantity... nearly all of them said they ignored the fact, except
the men complained that they had not enough to eat.” 128 However, not all cooks were this
\

bad and the same report noted that kitchens at both Charlottetown and Sussex, New
Brunswick, were exemplary.
Individual training at summer camps was problematic, not only because of the
limited time available but also because the purpose of the camps was to conduct
collective training. Both infantry and cavalry units at Sussex in 1913 devoted fewer than
three of the ten days available to individual training.

Artillery units, in particular, had

difficulties, and in 1912, the Inspector-General commented on the low standard of gun
layers, range-takers, and signalers.130 In London, Colonel W.E. Hodgiris, Commander of
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the 1st Division, thought in 1912 that “At present, most specialists are unfit to carry out
their duties in the field, as the whole time in Camp is devoted to the preliminary training
of their branch, and little, if any, combined work [collective training] is possible.” 131 T o '
remedy this, he recommended that all specialists be trained at local Headquarters during
the winter. In the case o f rural units, specialists were to be recruited in the same location
to facilitate winter training.
Training in the peacetime Militia may have been spotty and focused on
ceremonial, but there were conscientious and imaginative units that were surprisingly
progressive, considering the institutional limitations. The OC 16th Light Horse in
Saskatchewan, Lieutenant-Colonel R.J. Gwynne not only published his own training
manual in 1907, but attempted to enroll women to ride with the unit and provide first-aid
on the battlefield.

t T)

Not surprisingly, nothing came of this proposal for a Canadian
|

version o f the First Aid Nursing Yeomanry.
Other units made a conscious effort to make training as realistic as possible. In
1912, the Composite Cavalry Brigade conducted field firing at Petawawa, “firing 15
rounds per man. Three screens were placed as targets, representing the successive
positions taken up by a rear guard retreating, while the cavalry squadrons acted as the
advanced guard o f a pursuing force .” 134 The same year, the 26th Middlesex Light Infantry
made a point o f marching fifty miles under active service conditions from their
Headquarters in Strathroy to the Divisional camp at Goderich, a feat made possible,
according to one observer, by the fact that the “men, farmers and Indians, were well
hardened.” 135 Western units were also innovative, and in 1912, the 22nd Saskatchewan
Light Horse suggested a two-day exercise in the field under active service conditions.
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The plan was promptly approved by Militia Headquarters, although it was specified that
the General Staff Officer Western Canada should have a hand in planning the scheme.136
The following year, in Nova Scotia, the 63rd Halifax Rifles completed eight days’ training
in 1913 under canvas, a tactical scheme in October, and “a night’s bivouac in July, under,
service conditions.”

•;

: Exercises at LHQ were sometimes regarded as public spectacles; in 1912 1st
Division units had difficulty maneuvering during the Thanksgiving maneuvers because of
i i o

the crowds o f spectators.

However, field training involved considerable ingenuity. An

exercise in 1910 for units in the Toronto and Hamilton area saw the 10th Royal
Grenadiers using a section o f motorcycle scouts, while the unit’s baggage and camp
/
equipment was transported in a borrowed truck at the amazing speed of seven miles per
hour. . In 1912, Thanksgiving maneuvers included a machine-gun detachment from the
2nd Queen’s Own Rifles and wireless detachments from Hamilton.140 .
The 1st Division summer camp in 1914 was both ambitious and imaginative.
Rural units were to train at Goderich for eleven days, at the end of which city corps
v

would gather at Lucan. The two forces would then advance and meet in an encounter ;
battle. Both forces were equally balanced in terms of composition, with infantry, artillery,
cavalry, medical, and service corps elements. The rural units were to use horse transport,
while the city corps would employ trucks provided free o f charge by the Gramm Motor
Truck Company, with the Department of Militia and Defence paying for wages and fuel.
The aim o f the exercise was not only to train units in an all-arms setting, but also to
demonstrate the superiority of motor transport. Unfortunately, the exercise, scheduled to
take place 22-27 August 1914, was overtaken by the outbreak of war and had to be

(
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cancelled. Perhaps, it was just as well. Gramm trucks taken overseas by the First
Contingent in 1914 were later condemned as unserviceable in England.141
The question o f whether or not the Canadian Militia was well trained on the eve
of war is difficult to answer. Training standards, after all, are relative. However, the value
of both local and summer training seems questionable, if basic subjects such as
proficiency with firearms are considered. Inexperienced and poorly trained militiamen
called out in August 1914 had difficulties handling their weapons, sometimes with tragic
consequences: fifteen year-old Private Gordon Betts of the 5th Regiment, Royal
Highlanders o f Canada, was accidentally killed by another sentry at the Soulanges
Canal.142 At Depot Harbour, Ontario, the picquet furnished by a rural unit, the 23rd
:
y
Northern Pioneers, was withdrawn by 21 August 1914, after the Chief Commissioner of
Police in Ottawa received a complaint that a number of shots had been accidentally fired
by sentries and “the lives of the people around the elevator are unsafe.”143
The Militia was also hampered by a chronic shortage of equipment. While the
Departmental budget had leapt from $6,909,211 in fiscal year 1910-11 (the last Liberal
budget) to $10,988,162 in fiscal year 1913-14 (an increase of 59%), three-quarters of this
increase was accounted for by pay, engineer services, and building maintenance.
‘Warlike stores’ more than doubled, from $334,548 to $703,375, but much of this must
have been attributable to the purchase of 18-pounder and 60-pounder guns. The budget
for construction o f some fifty-four armouries, drill halls, and gun sheds increased over
the same period by 143% to $1,611,180 (or 277% if Department of Public Works funds
are included), but this was offset by the creation of new companies, squadrons; and
batteries. The budget for uniforms did not increase in proportion and amounted to
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$916,991 in fiscal year 1913-14. To put this into perspective, the budget allowed for the
purchase o f about 26,000 new and replacement uniforms for the PF, Militia, and reserve
stocks.144 : v
Uniforms may seem like a trivial concern, but they are utilitarian in the field and,
as a visible mark o f modernity, important for morale. Traditionally, the militia wore
scarlet, green, or blue serge uniforms, both in the field and on ceremonial parades. The
drawback to these uniforms became evident in the late nineteenth century, and in 1899
„J

the 2

(Special Service) Battalion of the RCR wore khaki in South Africa. Following the

Boer War, Canada adopted khaki uniforms for general wear by the militia in 1903.145 • ;
The issue o f new uniforms proceeded at a glacial pace, and some units purchased
their own. The 13 Royal Regiment in Hamilton was one of the first, and in 1903
adopted khaki because the scarlet uniforms “smacked too much of the parade ground and
church parades and not enough of the stem realities of war.”146 The 86th Three Rivers
Regiment, on the other hand, expected members to buy their own, although as late as
1913, there were a number of holdouts who still wore the old scarlet.147
Most units were content to wait until uniforms were issued. In Toronto, the 2nd
Queen’s Own Rifles did not receive khaki uniforms until the eve of their departure to
England to participate in the 1910 British Army maneuvers.148 The following year in
Québec, the 11 Argenteuil Rangers attended summer camp wearing the “new khaki
issue”149 The 52nd Prince Albert Volunteers and the newly-organized 60th Rifles of
Canada were issued with khaki in 1913, although the 60th asked that the brass buttons on
the new uniforms be replaced by rifle-regiment black buttons.150 The 48th Highlanders in
Toronto received khaki service dress in June 1914, just in time for summer camp at
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Petawawa, but many units that spring went to camp partially clothed in the traditional
uniforms.151 The 4th Chasseurs Canadiens at Lévis had only one company with khaki
shirts and trousers, while the Prince Edward Island Light Horse at Charlottetown had
squadrons wearing both the old and the new.152 At Niagara-on-the-Lake, the 2nd Field
Company thought “the red serge is very unsuitable for Engineers during training”153
while Major-General Lessard urged “that an early issue be made to those Corps not yet
furnished with this clothing. The red and green clothing is obviously quite unsuitable for
work in camp.” 154 Even after the outbreak of war, old uniforms remained in use. As late
as 1915, the 63rd Regiment manning the Halifax defences still had men dressed in the old
uniforms, while CEF recruits from Cobourg, Ontario, appeared at the Artillery Depot in
Montréal clothed in the peacetime blue serge.
Other uniform items, such as boots, were non-existent in the pre-war militia and
members were expected to provide their own.156 Not surprisingly, many could not afford
to purchase boots that would stand up to use in the field. In 1913, Major-General W.H. ;
Cotton inspected the 38th Dufferin Rifles and found that “About 50% of the boots worn
\
would be useless for active service.” 157 At Camp Aldershot, Nova Scotia, the
Commandant noted in 1914 that “Dress used by troops in camp was satisfactory with the
exception o f boots, none being issued. It is respectively submitted that a regulation boot
be issued, on Repayment, to every NCO and man training, at a nominal price.”158 The
same year, Major-General Lessard noted similar conditions at Niagara-on-the-Lake and
recommended to Militia HQ that boots be issued with repayment provided the soldier
attended at least three summer camps.159
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Unit equipment was also in short supply. CASC companies, amalgamated in 1913
at the summer camp at Sussex, New Brunswick, to form a Division CASC Train, lacked
vehicles and had to rent forty wagons from local farmers. Water carts were non-existent
and sugar barrels were temporarily mounted on some of these wagons as a substitute.160
The composite CASC Train was issued with obsolete military pattern harness from
Divisional stocks; “A number of old pattern head-collars were recently issued to this unit
from 6th Division”, complained Colonel R.W. Rutherford. “These head-collars are very
old, evil-smelling of old manure, and are not fitted to take the bit.”161 CE Telegraph
Detachments also lacked equipment. By 1914, each of the eight authorized detachments
was equipped with two cable wagons for carrying reels of telephone line and one airline
y
wagon for stringing telephone lines in the field, a scale of issue perhaps adequate for
training individuals but inadequate to support collective training.162
Wireless Detachments came into being before‘1914, although there was a
shortage o f equipment and enthusiastic militiamen had to purchase equipment out of their
own pocket.163 A communications demonstration staged by the 2nd Engineer Field
Company of Toronto in November 1910, for example, was possible only because a unit
enthusiast, Lance-Corporal Richardson, provided the wireless sets. By 1914, “Wireless
telegraphy stores became an Ordnance supply”164 but left unsaid was the actual amount
of equipment available. As well, the establishment of a specialist unit or detachment did
not necessarily mean that equipment would follow. In 1913, the QMG did “not approve
issuing Signalling Equipment to newly organized units [60th Regiment] - not until they
have shown proficiency in other work.”165 In the event, the 60th received the equipment,
but only after the CGS intervened.166

51
. Mounted units did not possess horses on a year-round basis and these had to be
rented; during the summer months, this could be difficult unless riding horses were
available from local farmers or commercial stockyards. Horses obtained under these
circumstances were not trained and had to be broken before training could start. In
iL

Alberta, the 25 Field Battery used untrained horses from a local stockyard to pull their
vehicles and equipment to Sarcee from the Calgary train station, but at the end of the day
“only one gun had arrived in camp; the rest of the guns and wagons were strewn all over
Calgary.”

Horses were also rented during the winter for city mounted corps for

equitation training. This could be both expensive and difficult to arrange, depending on
local prices and availability. In Charlottetown, both driving and equitation in the 4th
y
Regiment Garrison Artillery was considered to be weak because o f lack o f training at
local Headquarters.168 In the Okanagan, on the other hand, the 30th British Columbia
Horse did not conduct mounted training during the winter because they were “much ;
superior to the average Eastern cavalry as these men c a n ride and therefore have only to
put their horses into their places and learn their duties.”169
: The most serious deficiencies were in weapons and associated ancillary stores.
The standard weapon after Confederation was the single-shot breech-loading SniderEnfield rifle. In 1896, it was replaced by the Mark I Lee-Enfield magazine rifle, which in
turn was replaced by the Ross rifle in 1905.170 The reasons for the adoption of the Ross
rather than the Lee-Enfield are not clear. Sir Frederick Borden claimed that British
companies either could not or would not establish a factory in Canada to manufacture
Lee-Enfields, but Australia had no difficulty in establishing a Lee-Enfield factory in 1909
at Lithgow, after calling for tenders in Britain and the United States.171

T
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\ The Ross was obsolete when it first appeared because, unlike the British Short
Magazine Lee-Enfield introduced in 1902, chargers could not be used and the magazine
had to be loaded with individual cartridges, as noted in Annex C to Chapter 6.172 The
Ross magazine also held five rounds as opposed to ten with the Lee-Enfield. The small
magazine and lack o f a charger guide made it impossible to fire fifteen rounds a minute,
an important part o f the pre-war British musketry course. Significantly, a recommended
syllabus for musketry submitted in 1913 by the 2nd Division did not include a rapid-fire
practice.

A bewildering variety of Ross rifles was issued, but none were designed for

charger loading until the Ross Mark III was approved in late 1912.174
The adoption of a non-charger loading rifle created other problems. Unlike
y
Canadian ammunition, British ammunition was packaged in chargers. British web

i

equipment, purchased in 1910 to replace the leather Oliver equipment, needed special
cartridge carriers to hold Canadian ammunition that was produced in ten-round paper
packages.175
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The issue of modem small arms to the Militia proceeded unevenly. Lee-Enfield
Mark I rifles were first issued in 1896, but it was eight years before the 59th Stormont and
Glengarry Regiment were able to hand in their forty-year-old Sniders, while the 55th
Megantic Light Infantry had to wait until 1906 before they received their Lee-Enfields.176
In the meantime, the Ross was being issued to other Militia units as early as 1905.
Procurement o f all marks of the Ross was painfully slow, and by 1914 the Militia
was armed with a variety of weapons. The lucky units, such as the 56th Grenville
Regiment with Lee-Enfields and the 63rd Halifax Rifles with the Ross Mark II, had only
one type o f rifle to contend with.177 Others were less fortunate. The 91st Canadian
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Highlanders in Hamilton had 436 Lee-Enfields and 83 Ross Mark II rifles, made obsolete
by the introduction of the Mark III in 1913. Similarly, the 48th Highlanders had 200 LeeEnfields and 230 Ross rifles Mark'll. Astonishingly, in Québec, the 65th Carabiniers
)

Mont-Royal were equipped with 373 Lee-Enfields, 375 Ross rifles Mark II (short), and
55 modem Ross rifles Mark III.178

'• i

The profusion o f weapons created training problems and the CGS directed in
April 1914 that musketry training had to be carried out with the Ross rifle and special :
issues should be made to units equipped with the Lee-Enfield.179 However, the supply of
Ross rifles was inadequate, and newly-organized militia units arriving at Camp Sewell in
1914 had to be equipped with the Lee-Enfield.180 The CEF in Canada had much the same
y
problems and at least one unit, the 43rd Battalion, arrived in England in 1915 carrying the
Ross Mark II which could not be loaded with chargers.181
Artillery units were, perhaps, more fortunate than the infantry. The 12-pounder
field gun, which had been the standard gun in the artillery during the Boer War, had a
number o f disadvantages. With no recoil mechanism, the gun had to.be repositioned for
each shot, despite the use o f a recoil spade. Older models o f the 12-pounder had a ‘three
motion’ breech mechanism, although the few Mark IV 12-pounders purchased in 1902
had a ‘single motion’ breech. The biggest drawback, however, was the lack of a sighting
mechanism for indirect fire, which meant the target had to be visible from the gun
position before it could be engaged. The 18-pounder, introduced in 1907 to replace the
12-pounder, was an infinitely superior weapon with hydraulic recoil mechanism, dial
sights, and an indirect fire capability.182 A total o f 136 guns were purchased,.but
deliveries from England were slow and as late as November 1913, only 88 had been
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delivered.

1S I

With the introduction of the new gun, the old 12-pounders were not :

disposed of, but were placed into storage to be issued later to the CEF.
Ancillary equipment was also in short supply. At the heavy artillery camp in
Halifax in 1913, Lieutenant-Colonel H.C. Thacker noted that the 2nd Montréal Siege
Company was “Armed with two B[reech] L[oading] 6” Mk 1* Howitzers which are not
yet fully equipped.” The company also arrived in Halifax without its technical equipment,
“as all was available locally, but I am informed by the CO that Dial Sights, Observation
of Fire Instruments and other technical equipment [are] not yet folly issued.”184 The same
problem existed in the field artillery, and in 1912 a number of batteries arrived at
Petawawa lacking equipment such as dial sights and aiming posts.185 In some cases, guns
were available but were issued only for summer camp. In 1914, the Aldershot Camp
Commandant recommended “That the guns and equipment of the 11th Brigade, CFA, be
sent to their local Headquarters” and that the brigade should be sent to Camp Petawawa
where the guns could be fired.186
The absence o f guns and ancillary equipment at local Headquarters had an
adverse effect on training. General Sir Ian Hamilton noted in 1913 that, although he was
surprised by the standards attained by artillery units, “in many batteries the detachments
are not properly grounded in elementary gun drill” and went on to suggest that all gun
crews receive instruction in basic drills at home armouries to allow them to receive the
maximum benefit from summer camp.187
In 1914, the militia was of uneven quality in terms of equipment and training.
Many o f its characteristics - decentralization, collegiality, regimental identity, loyalty to
members, pomp and circumstance, initiative and dedication - were to be carried over to

the CEF. The basic organization was sound, but how well Canada tapped this potential
depended very much on war-time manpower policies.
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Chapter 2
Manpower and the Canadian Expeditionary Force

The First’World War was Canada’s first modem war in the sense that the whole
of society was involved, not just the armed forces. Inevitably there were competing
demands for manpower from agriculture, industry, and, above all, the military. The
problem was not unique to Canada. Manpower allocation was perhaps the most difficult
economic problem faced by combatant states, all of which found it difficult to strike the
right balance between the needs of the armed forces and the domestic production of food
and material.1
Although most nations were eventually able to impose some measure of control
on manpower, the Canadian government, from first to last, was never able to come to
grips with the need to control manpower resources and instead relied on gradualism,
voluntarism, and expediency. Competing demands of agriculture, industry and the CEF
were never resolved, the growth of the CEF continued right up to the end of the war, and
thousands o f Canadians were diverted to British industry or other armies with the
blessing of the Canadian government. The effect of this was to create a military
manpower crisis in 1917 with profound and long-lasting effects on the nation. The crisis,
however, could have been averted had the nation adopted a coherent manpower policy
earlyon.

:

■
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To be fair, the need for a national manpower policy was not apparent in 19141915. The war was expected to last a few months only and, with an abundant supply of
volunteers for the CEF, there was no apparent need for manpower controls. Instead,
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government manpower policies were concerned with offsetting the effects of the 19131914 recession. These were particularly severe in western Canada, where the construction
industry had collapsed and both the Grand Trunk Pacific and Canadian Northern
Railways had ceased laying track, idling thousands of company workers and contract

'

labourers.2 The outbreak of war and the initial economic uncertainty aggravated this
problem and large employers, such as Massey-Harris, laid off thousands of workers in
Toronto and Brantford because European markets were effectively closed. The effect on
the CEF was immediate, and many of those who volunteered for the 1st and 2nd Divisions
in 1914 did so because they were unemployed.4;
Men did not enlist simply because they were jobless, but concerns with
s'

unemployment were pervasive. In London, Lieutenant-Colonel L.W. Shannon, AAG 1st
Division, asked for instructions in dealing with “cases of hardship caused by volunteers
for the first Expeditionary Force giving up their permanent employment and not being
accepted. Many of these men find a difficulty at this time of year in securing
employment.”5 In reply, Militia HQ simply reminded Shannon that another overseas
division had just been authorized arid presumably would provide jobs for the unemployed
volunteers.6 A similar attitude prevailed in Winnipeg, where recruiting was viewed as a
khaki relief project, and militia units recruiting for the CEF were instructed that “the first
choice is to be made out of all unemployed members of their corps or other unemployed
who present themselves for enlistment. The above are to be enlisted prior to any men who
already hold positions or who are in good circumstances.” In Toronto, the 13 (Militia)
Brigade CFA assembled a full-strength battery in anticipation of mobilization and
requested permission to keep the men in the University Avenue Armoury because “The
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men being out of work are apt to drift off.”8 No detailed statistics are available, but one
historian has estimated that perhaps 20% o f all recruits came from the long-term
unemployed.9
Despite the general surplus of manpower in the early stages of the war, there were
local shortages o f specific trades. CASC recruiting was suspended 18 August 1914, but it
took until 3 September to enlist almost 500 Mechanical Transport (MT) drivers, cleaners,
and artificers, and in the Maritimes, advertising funds had to be allocated to attract

J

sufficient drivers.10 Even so, the 1st Division was short thirty farriers, saddlers, and;
shoeing-smiths and in January 1915, special authority.had to be sought from the War '
Office to recruit these specialists in Britain.11 At about the same time, the 1st Canadian
Field Butchery was organized at Larkhill and had to call on the 9th and 12th Canadian
Infantry Battalions for men who had been butchers in civil life.
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In Canada, men were

enlisted in the 2nd Divisional Supply Train as MT drivers, although some had never
driven before.

The shortage persisted and in AprilT915, the 4 Brigade CFA in

Toronto, which had no difficulty finding would-be gunners, had to appeal to Militia HQ
for advertising funds to attract shoeing-smiths.14
The economic downturn persisted for much of 1915, particularly in areas with
large numbers o f transient workers. In Vancouver, thousands of unemployed workers,
mostly immigrants, rioted in April 1915, when city officials decided to stop providing
relief to non-residents.15 But by the end of the year, employment had been restored to
normal peacetime levels, because of increasing employment in munitions plants,
enlistments, and a sharp reduction in immigration.16 But there was still considerable slack
in the labour force, and in Alberta, the 63rd Battalion reported in July 1915 that although
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recruiting had ceased, the unit was still “over-run with applications for enlistment.” In
Medicine Hat, there were 250 applicants for 100 positions and the AG at Militia HQ
directed that these men be enlisted and, if necessary, another battalion would be
authorized for MD 13.18
The general slack that persisted for much of 1915 meant there were skilled
workers who were not gainfully employed, and over 3,000 Canadians were hired to work
in Britain and Russia. The largest group was the Canadian Munition Workers Unit, hired
on behalf of British factories in the spring of 1915 by two Britons, G.N. Barnes, MP and
William Windham of the Board of Trade; A total of .1,699 workers were hired, mainly
machinists or members o f allied trades. Hiring was done directly by Barnes and
y
Windham, or their agents, but the Canadian Department of Labour paid separation
allowances to the workers’ families in Canada, retained copies of the contracts, and
provided offices and clerical staff for the recruiters. The Canadian Munition Workers
Unit was not regarded as a burden, but as an opportunity for employment.19 Additional
workers followed and in January 1917, Prime Minister Borden announced that at least
3,000 munitions workers had been sent overseas.20 Although men sent overseas were
British workers, the Canadian government retained a vested interest and in 1917 made
arrangements for some of those drafted under the British M
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to be

transferred to the CEF.21
; In addition to the Canadian Munition Workers Unit, at least 600 track layers,
blacksmiths, locomotive drivers, fitters, and bridge carpenters were hired in SeptemberOctober 1915 by the British firm of Pauling and Company, to help build the Murman
Railway in northern Russia.22 The enterprise was civilian in nature, but had been
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approved by Andrew Bonar Law, Secretary of State for the Colonies, who encouraged
the Canadian government to cooperate.23 The first group of 500 sailed from New York on
13 October 1915, and the remainder followed shortly thereafter. Difficulties arose in
Russia, however, because of poor equipment, harsh conditions and injudicious decisions
by Russian authorities and in March 1916, the group, considered by the Russians as
incompetent troublemakers, returned to Canada.24
Employment picked up considerably in 1916 and in November, labour bureaus
reported that only 45% of all unskilled labour positions had been filled, perhaps because
the labour force had been further diminished by 176,919 enlistments.25 War contracts
continued to flow and the Dominion Bureau of Statistics described 1916 as “a year of
y

almost abnormal activity.”26 Skilled labour was increasingly hard to come by and in
Brantford, “it was found very difficult to secure men for war work, so difficult that wages
up to $8 and $10 a day were paid to machinists working on munitions.” The problem
existed elsewhere and in August 1916, there were general complaints from manufacturers
in Ontario that orders could not be filled because o f the lack o f skilled workers.28 Interned
aliens were released in April 1916 to reinforce the labour force and the A
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was suspended to allow employers to import skilled workers from the United States.
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The relief was short-lived, however; relatively few aliens had been interned in the first
place and the supply o f American labour dried up in April 1917 when the United States
entered the war.30
But despite the increasing shortages o f skilled industrial workers, the Canadian
government made no real effort to regulate manpower or to redirect workers from nonessential industries, although the Department o f Militia and Defence attempted to restrict
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the enrolment o f skilled workers. The reasons for the Department’s interest in manpower
are not clear, but emerged fairly early in August 1915, when Militia HQ directed that
expert mechanics could be enlisted only if their expertise was required for technical
positions. The policy, which was limited in scope, was subsequently expanded and in
November 1915, the AG forwarded lists of munitions firms to all Districts and Divisions,
with instructions to “keep in touch with these firms with a view to ascertaining whether
they are in need of skilled labour, in order that all such men offering their services will
not be enlisted until it is ascertained whether they can be of use to these manufacturers.”

1

To some extent, this had the effect of turning recruiting offices into employment bureaus
and Recruiting Officers in Toronto, Hamilton, and St Catharines were directed to “take
all possible steps for mechanics offering at your Depot to be placed with the above firms.
They are only to be enlisted if unable to be so placed.”

.

Although the A G ’s instructions clearly applied only to potential recruits,
employers were under the impression the CEF was a manpower pool that could be tapped
as needed. In Toronto, for example, the District AAG was deluged with letters from
factories looking for skilled workers. Headquarters 2nd Division was sympathetic to these
requests, but at the same time was reluctant to lose soldiers. Very few seem to have been
released at the request of their former employers, although a handful of soldiers were
given furlough to return to their workbenches.33 Recruiting officers and commanding
officers were understandably reluctant to cooperate and in January, 1916, the Waterous
Engine Works Company Limited of Brantford complained that units were refusing to
release men: “We propose taking this up with the local corps but at the same time our
previous efforts along these lines have not been crowned with any success. The Officers :
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are anxious to get men and they have no inclination, and seem to have no power, to allot'
the men offering for enlistment, as is indicated in your circular letter of November 29th
they should do.”34 Commanding Officers elsewhere were as obstreperous as those in
Brantford and in June 1916, a battalion commander in Toronto told the head of a
munitions plant that a skilled tool-maker would be released only if the plant provided two
v

recruits to take the m an’s place.

If

: ;

,

Further restrictions followed and Recruiting Officers were forbidden to enlist
officers, engineers, and wireless operators of the merchant navy, as well as sailors from
the Royal Navy. In 1916, cable operators could not be enlisted without the consent of
Militia HQ, steel and coal employees in Cape Breton could not be recruited without
y”
■*
permission from District HQ, recruiting was prohibited in the coal, smelter, and coking
areas of southern British Columbia, and in 1917, it was ruled that telegraph operators
could not join without the consent of their employers.36 It was not only manufacturers
who were concerned with the shortage of skilled workers. In 1918, the GOC MD 11 in
British Columbia recommended that recruiting for the Canadian Forestry Corps and
\
Railway Construction Corps be stopped because of the importance of these industries to
the province.
Even with the full co-operation of units, the military’s efforts to coordinate
manpower could have not succeeded, simply because there were no legislative or
regulatory means to force ex-soldiers to return to their former jobs. The AAG 2nd
Division remarked in A pril! 916, “This is a free country and a man cannot be compelled
to work on Munitions if he does not so desire.”38 The AAG’s remarks were echoed by
others, such as Private O ’Brien in Kingston, who defied his commanding officer and said
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that if He were released at the request of the Canadian Locomotive Works, he would work
elsewhere.39 Other soldiers were equally intransigent and threatened to join units
elsewhere under assumed names, while others were careful not to declare their true
occupation on enrolment. In some cases, men who had been identified as skilled workers
by various companies claimed to have been common labourers, thus leaving the military
in the unenviable position of adjudicating conflicting claims. In the face of such
resistance, the policy was clearly unworkable, a fact recognized in May 1916, when
Headquarters MD 2 advised the 129th Battalion that men who refused to return to their :
former jobs would not be discharged.40
Apart from the soldiers’ reluctance to cooperate, departmental efforts were
y
doomed to failure because there was no comprehensive inventory of essential jobs. In
effect, all jobs had the same priority and, had this been followed to its logical conclusion,
few workers in Canada would have been eligible for the CEF. The problem was neatly
summarized by the OC 129th Battalion in December 1915, when he complained that “The
farmers argue that they are being asked by the Minister of Agriculture to produce,
produce, produce, and that if they enlist they cannot produce. The manufacturers, whether
engaged in munition work or not, complain every time an employee talks about enlisting.
This leaves only the clerks in the stores and labourers available.”41
The agricultural sector was probably worse off with workers moving to urban
centres from 1915 onwards to take advantage of steady jobs with higher wages. In Brant
County, for example, it was estimated that the needs of industry and the CEF had left
only one experienced farm worker for every 250 acres.42 Moreover, farming was also
seasonal and considerable numbers of labourers were required for short periods to assist
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with seeding and harvesting. Estimates vary, but across the country it was thought that
about 42,000 seasonal workers were needed in the spring and 54,500 in the fall.43 Under
ordinary circumstances, there was an ample supply of workers from eastern Canada, but
by 1916-1917, many had joined the CEF or found more lucrative jobs in the growing
munitions industry.44 The shortage of workers affected recruiting and in Alberta, the
GOC MD 13 commented in January 1917 that farmers were actively discouraging men
from joining the CEF.45
The shortage o f seasonal labour persisted throughout the war and by 1917, radical
solutions were being adopted. In Ontario, the provincial government set up employment
bureaus to find 3,530 agricultural workers, 8,000 high school students were given
s'

standing, provided they performed three months’ farm work, and the Provincial Women’s
Farm Department recruited 1,126 young women to work as berry pickers.46 To some '
degree the CEF. was able to relieve seasonal shortages by sending soldiers on seeding and
harvesting furlough as early as 1915.47 The policy remained in effect throughout the war,
but as men were drafted overseas, the number available for farm work declined
\
dramatically. An attempt was made in 1917 to limit harvest leave to 10% of unit strength
in addition to farmers’ sons, but a large number of men continued to be lost to the CEF
every spring and fall.18 Even in 1918 when there was an urgent need for reinforcements
overseas, 12,744 draftees were given thirty-day furloughs, while ex-farm workers were
allowed an additional two weeks.49
The policy that had the most effect on manning in the CEF was the M
S e r v ic e A c t

[MSA], introduced in the House of Commons in June 1917 by Prime

Minister Borden. Although the primary purpose of the MSA was to secure

j
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reinforcements for the CEF, the Act also gave lip service to national manpower needs. As
Borden explained in the House of Commons, new legislation was needed because the
existing M

ilitia

A c t

provided only for balloting, which did not allow for “an intelligent

consideration of the country’s needs and conditions.”50 The MSA was needed, therefore,
to allow men to be called up selectively, with provisions to exempt essential workers. The
preamble emphasized the dual purpose of the MSA: “by reason o f the large number of
men who have already left agricultural and industrial pursuits in Canada to join such
Expeditionary Force as volunteers, and of the necessity of sustaining under such
conditions the productivity of the Dominion, it is expedient to secure the men still
required, not by ballot as provided in the M

ilitia A c t,

but by selective draft.”51 The dual
i

y

purpose of the MSA was further emphasized by the Department o f Justice manual that
stressed the need for CEF reinforcements, but added that local tribunals were required to
consider t>oth the civil and military requirements of the nation in granting exemptions to
military service. However, the manual continued, the needs of the nation were complex,
circumstances varied widely depending on local and individual situations, and no detailed
guidance could be offered. Instead, local tribunals should consider the importance of the
production o f food, coal, steel, metal, wood, and other manufactured articles as well as
the need for the continued operation of railways, steamships, telegraphs, telephones,
light, heat, and power plants, and financial institutions. All were equally important and
local tribunals were expected to exercise common sense, “having regard to local
conditions and to their general knowledge of the domestic and world situation from the
point of view o f production, manufacturing and commerce.”
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In effect, the bulk of the labour force enjoyed some degree of immunity from
conscription, as borne out by a sample of 469 MSA infantrymen. Only 6% (28 men) were
industrial or munitions workers while 61% (286 men) were either farmers or labourers.
Even allowing for the scale of agriculture in Canada at this time, the difference is
striking. However, not only individuals but employers as well were allowed to submit
requests for exemption, a process that favored wage-earners but not the self-employed:
There may have been some intent to use the MSA as a means of rational allocation of ' ■
manpower, but it does not appear that this was translated into practice.

:

However, despite its shortcomings as a means of controlling national manpower
resources, the MSA made a considerable difference to manning within the CEF. The
y
most obvious difference was that under the volunteer system, men were free to apply to
whichever unit took their fancy. By 1917; this invariably meant almost any corps but the
infantry, which had the highest casualty rate, a fact that the majority of applicants
realized. But the MSA, for the first time in the war, made it possible to allocate recruits
where they were needed, not where they wished to serve. Men who were medically unfit
for the infantry were no longer rejected outright, but directed to less demanding positions
where their medical category was acceptable.
: The MSA, together with the adoption of standard medical categories in 1917 and
the transfer o f all men on full-time service to the CEF in 1918, made it possible to comb
out the fit men in Canada and replace them with those who could not be sent overseas.54
In April 1918, the Canadian Garrison Regiment (CGR) with eleven battalions was
formed as part o f the CEF, to guard vital points and internment camps. Militiamen on
full-time duty were invited to transfer to the CGR; those who declined were released, and
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in a few cases simultaneously drafted under the MSA.55 The CGR contained a large
number of unfit men; a study o f 134 members who died between 1918 and 1922 shows
67 MSA draftees, 38 o f whom were unfit, and 26 volunteers, only one of whom was fit to
go overseas.56
Unlike militiamen, members of the CGR were also members of the CEF and
could be sent overseas if their medical category was raised. They could also be redirected
to other areas, regardless of whether or not they consented. In July 1918, MD 10 and MD
12 provided 146 troops from the local CGR to guard prisoners of war working on Nova
Scotia railways, while MD 10 provided an additional company to augment the Halifax
Garrison.57 Apart from the number of reinforcements provided by the MSA, the act made
/

the intelligent and rational allocation of manpower possible within the CEF.
At the end o f 1917, the newly returned Union Government was aware o f the need
to address the problem of “more fully and intelligently utilizing Canada’s man and
woman power in the prosecution of the war.”58 Government action was prompt, and on
16 January 1918a conference was convened with representatives from provincial

:

governments, industry, and unions to consider, “ways and means of quick and effective
mobilization of Canada’s man-power.”59 Unfortunately, there was no unanimity and the
results of the conference were inconclusive. T.H. Auld, Deputy Minister of Agriculture
for Saskatchewan, encouraged the use of tractors to reduce the need for labourers while a
, special committee recommended that conscripts rejected as medically unfit should be
drafted to farms. It was also felt that federal labour exchanges should be established and a
registration scheme put in place to determine the availability of labour. The Railway War
Board asked that members o f the Chinese Labour Corps, in transit from Victoria to
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Halifax for service in France, be detained for essential track laying, while farmers from
Ontario and British Columbia wanted to make use of indentured Chinese workers.60
However, most of these proposals were rejected by union representatives who opposed
the conscription of labour and the use of Chinese workers, although they grudgingly
agreed to national registration and coordination of the labour supply.61
Faced with this intransigence, the government backed off and no attempt was
made to emulate the British Ministry of National Service, set up in the fall of 1917 with
the power to allocate manpower for both military and civilian purposes.62 A sub
committee o f Cabinet was formed in January 1918 to deal with registration of labour and
classification of industries, but the emphasis was placed on cooperation and not
compulsion.63 A Dominion-Provincial Employment Service was set up, but this was
intended only to facilitate the exchange of information between the provinces and the
federal government. Sixly-six employment offices were organized by the end of the year,
but the Employment Service had an annual budget of only $50,000, which suggests the
priority assigned by the Union Government.64 An Order-in-Council (the Anti-Loafing
Law) was passed in April 1918, making it an offence not to be gainfully employed or
actively seeking employment, and a few months later, in June, some five million men and
women were registered. Names and addresses were passed to employers and local
authorities, but no attempt was made to make use o f the information to redirect labour,
effectively leaving the MSA as the only control over national manpower.65
Whether or not Canada was in a position to control manpower is very much a
moot point since the government was in no position to control the war-time economy.
Canada’s ambiguous status as a Dominion meant that the British government felt free to

!
c

77
place orders in Canada without reference to the Canadian Government. As early as 1914,
orders were placed by the War Office in Canada and the United States for 1,300,000
uniforms and 900,000 greatcoats with no regard for the needs of the CEF.66 The contracts
were viewed as beneficial, and the

T o r o n to
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felt that “as a result of war contracts

which will be placed in Canada from the other side of the Atlantic many important
industries throughout the Dominion will be in a position to keep their men in steady
employment during the coming winter.”67 In other cases, however, British contracts were
an obvious intrusion. In 1914, without consulting the Canadian Government, the
Admiralty ordered ten H-class submarines from Canadian Vickers of Montréal. American
supervisors and technicians were provided by Bethlehem Steel and local militia units
/

furnished a security detail. Informed of this in January 1915, Prime Minister Sir Robert
Borden was livid, especially when he found out that repairs to the Canadian icebreaker
J .D .H a z e n

had to be suspended because the shipyard was fully occupied with the ;

submarines.68
The largest commitment of Canadian manpower under British control was the •
Imperial Munitions Board [IMB], established in November 1915 to coordinate the
purchase of munitions for the British Government. Under the direction of Sir Joseph
Flavelle, a Toronto businessman, the IMB flourished and by 1918 almost 700 Canadian
plants with 300,000 workers were churning out supplies, not only for the British Ministry
of Munitions but also for the United States Ordnance Department. The IMB did not
answer to the Canadian Government, but to the Ministry of Munitions.69 The relationship
seems to have been regarded with equanimity by the Canadian government and by 1918,
military work parties were being provided to IMB plants in MD 2, MD 3, and MD 6.
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However, the establishment of the IMB meant that “the most significant economic
activity generated in Canada by the Great War was not supervised by the Government of
Canada.” 71

Apart from men diverted to industry, substantial numbers of potential recruits
were lost to the CEF because they were reservists or had been recruited by other nations
in Canada. The total number o f potential recruits lost to the CEF is uncertain but was
probably in excess of 60,000 men, or substantially more than the number of MSA
conscripts posted to the Canadian Corps in 1918. However, not all of these men could
have been diverted to the CEF. It would have been difficult if not impossible, for
s'

example, to have prevented the 21,000 British and Allied reservists in Canada from
returning to their home countries. To do so would have required a rigid manpower policy
from the beginning and a degree o f independence in foreign affairs that Canada did not
enjoy. However, there were substantial numbers of men recruited in Canada by other
nations, representing a genuine loss to the CEF. v •: r
The most prominent group were British Army reservists who had permission to
reside in Canada during their five-year stint in the Army Reserve .72 At the outbreak of
war in 1914, there were 3,294 of these men living in Canada, of whom 149 were
members of the PF .73 The latter, all of whom were experienced soldiers, were clearly
important to the CEF as it mobilized, a fact eventually recognized by the War Office,
which ruled in March 1915 that “all imperial reservists now serving in the Canadian
Permanent Force shall be allowed to continue in such employment.”74 But the situation
was different for Reservists who were not members of the PF, and the British Army
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Council ruled that “Army Reservists reported to be in Canada should not be used in the
formation o f Canadian units which may be placed at the disposal of the War Officé. They
should be sent home as soon as possible .”75 Notwithstanding this decision, at least 150
reservists joined the CEF and in December 1914, the War Office made an unsuccessful
attempt to recall medically fit reservists serving with the First Contingent.76
British authorities coordinated the repatriation of reservists using the peacetime
militia camp at Lévis, presumably staffed by the PF, as a transit camp. By the end of
August 1914, more than 2,000 men had been returned to England with another 106
accompanying the First Contingent at the end of September.

The final number returned

is not certain, but in early 1917, the Minister of Militia and Defence told the House of
• •- ■
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Commons that 2,779 reservists had been returned to Britain.

■

.

.
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Not all reservists domiciled in Canada were British. By January 1917,18,100
French, Russian, Belgian, and Italian citizens living in Canada had been returned to their
homelands. As with the British reservists, the Canadian Government assisted where
possible, going so far as to commission two French doctors as militia officers in
November 1916 for the express purpose of examining French reservists before their
departure for France.

Not all reservists returned to France and at least twenty-nine,

including Raymond Brutinel who later became head of the Canadian Machine Gun
Corps, joined the 1st Division. One, Private Klein, who had joined the 14th Battalion, was
served with his call-up papers by the French Consul in Montréal. Concerns were
expressed about the legal status of these men, some of whom were naturalized British
subjects, but after some discussion, the British Ambassador in Paris reported that French
authorities would not press for the return of their reservists if the men concerned were
;
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serving with the CEF .80 An estimated 5,000 Russian reservists living in Canada were also
returned under arrangements made by the Russian Consul General in Montréal, although
the trip could not have been easy. The Russian Government also took the position that
Russian subjects were liable for military service regardless of their résidence but this was
resisted by both the CEF and the men concerned. In June 1915, therefore, the Russian
Government relented, and all Russian subjects domiciled in Canada, including reservists,
were allowed to join the CEF .81

'

.

Table 5
Reservists Called Up in Canada
' '
C ountry
Great Britain
Russia
France
Belgium
Italy
Total

Reservists
2,779
5,000
5,000
600
7,500
20,879

Remarks
/

Estimate
Estimate
Estimate
Estimate

Apart from reservists, other Canadians also served with British forces, although
the number is far from certain. In June 1919, E.H. Scammell, Assistant Deputy Minister
for the Department of Soldiers’ Civil Re-establishment, estimated that about 50,300
Canadians served with the British. On the other hand, in January 1942, Edwin Pye of the
Historical Section claimed a total of 17,498.83 Neither Scammell nor Pye outlined their
methodology or sources. However, the Veterans Affairs Canada data-base lists 1,794
Canadians who died while serving with the British Army.84 Assuming the British death
rate to have been roughly the same as the Canadian death rate (9.6%), then approximately
18,500 Canadians served with the British Army .85 Pye’s estimate appears to exclude
members of the Royal Navy and Royal Air Force as well as civilian physicians and
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nurses while if these groups are deducted from Scammell’s estimate, then the total of
those who served with British forces can be reduced to 27,500.
However, Scammell’s figures include an estimated 2,000 men who made their
own way to Britain to enlist and 12,000 who left the CEF in England to join the British
forces. Neither figure can be confirmed, but there is no doubt that many Canadians

;■

managed to join the British Army one way or another. There were a small number of
expatriate Britons who joined the CEF because they could not afford the passage home,
such as Alwyn Bramley-Moore from the 11th Canadian Infantry Battalion who joined the
23rd (Sportsmen’s) Battalion of the Royal Fusiliers on arrival in England, and Charles de
Fallot of the 12th Canadian Infantry Battalion who joined the 6 th Battalion Loyal North
Lancashire Regiment and was killed at Gallipoli in July 1915.

Others, such as

Lieutenant V. Michie of the 5th Canadian Infantry Battalion and Captain G.M. Brew of
the 1st Regiment CGA, made their own way back to England to rejoin their old
regiments.87
The largest group of Canadians serving with the British Forces were those in the
V

Royal Flying Corps [RFC], the Royal Naval Air Service [RNAS] and (after 1 April
1918), the Royal Air Force [RAF]. Some were seconded from the CEF, but most were
enlisted in Canada. The total is far from certain. Some years ago, the Directorate of
History compiled a data-base listing 13,160 aircrew, including 1,736 known nonCanadians, primarily Americans, who were enlisted and trained in Canada. Together with
7,453 men enlisted in Canada as mechanics for the RFC/RAF training scheme, the total is
20,613. On the other hand, a panel in the Memorial Chamber of the Parliament Buildings
in Ottawa claims that 22,812 men served with British flying services. An exact total,
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therefore, is impossible to determine, but it would be reasonable to assume that about
22,000 Canadian officers and men served with the RFC, RNAS or RAF .88
Recruiting of personnel for the RFC and RAF was done with the agreement of the
Canadian government. No quota was imposed, but by October 1918, the drain on the
CEF was such that restrictions had to be placed on transfers to the RAF .89 RFC recruiting
in Canada was initially coordinated by Lieutenant-Colonel E.A. Stanton, the GovernorGeneral’s private secretary, with the assistance of Militia Headquarters, and successful
applicants were sent to England for training. In the case o f the RNAS, potential pilots
were recruited by Naval Service Headquarters in Ottawa and then trained at Curtiss
Aeroplanes and Motors Limited of Toronto before proceeding overseas. A special
holding company of the Royal Navy Canadian Volunteer Reserve was established at
Halifax for potential naval aviators waiting for training .90
In December 1916, the War Office decided, without consulting the Canadian
government, to establish a large RFC training organization in Canada. In the event, the
Canadian Government had no objections and for the remainder o f the war, the
Department o f Militia and Defence provided administrative and logistical support for
RFC Canada, as the new organization became known. The IMB constructed airfields at
Camp Borden, Rathbun, Tyendinaga, Armour Heights, and Leaside with ground training
facilities at the University of Toronto. Two of these facilities (Camp Borden and
Tyendinaga) were established militia training areas, while the remainder were leased or
donated to the Department of Militia and Defence for use by RFC Canada .91 The
manpower cost o f supporting not only RFC Canada, but British flying services in general,
was significant. Although the Canadian contribution directly aided the Empire war effort,
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the unchecked diversion o f manpower was a direct loss to the CEF and precluded any
control over national manpower resources.
. ;

Canadians served with a wide variety of other British units including a number

that catered to men from the Dominions: 1st and 2nd King Edward’s Horse (The King’s
Overseas Dominions Regiment) and the 17th (Empire) and 25th (Frontiersmen) Battalions
of the Royal Fusiliers.

However, apart from British flying services, the two largest

contingents were those with the Inland Water Transport (Royal Engineers) and the
mechanical transport section of the Army Service Corps [ASC].
The Inland Water Transport [IWT], from its humble beginnings in 1914, grew
rapidly and by 1918 had 10,164 men in France and Mesopotamia as well as 41,940 Y
y
African and Asian labourers.93 A large proportion of the IWT was Canadian and Captain
W.W. Murray, a Canadian who served in the Middle East, later wrote about the IWT ,
crews on the Tigris River: “just to illustrate Canadian ubiquity during the war, let it be
known that a large percentage of the officers and men of those river craft [on the Tigris
River between Basra and Baghdad] was made up of British Columbians.”9- ,
Recruiting for the IWT in Canada did not start until November 1916, when Royal
Engineer Detachments were established in CEF recruiting offices in Montréal, Toronto,
Fort Frances, and Vancouver with instructions from Militia HQ. that districts were
expected to facilitate recruiting .95 From 1916 to 1918, at least 3,108 men were either
recruited in Canada by the Royal Engineers or transferred from Canadian units .96
Recruits had to be skilled mariners and advertisements called for master mariners, marine
engineers, bargemen, riveters, and calkers. Men were paid according to British pay scales
(less than Canadian) and medical standards were less stringent, although this seems to
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have boomeranged in 1917, when the IWT complained that CAMC doctors were passing
men with tuberculosis, Bright’s Disease, chronic heart disease, and rheumatism .97 Once
enlisted, the men were Royal Engineers and not members of the CEF. Nonetheless, they
seem to have retained their Canadian identity and ex-Sergeant-Major R.W. Gomall of
Vancouver later claimed that men recruited in Canada wore Canada badges on their
shoulder straps during their service with the IWT.

Not all IWT recruits were civilians

and some came from the CEF, with the 1st Canadian Pioneer Battalion, for example,
providing a draft of twenty-three men .99
At least 1,035 men were also recruited in Canada for the Mechanical Transport
section o f the British ASC. Recruiting started in October 1916 with the agreement of the
Canadian government with a hoped-for quota of 2,470 men, although in the end only
1,100 were enlisted .100 Applicants had to be skilled driver-mechanics, wheelers, fitters,
electricians, or blacksmiths and an elaborate system was set up in Canada to test trade
proficiency . 101 However, Canadian standards were evidently suspect and further tests at
the Grove Park ASC Depot in England weeded out some 500 Canadian volunteers who
were unsuitable for one reason or another. 102
Disposing o f unsuitable Canadian volunteers was a problem and initially they
were sent to the CASC Training Depot at Shomcliffe, where a batch o f ninety-eight men,
many o f whom had been without a bath or change of underclothing for a month, arrived
with no warning. The incident provoked an outburst from Major-General J.W. Carson,
Hughes’s representative in London:
I would think that with the terrific demands that are being made on Canada for the
purpose of keeping up the present and future Divisions in the Field, we can use all
the men that Canada can give us, without turning over these fine boys to the

85
•British Service and then find that they are treated in anything but the proper
spirit.103
The rejected volunteers were eventually given the opportunity to join the CEF at
Shomcliffe, but more than half declined the offer and were returned to Grove Park for
repatriation to Canada . 104
Many o f those who were accepted at Grove Park were drafted to British forces in
German East Africa, where a British officer thought Canadians were “A little difficult at
first, apt to chafe at the restrictions that, though perhaps not necessary for themselves in
particular, were yet essential in preserving discipline.” 105 Like their counterparts in the
IWT, Canadian ASC men maintained their Canadian identity and Corporal J.R. McNeice
of Toronto wrote that he and his comrades felt they were only on loan to the British
Army and that some wore CASC badges rather than ASC insignia . 106
Apart from the ASC and IWT, other units recruited in Canada as well, including
the Jewish Legion, which originated in September 1917 at the behest of the Jewish
community in Britain. The original intention on the part of the War Office was to raise
five battalions o f Royal Fusiliers (38th, 39th, 40th and 41st with the 42nd as a regimental
depot) from British Jews .107 However, it soon became evident that the pool of recruits in
Britain was too small to sustain the Legion, and the War Office decided to recruit in both
Canada and the United States.108
Recruiting for the Jewish Legion in Canada was controlled by the BritishCanadian Recruiting Mission [BCRM)] in New York City, an unusual arrangement that
was approved by Militia Headquarters in March 1918. To assist recruiting, the BCRM
organized Jewish Recruiting Committees in Montréal, Toronto, and Winnipeg .109 Each
Committee was to “enquire into the antecedents and bona fides of the applicants and
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furnish each applicant with a Certificate to the effect that he is not within a class calledout for service under the Military Service Act of Canada, and that he is in all respects a
suitable recruit for enlistment in the British Army .” 110 There was some ambivalence
about ethnicity and religion and the BCRM instructed local committees that Russian,
Polish, and Rumanian Jews were acceptable, but “Armenians and Syrians ought to be
classed as enemy aliens .” 111 Recruits attracted by the Committees were processed by CEF
recruiting centres and then transported by the Department of Militia and Defence to the
Imperial Recruit Depot at Windsor, Nova Scotia .112
However, there was no rush to the colours, perhaps because Jews who were
British subjects were eligible for conscription under the MSA while many had already
joined the CEF.

Canadian Jewry was also divided and Zionist support for the Legion

may have inhibited recruiting, particularly in the Orthodox community. In Winnipeg,
Rabbi Herbert J. Samuel of the Shaarey Zedek synagogue not only recruited on behalf of
the Legion, but announced he would volunteer as well.114 However, in a confidential
letter to Prime Minister Borden, he opposed the Legion unless Jews bom in enemy
countries were included as well. 115 By mid-July 1918 it was apparent that recruits w ere,
few and far between and the Jewish Recruiting Committees were disbanded.116 The - . f
number o f men enlisted in Canada is uncertain and official figures were never compiled,
although Vladimir Jabotinsky, a former officer of the Jewish Legion, estimated that about
300 Canadians were recruited, a figure confirmed by another veteran, Hyman Sokolov of
Winnipeg.
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A handful of men joined other British units. In December 1916, three men from
the 3rd Canadian Pioneer Battalion and the 72nd Canadian Infantry Battalion joined the
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Royal Engineer Wireless Detachment at GHQ while four others managed to join Number
6

Wireless Depot Company, Royal Engineers, by May 1917. . There were also 182

veterinarians, eight chemists, twenty-five men with the motor boat patrol and Lieutenant
F.C.C. Devlin of the 102nd Regiment (Rocky Mountain Rangers) in Kamloops, who was
seconded to the Gambian Company of the West African Frontier Force and died at Dar
Es Salaam in 1917.119
Table 6
Canadians Serving with British Army
Component
Flying Services
Inland Water Transport
Mechanical Transport
Jewish Legion
Minor units
Sub-total - confirmed cases
Joined from CEF
Made their way to Britain
Sub-total Scammell’s
estimate
Total

Remarks

Number
2 2 ,0 0 0

3,108
1,035
300
250
26,293
12,000
2 ,0 0 0

/

Estimate
Scammell’s estimate
Scammell’s estimate

14,000
40,293

Canadian expatriates also served with other nations. It is estimated that about 200
Canadians served with the French Army, although some o f these may have been pre-war
Regulars.120 Contrary to popular belief, only a handful served with the Foreign Legion
such as Harley Gianelli Smith, a Toronto broker serving as an officer with the 12th
Canadian Reserve Battalion at Shomcliffe, who was court-martialled in May 1917 for
scandalous behavior, desertion, drunkenness, and escaping from custody. Smith made his
way to France after being cashiered, joined the Foreign Legion, and was killed in 1918
after being decorated for gallantry . 121 Some 2,485 Montenegrin and 8,894 Rumanian
recruits were sent overseas from Canada under arrangements made by the Department of
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Militia‘and Defence . 122 The majority were probably from the United States but judging
by the Polish Legion which drew 1.7% of its recruits from Canada, about 193 were
Canadians.
The Serbian Army also recruited in Canada. The campaign was headed by Nicola
Pavlovich, an agent o f the Serbian Legation in Washington, who had been authorized by
the CGS in February 1917 “to superintend the recruiting of Serbians resident in Canada,
not for the Canadian Expeditionary Force but for the Serbian Army .” 123 Like the Jewish
Legion, recruiting was done by local committees formed by the S r p s k a
O d b r a n a

N a r o d n a

or Serbian National Defence League. Recruits were interviewed, provided with

identity cards, and quartered at the nearest Militia District HQ before proceeding to a
central Serbian Mobilization Camp, originally at the Sussex militia camp in New
Brunswick, and then at Lévis, Québec. Costs were shared by the British and Serbian
Governments. 124
The Serbian National Defence League, however, had a pan-Serbian outlook and
considered all ethnic Serbs, including those bom in the Austro-Hungarian Empire, as
potential recruits. But the League’s efforts to recruit men who were classed as enemy
aliens created difficulties and in June 1918, the Serb Legation asked that the Canadian
government certify ethnic Serbs as friendly aliens despite their formal citizenship.
The League’s activities were not confined to Canada and men were recruited in
the United States, a gross violation of American neutrality condoned in February 1917 by
the CGS who wrote “efforts will be made to enlist Serbians in Canada and (the fact is not
to be disclosed) in the United States [and] it is desirable to attract as little attention as
possible .” 126 The number of Serbs recruited in Canada and the United States is not

,
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certain; although returns submitted by the Commandant of the Serbian Mobilization
Camp at Levis between 17 March 1917 and 28 November 1918 show 6,203 Serbs were
sent overseas. 127 To this can be added an additional thirteen men who died at the Levis
Mobilization Camp: ten from influenza, two in an altercation, and one who was
accidentally electrocuted .128 Again, using the Polish Legion as an example, it is probable
that about 106 Canadian Serbs were recruited.
In some cases, national armies were raised for nations that did not exist.
Czechoslovakia, part of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, was recognized by Britain as a
distinct nation in August 1918, but did not have an army, although Czech units were
serving on both sides with the Russian, French, Italian, and Austro-Hungarian armies.

f00

There is no evidence that Czech legions actively recruited in Canada, although an
estimated 3,000 Czechs were recruited in the United States, and it would be surprising if
some of these were not Canadians. 130 However, Czech-Canadians in the CEF were
willing to join one o f the Czech Legions and in October 1918, a handful of men from the
2nd Battalion Canadian Engineers were discharged and sent to the Czech Legion Depot at
Cognac. 131 At the same time, Czechs and Poles with the CEF at Bramshott, England,
were given the option o f waiving demobilization entitlements and joining the new
national armies. The policy did not last long, however, and in December 1918, transfers
to the Czech Army were banned, although men could still join the Polish Army.

119

Although Poland had not existed as an independent state since 1792, the ideal of a
Polish nation persisted throughout the nineteenth century and was given considerable
impetus on the outbreak o f war. In the United States, Polish nationalism was fostered by
paramilitary groups such as the Z

w ia z e k

W o js k P o ls k ic h

or Polish Military Alliance
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formed in 1894, and other groups, including the Polish Falcon Alliance based in
Pittsburgh, that conducted military training from 1913 onwards.133 With the outbreak of
war and the possibility o f Polish independence, the Falcons actively searched for a
sponsor for a Polish national army. In October 1916, Vincent Skarzynski, a member of
the Falcons, and Andrzej Malkowski, an associate of Joseph Pilsudski, the Polish
nationalist who devoted much of his life to Polish independence, were introduced to Sam
Hughes by a mutual acquaintance and took advantage of the opportunity to suggest that
Canada take steps to train recruits for a new national army. Hughes took their proposal
seriously, and after some discussions with London, the Department of Militia and
Defence agreed to train Polish volunteers, with the first batch o f twenty-three starting at
the University of Toronto on 3 January 1917.134
Facilities at the University of Toronto were inadequate and after spending th e :
summer at Camp Borden, the Polish School of Infantry moved to Niagara-on-the-Lake in
October 1917, where a Polish Army Camp had been established by, Lieutenant-Colonel
A.D. LePan of the Canadian Officers Training Corps [COTC}. Recruiting, at least in the
United States, was initially brisk, Niagara Camp very quickly became overcrowded, and
at the end of November, 1917, the 1st Depot Battalion under Major H.H. Madill, COTC,
was moved to the PF barracks at St John’s, Québec. Additional barrack accommodation
was also made available by the United States Army at Fort George, New York, leaving
LePan with the job o f coordinating Polish Army activities with two nations and two
Canadian military districts.
Between October 1917 and March 1919, the three camps handled 22,395 Polish
recruits, of whom 20,720 were sent overseas. The majority of these men were Americans,
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with only 384 claiming Canada as their home.135;Financial costs were borne by the
French Government, but Canada had to provide the physical infrastructure, equipment,
and uniforms (some men were issued with peace-time scarlet uniforms withdrawn from
militia units). Twenty-five officers and several hundred NCOs and soldiers were attached
to the Polish Legion, many o f whom presumably could have been employed elsewhere by
the CEF . 136
Polish recruiting centres were opened in Winnipeg, Toronto, and Montréal in
I October 1917 with the approval of Militia HQ . 137 But, with only 384 Polish-Canadians
joining between October 1917 and December 1918, recruiting could not be described as
brisk and Polish recruiters turned to the CEF. In March 1918, informal arrangements
/

were made with the CO 1st Depot Battalion, Manitoba Regiment, to discharge Polish
conscripts from the CEF if they agreed to j oin the Polish Legion.

1O

Evidently this did not

produce the number o f recruits expected and in June 1918, the Polish Recruiting Centre
in Winnipeg asked for permission to browse personnel files of MSA draftees and post
; advertisements in the Manitoba Regiment barracks at Minto Armoury. The Recruiting
Centre also suggested that Polish-speaking MSA draftees who had been born in Germany
or Austria and who did not speak fluent English should be transferred to the Polish Army
where they would be more useful. Initially, HQ MD 10 balked at the idea, but by July
1918, MSA draftees o f Polish origin were being handed over to the Polish Recruiting
Centre . 139

'

In Montréal, Number 44 Polish Army Recruiting Centre also sought recruits from
the CEF and in May 191 8 , was able to persuade MD 3 to hand over twenty-one soldiers
from the Polish settlements at Wilno and Barry’s Bay in Ontario. Presumably, the men
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concerned agreed to their discharge from the GEF and enlistment in the Polish Legion,
although this is far from clear. 140

-

Table 7
Canadian Recruits in Foreign Armies
Foreign Armies
Poland
Montenegro

Canadian Recruits
384
42

Romania

151

Serbia

106

Remarks
22,395 recruits overall
Estimated. 2,485 from
Canada and United States
Estimated. 8,894 from
Canada and United States
Estimated. 6,216 from
Canada and United States

?
Czechoslovakia
683
Total
Note: At least 1.7% oJ■the Poles lived in Canada and it has been assumed that the
same proportion applied to other nationalities.
s

The total loss o f Canadian manpower to other nations is difficult to determine, but the
estimated numbers are summarized in Table 8 .
Table 8
Canadians in Other Armies
Nation
British reservists
Italian reservists
French reservists
Russian reservists
Belgian reservists
Recruits - British army
Recruits - British flying
services

Estimated Number
2,779
7,500
5,000
5,000
600
18,500
.2 2 ,0 0 0

Remarks

Includes Jewish Legion
Includes men enlisted by
British-Canadian Recruiting
Mission

384
Recruits - Polish army
151
Recruits —Romanian army
Recruits - Serbian army
106:
42
Recruits - Montenegrin
army
61,956
Total
Note: (1) Table 8 excludes a landful of men from neutral countries who were
recalled. At least two reservists serving with the CEF in Saskatchewan were
discharged after being recalled by the Dutch army .141
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(2) George Forgeon, an Italian reservist, was discharged from the CEF after
being recalled by the Italian army although he was a naturalized British
subject. No doubt there were a handful of other foreign reservists in the same
position .142

Valuable as these contingents were, Canada’s maj or contribution was the CEF in
general and the Canadian Corps in particular. Almost 620,000 officers and men were
enrolled, no small feat for a nation of fewer than eight million people. 143 But ’’neither
Borden nor his ministers appreciated the strain this large commitment would place upon
the voluntary system o f recruitment and upon the nation’s economy .” 144 It can also be
added that neither Borden nor his ministers had a clear idea of the size, purpose,
y
composition, or control mechanisms of the forces required. Politics ruled all and Borden
has received considerable credit for cleaning up the chaos created by Sam Hughes and
asserting control over Canadian Forces overseas by creating the Ministry of Overseas
Military Forces of Canada, [OMFC]. However, while the OMFC may have solved the
immediate problem o f the administrative control of Canada’s army overseas, it also
meant that effective command of the bulk of Canada’s army was exercised by a cabinet
minister in England, far removed from Militia HQ in Ottawa, who did not have to
concern himself with the larger problem of coordinating national requirements for
manpower.
Most of Canada’s soldiers overseas were concentrated in five divisions, all raised
under differing circumstances. The 1st and 2nd Divisions were offered to Britain in 1914
as independent forces with no plan to join the two to form a corps. However, in’April
1915, Hughes, apparently on his own initiative, suggested the creation of a corps to the
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Canadian representative at GHQ in France. The offer was promptly passed by GHQ to
the War Office and on 13 September 1915, the Canadian Corps under the command of
Lieutenant-General E.A.H. Alderson was formed in France. Alderson, an experienced
professional officer, considered that a corps with only two divisions was unbalanced and,
at his suggestion, Canada offered two additional divisions to bring the corps up to four
divisions. 145 The offer was accepted and the 3rd Division arrived in France in December
1915, with the 4 Division, delayed by the need to provide reinforcements to the <
Canadian Corps, arriving in the summer of 1916.146 Subsequently, in August 1916,
Hughes ordered a fifth division to be organized, with a sixth division to follow .147 But
manpower was becoming increasingly limited and the creation of the 5 Division was
/

delayed u n til January 1917, largely because the men earmarked for the division had to be
sent to France in November to replace the losses on the Somme. 148
? The 5th Division was perhaps the most visible indication of the lack of manpower
planning. It was not formed to meet any identifiable national or operational need but
simply, it would appear, to save face by honouring a commitment made by the Minister
of Militia and Defence. Both Hughes and the War Office thought the 5th Division would
be sent to France but OMFC staff, wrestling with the ongoing problem of finding
reinforcements for the Canadian Corps, thought otherwise. As early as March 1917, the
Deputy Minister OMFC warned the War Office that casualties could not be replaced if
the 5th was sent to France and that it would be difficult to keep the Canadian Corps up to
strength, even if the 5th were tapped for reinforcements. 149 The warning was repeated
three months later when the Minister of the OMFC, Sir George Perley, again advised the
War Office that it would be necessary to use the 5th Division to keep the four divisions in
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France up to strength . 150 By November 1917, it was evident that maintaining the 5th was
pointless and Perley recommended that the division be broken up to provide
reinforcements. Prime Minister Borden concurred, but Perley avoided taking action until
February 1918, perhaps, as one historian has suggested, to avoid losing 5th Division votes
in the December election . 151
i

iL

Whether or not the 5 Division tied up manpower that could have been better
; used in France seems doubtful and in practice, the division was an extension of the
: Canadian reserve organization in England. For example, the 5th Division was used as a
holding unit for underage soldiers starting in January 1917, when minors at Shomcliffe,
who were not employed as drummers and buglers, were posted to 5th Division units. By
. the end o f February 1917, the division held 698 juveniles with 951 on strength at the end
■of March 1917. These were the peak months, however, and when the division was broken
up in February 1918, there were only fifty-nine minors on strength . 152
’

The 5th was also used as a training formation and during its twelve-month

; existence, almost one-third of its infantrymen at any given time were undergoing basic
training. Needless to say, units were unhappy with this state of affairs and in May 1917,
the 119th Battalion complained about a batch o f 513 men from the 8 th Canadian Reserve
Battalion: “This draft is largely made up of men enlisted in Canada as artillerymen. Many
of these men have had no shore leave; no P.T., no route marching, no BF [bayonet
fighting], no armed drill and no squad drill.” 153 The Division was also periodically called
upon to provide reinforcements and War Office returns suggest that about 4,800 men
were drafted to France with the largest batch of 1,400 sent in May 1917, a drain
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commented on by one historian who wrote that in the 134th Battalion, “Drafts were called
for regularly and then the numbers would be replaced from reserve battalions.” 154
T a b le 9 •
..
Infantry Strength 5th Division 155
Month
-

.....

■ ■

Trained

Untrained

Underage

•-.>

Total

NonEffective
72.3%

10,857
3,004
697
February
7,156
1917
39.4%
951
11,348
6,878
March 1917
3,519
11,141
33.3%
7,434
3,300
407
April 1917
405
9,240
42.8%
3,546
May 1917
5,289
11,059
57%
4,760
5,990
309
June 1917
392
11,200
43.6%
July 1917
4,489
6,319
11,124
17.8%
August 1917
9,142
1,681
301
312
10,985
13.8%
September
1,204
9,469
1917
12,537
• 24.6%
October
9,450
2,842
245
1917
9,222
10,540
12.5%
November
1,157
161
?
1917
11.7%
December
9,226
1,130
91
10,447
1917
9,102
76
19.7%
January
7,309
1 ,7 1 7 .
1918
8180
11.3%
59
February
7,256 .
865
1918
31.2%
10,597
339
Average
7,289
2,969
Note: The term non-effective is used to denote soldiers who were underage, medically
unfit, untrained or otherwise not immediately available for drafting to France.
Canada’s willingness to be a helpful member of the British Empire created other
manpower problems. In March 1917, the Cabinet agreed to a British request for drafts of
the Chinese Labour Corps [CLC] to land in British Columbia and travel under escort to
Atlantic seaports for onward passage to Europe. The decision meant that a staging area
and depot had to be organized on Vancouver Island and transit facilities provided at
Camp Petawawa. Guards, medical orderlies, and support staff for the various camps,
together with a thousand men for the Railway Service Guard, also had to be found. While
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most o f these men were unfit for overseas service, many could perhaps have been used
elsewhere in Canada to replace fit men .156 Guards and medical orderlies were also needed
for CLC transports, most of which sailed from Atlantic ports although a few proceeded to
Europe via the Panama Canal. Providing the men for these ships was a minor headache
and small detachments had to be detailed, many with little or no training; a CLC officer
later commented, “Canadian recruits, still quite raw. They had only their rifles given to
them a week before they sailed .” 157 Despite this, the detachments seem to have done well
and in May 1917, a platoon from the 122nd Battalion was singled out for successfully
putting down a CLC mutiny on the SS M

is s in a b ie .

Canada was also willing to help with the expansion of the Tank Corps and in
/

March 1918, agreed to form the 1st Canadian Tank Battalion . 159 Subsequently, a second
tank battalion was offered and then, at the request of the War Office, a third. OMFC,
however, understood what Ottawa apparently did not: apart from the initial cost in
manpower and future reinforcement needs, three tank battalions meant a Canadian Tank
Brigade, with the need to find 388 men for a brigade headquarters, supply company,
signal company, and mechanical transport company. The OMFC CGS, LieutenantGeneral Sir Richard Turner, thought the job would be difficult “Unless the numbers to be
enlisted under the Military Service Act are likely to be increased .” 160 Fortuitously, the
war ended before all three battalions and the brigade components were formed.
Other increases and changes to establishments had manning implications that to
all appearances were not considered by either OMFC or Ottawa. In 1918, infantry
battalions in the Canadian Corps were increased by 100 men each, while engineer field
companies and brigade machine gun companies were grouped into battalions.161 Much

c
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has been made o f these increases and one historian has claimed that the effect was to give
each Canadian division the hitting power of a small British corps.

But the claim does

stand up to scrutiny. Divisions did not operate independently and additional firepower
resources were allocated from corps and army resources as required. In the opening
stages o f the Battle o f Arras on 26 August 1918, for example, the 3rd Canadian Division
was supported by sixteen guns from the 1st Life Guards Machine Gun Battalion, while the
iL

divisional artillery was tripled with the addition of the 16 (British) Divisional Artillery,
a field brigade from the 15th (British) Divisional artillery, and the 52nd and 126th (British)
Army Field Brigades.

Nor did the increase in infantrymen have a significant effect and

in July 1918, the average Canadian battalion with 1,018 men had only eighty-nine more
s'

infantrymen than the average British battalion with 929 men . 164
; Nor was the much-vaunted addition o f 100 men to every Canadian infantry
battalion new or original. In 1916-1917, battalions within the BEF (including the CEF)
had been deliberately over-manned. The purpose is not clear, but was probably intended
to compensate for the number o f men routinely detached from their battalions for other
purposes. 165 Overmanning started as early as January 1916, when a visitor to the
Canadian Corps reported that untrained supernumerary men were serving with brigades
in the Canadian Corps. Official sanction, however, does not seem to have been granted
until March 1916, when the War Office recommended that Canadian battalions in the ;
Canadian Corps carry an additional fifty soldiers, presumably to ease congestion in
England and position reinforcements closer to the front.166
The number o f supernumeraries with each battalion varied over time. In August
1916, the Canadian Training Division at Shomcliffe provided an additional 200 men to
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each battalion in France while in December 1916, GHQ directed that all infantry
battalions (including Canadians) would be “brought up to a strength of 100 other ranks
above establishment.” 167 The policy was further refined in June 1917 to 100 men per
battalion in addition to the First Reinforcements held by Entrenching Battalions.168 The
practice ended in August 1917 over Lieutenant-General Currie’s protests when GHQ
withdrew all supernumeraries to form part of the reinforcement pool at the base . 169
The addition of 100 men to each Canadian battalion in February 1918, therefore,
simply restored an out-dated policy. However, the devil is in the details, and OMFC did
not authorize a temporary increase but amended the battalion establishment, probably at
Currie’s suggestion.

Reserve units in England, therefore, became obligated to provide

more men since reinforcement demands were tied to establishments. Nor did the
battalions benefit to any great extent from this increase. As discussed in Chapter 7, men
still had to be detached to a variety of miscellaneous duties and in April 1918, each
battalion had to provide fifty men to the newly formed machine gun battalions, a shortfall
that the Canadian Corps Reinforcement Camp could not make up until the eve of the
Battle of Amiens in August.

The Canadian policy of over-manning did not last long,

and was quietly done away with in August 1918.172
Other aspects o f the Canadian establishment changes created problems and new
units such as the twelve engineer battalions and four machine-gun battalions required an
additional 12,243 men to bring them up to strength. 173 There were other consequences as
well, since the increased establishment meant an increase in wastage which had to be
replaced . 174 The exact manpower cost is difficult to calculate, but it is estimated that the
reorganization required an additional 13,868 men, which may explain why “the Corps
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was considerably under strength on the date when operations began [8 August 1918]”.

1

To put this figure into context, 24,132 MSA draftees were needed in 1918 to maintain the
Canadian Corps.

11 (\

; Table 10
Engineer and Machine Gun Increases 1918177
M achine Gun Corps
> Divisional Engineers
Strength
4,219
11,545
31 January 1918
8,572
15,551 (note 2)
31 July 1918
4,353
4,006
Increase
51%
Percentage Increase
35%
5,006
8,477
Wastage -Hundred Days
2,542
Added Wastage
2,967
6,895
Summary (increase and
6,973
added wastage)
Total increase-Engineers
!3,868 .
and Machine Gun Corps
Notes: (1) I am grateful to Doctor Bill Rawling of the Directorate of History and
Heritage for reviewing the initial calculations.
(2) The engineer strength for 31 July 1918 and the wastage during the
Hundred Days have been adjusted to compensate for the pioneer battalions
i , .
absorbed during the reorganization.
(3) Twenty-three new units were sent to France in 1918 including three
engineer field companies and three machine gun companies which were
absorbed by the Corps.178
Canada also provided a large number of troops that did not directly benefit the
Canadian Corps or the CEF in general. Unlike Australia, which made a conscious
decision to provide troops for the Lines of Communications [L o f C] only when they
would directly benefit the Australian Imperial Force [AIF], Canada provided L of C
troops throughout the war, regardless of whether or not there was any benefit to the
Canadian Corps.179 As summarized in Table 11, by November 1918, there were an
astonishing number o f men deployed with units that did not directly support the Canadian
Corps in France.

101

Table 11
1Bfi
Canadian Units Outside of Canadian Corps 11 November 1918
v-

\

Element.

,

Total

Railway Troops
14,881
11,751
Forestry Corps
Cavalry Brigade
2,860
CAMC
.
2,827
1,732
CASC
CAVC
447
CADC
156
' Miscellaneous '
544
35,198
Totals
Notes: (1) The table does not include small detachments such as the nine
man section with the Royal Engineer Messenger Dog Service or
the two Auxiliary Horse Transport Companies employed as Army
Troops. 181
(2) The 8 th Army Brigade CFA were army troops but spent most of
their efforts supporting the. Canadian Corps. /
There were also troops deployed in other theatres, with the Siberian Expeditionary

Force being the largest with almost 5,000 officers and men. Two field artillery batteries,
together with 108 instructors and twenty-six dog drivers with their 251 dogs, served with
British forces at Murmansk and Archangel, as well as forty-one instructors with
Dunsterforce in the Middle East. Artillery detachments served in St. Lucia throughout the
war, while Bermuda was garrisoned by a Canadian infantry battalion from 1914 to
1916.

Perhaps the oddest diversion were the instructors sent to Russia in April 1917 to

teach men to drive Caterpillar tractors used to pull siege guns provided by the British
Army. Fifteen Russian-speaking soldiers were selected but in the event, only two were
actually sent. Both were promoted to sergeant, paid in rubles, and required to wear their
Canadian uniforms. Amazingly, despite the chaos in Russia, the two were able to make
their way to a training school near Petrograd and then back to England after four months
of instructing Russian drivers . 183
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-A substantial number of troops were also tied up in Canada during the war. For
the most part, this was decided upon by Canada, not Britain, although clearly the need to
maintain garrisons at Esquimalt and Halifax, which on the outbreak of war “had
immediately become the principal base for British forces that protected transatlantic
shipping,”
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was unavoidable. The number of troops required in Canada for home

defence was indeterminate, but by 1916, government policy was to retain 50,000 CEF
troops in Canada in addition to militia units called out for guard duties, although the "
CGS, for one, thought this was unnecessary . 185
The use o f militiamen for guard duties started as early as 4 August 1914, when

i

10,000 men were called out: all coast defence artillery units, the Prince Edward Island
/

Heavy Brigade CGA, five infantry units complete, and detachments from fifty others.186
Guards were deployed along the Welland Canal, at the Niagara Falls power stations, the
Vickers floating dock in Montréal, the Soulanges Canal, and a variety of other vital
points in Port Arthur, Fort William, Sydney, and Canso.

The number grew steadily as

additional responsibilities, such as guards for internment camps, were added and peaked
on 5 August 1915 when 14,782 militiamen were on full-time service. Thereafter, the
numbers slowly dwindled to 11,084 men on 1 April 1917.188 With the introduction of
Special Service Companies in 1917 to handle guard duties and their replacement by
district battalions o f the Canadian Garrison Regiment in April 1918, militia units were
relieved of the responsibility of finding men for full-time service. In June 1918, all
militiamen on full-time duty, as well as the PF, were compulsorily transferred to the CEF,
a move that effectively created a unified national army.

18Q
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The number o f militiamen on full-time duty suggests a fairly large pool of
manpower that could have been tapped for the CEF, but this was not the case. Initially,
many o f the militiamen called out seem to have been fit for the CEF, but as time went on,
manpower became scarcer and fitness declined as medical standards were relaxed. By
April 1916, there were sufficient concerns over the quality of militia manpower that the
Militia Council decided to use members of the CEF rather than militia wherever
possible . 190 Their concerns were justified. In 1918, for example, members of the thirtyfive man detachment o f the 107th East Kootenay Regiment at the Morrissey Internment
Camp in British Columbia, were, on average, forty-nine years old. Twenty-five were well
beyond the maximum age for enrolment (the oldest was sixty-seven) and of the
/

remaining ten, eight were medically unfit.191 The Welland Canal Force had similar
problems and in September 1918, Major-General Lessard, the Inspector-General for ,
Eastern Canada, wrote, “These men were all of lower category than ‘A ’ and were not
particularly intelligent. There was a sprinkling of aliens in the Force, some of whom
could not speak English. As a whole the men were of rather poor class and physique.” 192
There are no definitive strength returns for militia on full-time duty during the
entire war, but the following partial return illustrates the extent to which the militia was
used between 1915 and 1917.
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Table 12
Militiamen on Full-Time Duty 193
Date
5 August 1915
1 October 1915
1 November 1915
30 November 1915
31 January 1916
18 March 1916
1 September 1916
30 November 1916
28 February 1917
1 April 1917

Strength
14,782
12,831
12,753
11,874
11,321
13,000
12,500
11,783
11,050
11,084

By 31 December 1916, there were almost 50,000 members of the CEF still in
Canada, a strength consistent with the government policy discussed previously.
/

Recruiting, which had fallen off since June 1916, appeared to have stabilized and in
December 4,930 men joined the colours. 194 Since Militia HQ was planning to send 5,000
men overseas every month, the anticipated intake of recruits meant the strength of the
CEF in Canada would remain roughly the same. But as the CGS noted on 7 January
1917, if the newly formed 5th Division was committed to battle and there was intense
fighting with heavy losses in a short period of time, there was a distinct possibility that all
CEF troops in Canada would have to be sent overseas regardless o f the need to retain
troops for home defence. The manning issue as seen in January 1917 was two-fold: _
providing the requisite number o f reinforcements for overseas; and maintaining a force of
50,000 men for home defence. The Canadian Defence Force [CDF] was therefore
established in March 1917 with the twin aims of recruiting 50,000 militiamen for home
defence and stimulating CEF recruiting by allowing select militia units to form recruiting
depots. The plan was a stunning failure and three months o f recruiting managed to
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produce only 565 militiamen and 1,293 CEF recruits .195 Apart from the lack of recruits,
the US entry into the war in April 1917 reduced the need for a large home defence
establishment and by July, the CDF, or ‘Canadian Damn Fool Force,’ as Major-General
S.C. Mewburn called it, had been absorbed by the CEF. 196
Manpower shortages were of concern not only to Canadians, but also to the ;
British who actively sought to substitute East Indians, women, and juvéniles for
physically fit men who could then be sent to the front. In April 1917, GHQ suggested that
blacks could be attached to divisional ammunition columns, reserve parks, and auxiliary
horse transport companies. The issue was examined by the War Office and the upshot
was a program to place 134 Indian drivers in each of the fifty-two British and ten
/

Dominion divisional ammunition columns.197 There were concerns over the abilities of
non-whites, however, and it was not until May 1918 that the 36 (Ulster) Division, for
example, received “a proportion of Indian personnel for its DAC to replace English
drivers. These were thereupon sent back for training as gunners.”

By November 1918,

Indian soldiers had been posted to thirty-one British ammunition columns.199 While no
Indian soldiers were sent to Canadian ammunition columns, GHQ manpower planning
included the Canadian Corps and it is entirely possible that had thè war dragged on into
1919, the shortage of reinforcements may very well have led to the acceptance of non
white substitutes.
The principle o f substitution was applied elsewhere in the BEF after LieutenantGeneral Sir Henry Lawson completed his report on manpower utilization in January
1917.200 There is no indication that the report was considered or adopted by Canada, but
copies appear in OMFC files and it appears that his principles were taken to heart. As
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early as April 1917, HQ OMFC considered the use of British boy scouts or underage
Canadian soldiers at HQ OMFC as orderlies and messengers, while in 1918, provision
was made for fourteen-year-old boys and girls to work at OMFC.201 Women were also
employed as substitutes and by May 1917, there were fourteen female drivers at OMFC
Headquarters. The experiment was a success and the following year, CASC Mechanical
Transport Companies were opened to British women serving with the Women’s Army
Auxiliary Corps [WAAC].202 Other British women from the WAAC, Voluntary Aid
Detachments, and the Almeric-Paget Military Massage Corps were also employed with
Canadian hospitals in Britain.203 The WAAC or Queen Mary’s Army Auxiliary Corps as
it was later known, also provided mess staff for the Canadian Training School at Bexhill
and the 1st Canadian Tank Battalion, while a proposal to use women with Canadian
Forestry Corps companies was only scotched by the Armistice.204

In the First World War the Canadian government was never able to come to grips
with the thorny issue o f controlling manpower. No attempt was ever made to allocate
1
X
manpower on a rational basis and no measures were taken to economize manpower. Nor
'

was there any serious consideration of the size and composition of the military forces that
could be raised and sustained. Instead, national policies and measures focused almost
exclusively on allocation, as though the nation’s manpower resources were infinite and
simply had to be pointed in the right direction. The only meaningful manpower policy
that emerged was the MSA which, in the short term, may have headed off a military
manpower shortage, but in the long term, helped to create problems that later came to a
head in the Second World War.
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Clearly the government had no rational basis understanding for manpower needs
in wartime. Despite this, the government nevertheless embarked on an ambitious
recruiting program. The military management o f this program forms the central theme of
Chapters.
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Chapter 3
The Recruiting Structure 1914-1918
CEF recruiting, with its monster rallies, strident newspaper stories, public
•i
demonstrations, posters and recruiting sergeants on the streets, was a highly visible
process that has been examined by a wide variety of historians. But, this ignores the
organizational framework created by Militia HQ and the nine district headquarters across
, the country that made recruiting possible. Recruiting was not simply a social or cultural
event, but also a military process controlled and guided by the Canadian Forces with
varying degrees of success until 1918 when the Military Service Branch of the
Department o f Justice assumed responsibility for calling up recruits conscripted under the
M ilita r y S e r v ic e A c t,

Many o f the studies of recruiting for the CEF. have focused on the recruiting crisis
of 1915-1916 arid the chaos, confusion and gross inefficiency that resulted when Sam
Hughes created almost a hundred infantry battalions overnight. Without denying that
there was a genuine recruiting crisis, it should be noted that more than one-third of all
V

recruits (36.8%) were not infantrymen. These men were recruited by a variety ot
agencies: corps depots, reserve squadrons, depot batteries, district recruiting offices and
in the case of some o f the forestry and railway units, by the unit itself. For these units,
there was no crisis. Having said this, the infantry was not only the largest component but
\t

the one that had the most difficulties.
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Table 13
Enlistments by Corps
Other Ranks
1914-1918 1
Corps

Infantry
Artillery
Engineers
Forestry Corps
Railway Troops
Medical Corps
Service Corps
Machine Gun
Labour
Cavalry
Forestry and Railway
Construction
Miscellaneous
Total

:v

Enlistments
378,070
42,237
37,759
22,195
21,768
17,593
16,719
14,954
11,263
8,344

Proportion ,
63.2%
7.1%
6.3%
3.7%
: 3.6%
:
2.9%
2 .8 %
2.5%
1.9%
1.4%
1 .0 %

6 ,2 1 2

'

20,906
598,020

3.5%

y

From August 1914 to November 1916, recruiting was periodically modified as a
result o f snap decisions by Sam Hughes, the eccentric Minister of Militia and Defense,
and it is easy to see him as the cause of all problems. But in practice, Hughes’s authority
was not absolute. First o f all, he did not concern himself with the overall policy and
organization but instead dealt with specific issues as they arose. Secondly, the staff at
Militia HQ, to their credit, persisted in trying to put CEF recruiting on a rational basis. In
April 1916, for example, the Militia Council took advantage o f Hughes’s absenceTrom
Ottawa and decided that new battalions would not be created until the existing ones had
reached full strength. The action ran counter to Hughes’s penchant for creating new units
at the drop of a hat and, not surprisingly, A.E. Kemp, the acting president of,the Council,
deferred any action until Hughes returned to Ottawa.
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As discussed in Chapter 1, district commanders expected to be consulted on
matters concerning units in their district and to be kept informed of any decisions
affecting their district. Not even Hughes could ignore these long-standing conventions
without provoking a backlash. In August 1915, for example, Colonel W.A. Logie, the
commander of MD 2, complained to the AG that he had been directed to organize the
92nd Battalion in Toronto with a full slate of officers but that Hughes had appointed :
Colonel J. A. Currie as the CO. Even worse, Logie learned o f the appointment from
Currie and not Militia HQ. Logie’s outrage was palpable: “I am at a loss to know whether
I am organizing this Battalion or whether he [Currie] is organizing it...May I be informed
therefore, authoritatively, what status I have .”3 The reply from the AG was succinct:
Currie would not command the 92nd and a CO would be appointed based on Logie’s
recommendations.4 The issue here was not Currie’s suitability to command the new
battalion, but adhering to established military conventions. A few months later, in
November 1915, Hughes appointed Lieutenant-Colonel R; Belcher as the CO of the 138
Battalion in Edmonton although Colonel Cruikshank, the District Commander, thought
that Belcher was not fitted for command because he was sixty-six years old and
“occasionally drinks to excess and then becomes unmanageable. I have been obliged to
admonish him for this on two occasions.”5 In this case, there was no protest from
Brigadier-General Cruikshank because he had been consulted and allowed to make
recommendations.
The district commanders’ powers with regards to creating o f new units remained
unchanged throughout the war. However, the means by which men were enlisted to fill
the ranks varied widely: militia units, the newly-mobilized CEF units themselves (unit-
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based recruiting) and district-controlled recruiting offices. These agencies were not
created sequentially and at various times all three operated together, sometimes in the
same place. In many cases, recruiting agencies had multiple functions. Militia units not
only enlisted men but processed them or, in other words, conducted medical

.

examinations, completed documentation and then drafted the recruits to their new units.
CEF units, on the other hand, not only recruited and processed volunteers but also trained
them for overseas deployment. Lastly, district-controlled recruiting offices had the same
responsibilities as militia units, but starting in 1915, acted as personnel depots by holding
recruits until they could be drafted to units.

Large-scale recruiting was not a wartime phenomena but had been considered as
early as 1911 when Canada’s first mobilization plan was drafted by Lieutenant-Colonel
W.G. Gwatkin, who later became CGS. Two possibilities were considered; a levée en
masse in the event of war with the United States and an overseas contingent with an
infantry division and a cavalry brigade drawn from the militia in the event of a European
war .6 Plans were drafted for the latter contingency, but there is no evidence that a levée
en masse was seriously considered.
Ideally, the overseas contingent should have been formed by select militia units to
preserve regimental and regional identities but as discussed previously in Chapter 1,.
peacetime units were nowhere near full strength. Some o f the stronger units could have
been brought up to full strength with new recruits, but there would have been howls of
protest across the country from units not selected, many of which had politically wellconnected honourary colonels. In the end, Militia HQ decided to form the overseas
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division with composite units made up of men from ninety-six militia infantry regiments
with quotas ranging from a machine gun section to five companies.*
Volunteers for the planned overseas division were required to be single,
physically fit and between the ages of twenty and thirty-five, standards that excluded a
significant number o f serving militiamen .7 Perhaps because of this, the mobilization plan
also provided for recruiting. Both district and unit commanders retained a general :
oversight, but the actual recruiting was to be done by the squadron, battery and company
commanders who would actually command the men enlisted. In effect, the prewar
mobilization plan relied not only on militia units for recruiting, but also the newlymobilized units themselves, almost precisely what happened in the early days of the war.
Finally, in keeping with British practice [Chapter 7], composite units were to form
regimental depots to hold both recruits and reinforcements.8
The prewar scheme was not perfect: there were limited reserve stocks of clothing,
equipment and weapons, no plans existed for detailed reports or pay services, and the
reliance on militia units with inexperienced staffs left much to be desired. Still, the plan
was useful, because it was based on a rational consideration o f national manpower
resources and provided a clear start point. Unfortunately, the scheme was abruptly
cancelled by Hughes on 31 July 1914 and the orderly mobilization envisaged before the
war was replaced by an improvised concentration at Valcartier, a temporary camp created
on the spur of the moment.9 In the short term, the abrupt cancellation of the scheme had
little effect on the structure of the First Contingent, which resembled the 1911 plan with
an infantry division and a cavalry brigade . 10 But, in the long term, the abandonment of

* The peacetime establishment called for eight companies.
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prewar plans meant that recruiting and mobilization would be an improvised business
until alternative arrangements could be put into place.
,

The story of the First Contingent and the resultant chaos at Valcartier in August

1914 is too well known to be repeated here. Raising and dispatching the contingent in
less than six weeks was a considerable achievement, but the process was anything but
orderly and in practice amounted to nothing more than shoveling militia volunteers into
Valcartier, leaving a hard-pressed group of twenty-five staff officers under the direction
o f the camp commandant, Colonel V.A.S. Williams, the AG, to sort things out as the
troops arrived .11
Calling on the militia to provide recruits for the First Contingent was not a
straightforward process. Few, if any, units had a full-time staff and instructions from
Ottawa had to be sent to commanding officers at their home or business and then passed
to the troops by runners or through newspaper advertisements. City corps could react
quickly but rural units could not. Urgent telegrams from Militia HQ took two or more
days to reach the 26th Middlesex Light Infantry in south-western Ontario, for example,
■

.

•

V

because the CO lived near Ilderton, “a considerable distance from a telegraph station.”

19

Elsewhere in Prince Edward Island, the CO of the 36th Light Horse complained that his
men were scattered across the province and it was impossible to contact all of them in a
reasonable period o f time.

-

:

Units also had some initial difficulties with recruiting and processing because
Hughes chose to bypass district headquarters. 14 As a result, ordnance officers had no
authority or basis on which to distribute uniforms and equipment from district stocks
while district paymasters lacked the authority (and funds) to pay recruits or to call out
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unit staff. The 24th Kent Regiment in Chatham, Ontario, for example, was forced to
recruit in the evenings when officers and NCOs were free from their civilian jobs .15 But,
this was only a temporary glitch and by mid-August 1914, many units had called out staff
to handle the influx of recruits.
The number called out by each unit varied. In Stratford, the 28 Perth Regiment
called out the CO, second-in-command, medical officer and quartermaster together with
nine clerks, medical orderlies and storemen to process 156 volunteers from 12-23 August
1914.16 In Galt, the 29th Regiment used the, CO, adjutant, medical officer, Quartermaster
and Regimental Quartermaster-Sergeant to process 117 volunteers, while the 25th
Regiment in St Thomas was content to rely only on the CO and an orderly room
sergeant. 17 Even small units called out regimental staff; in Calgary; Sergeant-Major
Barker supervised recruiting for the 14th Company, CASC .18 In a few cases, support
personnel were also called out by rural units that chose to concentrate recruits from'
outlying companies at regimental headquarters. In Parry Sound, for example, the 23rd
Northern Pioneers called out unit cooks to feed the influx of recruits.19
Some militia units were needed for home defence duties and were unable to
recruit for the First Contingent. In New Brunswick, the 73rd Regiment, a rural corps,
abandoned its outlying armories when the regiment was called out at the beginning of the
war, leaving nobody behind to take in recruits. Providing guards for strategic installations
was important, but so was recruiting for the First Contingent and HQ MD 6 ordered one
i

officer from each outlying company to return home and reopen the local armoury to
receive recruits .20
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- One unit was unable to call on the militia for recruits. Princess Patricia’s
Canadian Light Infantry (PPCLI) was a wartime creation with no ties to the peacetime
militia. But regimental enthusiasts opened improvised recruiting offices in Montréal,
Toronto, Winnipeg, Edmonton and Calgary and the regiment was quickly brought up to
full strength .21

..

; Almost immediately after the First Contingent sailed to England, Canada
offered a Second Contingent. Unlike the First which had been concentrated at Yalcartier,
the Second was dispersed across the country in improvised barracks under the command
of district commanders. In the case of the fifteen infantry battalions, each district was
assigned a specific quota by Militia HQ on 18 October 1914.22 MD 1 (South-Western
Ontario), MD 3 (Eastern Ontario), MD 5 (Eastern Québec) and MD 13 (Alberta) were
responsible for recruiting one battalion each, MD 2 (Central Ontario), MD 4 (Western
Québec), MD 6 (Atlantic Canada) and MD 11 (British Columbia) were tasked to recruit
two battalions each, while MD 10 (Saskatchewan, Manitoba and North-Western Ontario)
had to raise three battalions.
As with the First Contingent, militia units were called upon to provide recruits
and district commanders kept a grip on the process. In Toronto (MD 2), twenty militia
regiments provided recruits to the 19th and 20th Battalions. City corps in Toronto, the
aL

Niagara Peninsula and Sault Ste Marie sent men to the 19 while rural corps sent their
men to the 20th Battalion .24 Further west in Winnipeg, HQ MD 10 assigned quotas to all
infantry and cavalry units in Saskatchewan, Manitoba and the Lakehead. The 79th, 90th,
100th and 106th Regiments in Winnipeg as well as the 98th Kenora Light Infantry and the
99th Manitoba Rangers in Brandon recruited men for the 27th (City o f Winnipeg)

126
Battalion while four Saskatchewan regiments and the 96th Lake Superior Regiment from
the Lakehead recruited for the 28th Battalion. Lastly, each of the nine cavalry regiments
in the district was required to provide 116 recruits for the 32nd Infantry Battalion.25 In
Québec, both MD 4 and MD 5 sent French-speaking recruits from the 9th, 65th and 85th
Regiments to the 22nd Battalion .26 Militia units were also provided specialists as required
and October 1914, for example, the 79th, 90th and 100th Regiments were each given a
iL

quota o f two cooks, four buglers and four signallers for the 27 Battalion àt Tuxedo
Barracks near Winnipeg .27

;

Not all districts were able to rely on the militia for recruits.' In the Maritimes, the
25th and 26th Battalions had to recruit for themselves, probably because the strongest
s'

militia units had been called oût for home defence and the remaining units were not
sufficiently well organized to process recruits.28
In contrast, Colonel Cruikshank of MD 13 (Alberta) used a variety of methods to
find recruits for the 3 1st Battalion. Edmonton recruits, for example, were enlisted by a
battalion officer, Major Hewgill, originally from the 16 Light Horse (a Saskatchewan
unit).29 Further south in Calgary, Captain Morfitt of the 103rd Calgary Rifles was
appointed by Hughes to recruit men for the 31st and then the 56th and 63rd Battalions.30
Outside o f Edmonton and Calgary, recruiting was delegated to militia units. In
Lethbridge, Major Stewart o f the 25th Independent Field Battery enlisted a hundred
infantrymen for the 31st while in Medicine Hat, Captain Oakes o f the 21st Alberta Hussars
and his medical officer, Captain Orr, recruited another hundred volunteers, also for the
3 1st Battalion .31

-
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For those units that recruited for the Second Contingent, procedures were
broadly similar to those followed in August 1914. In Stratford, five members of the 28th
Regiment (second-in-command, medical officer, hospital sergeant and two sergeantclerks) were called out on 22 October 1914 to process ninety-three recruits from Perth
County for the 18th Battalion at Queen’s Park Barracks (today’s Western Fair grounds) in
London. The recruiting campaign was brief and on 4 November 1914, the 28th staff
downed tools and returned to their civilian jobs .32 Other militia regiments in MD 1 also
called out staff to recruit for the 18th Battalion: the 24th in Chatham, 29th in Galt, 33 rd in
Goderich and the 27th in Sarnia.33 In some cases, outlying companies were used; the 30th
Wellington Rifles opened recruiting detachments at company armories in both Fergus
/

and Guelph .34 Other districts also called out militia staff for recruiting purposes. In MD 2
the 23rd Regiment in Parry Sound, the 32nd in Walkerton and the 34th in Oshawa all
recruited on behalf o f the 19th and 20th Battalions.35 Non-infantry units also recruited for
the Second Contingent and in Alberta (MD 13), the 14th Company CASC employed two
officers and one private from 30 November to 3 December 1914 to recruit and process
thirty-two volunteers for the 2nd Divisional Train .36
Prewar French-speaking militia units in eastern Québec were weak and in 1914
were unable to recruit enough men for the 22nd Battalion. The shortfall was made up by
posting men from two western Québec battalions (the 23rd and 24th) to the 22nd, but
English-speaking recruits then had to be transferred from other districts to replace the
losses in the 23rd and 24th. A draft of 135 recruits for the 23rd Battalion came from far-off
Alberta (MD 13) while Lindsay, Ontario, (MD 3) provided a complete platoon for the
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24th. Other recruits from MD 11 (British Columbia) and MD 10 (Manitoba) also joined
the 23rd and 24th Battalions.37
The 2

j

Divisional Artillery also relied on recruits from militia units. In

Fredericton, recruits for the 2.3rd and 24th Field Batteries came from all three militia field
artillery brigades in Atlantic Canada.38 In Toronto (MD 2), five batteries in the local area
sent their recruits directly to the 4th CFA Brigade. Further west in Winnipeg (MD 10),
only one o f the three local militia batteries (13th Independent Field Battery) was required
to enlist men for two batteries and the ammunition column of the 5th CFA Brigade while
the third battery was raised by the 26th (Militia) Field Battery in Regina.39
Men with technical skills not found in peacetime militia units were also needed
and a variety of methods were used to recruit these men. In Montréal, the 1st Canadian
Heavy Battery turned to the Canadian Pacific Railway shops to find skilled artificers.40
There was also a shortage of skilled electricians to operate searchlights and electrical
equipment in the Halifax fortress. Fortunately, in August 1914, the Canadian General
Electric Company offered to recruit and pay for twenty-five electricians. Militia HQ
accepted the offer and the men were enlisted in the Royal Canadian Engineers (PF) and
sent to Halifax, where they remained until at least February 1916.41 In Toronto, the 2nd
Canadian Field Butchery did not turn to local militia units but recruited experienced ’
civilian butchers from December 1914 to April 1915 with the aid of Sergeant Lilley, an
ex-Royal Marine butcher trained at the Army Service Corps School at Aldershot,
England .42 Further east, Number 5 Depot Unit of Supply* in Montréal did not turn to the

* The Depot Unit of Supply was concerned with ration accounting at the corps railhead. The staff therefore
needed both clerical and accounting skills, talents not usually found in a peacetime CASC company
responsible for delivering rations to a camp kitchen at an annual summer camp.
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militia either and conducted its own recruiting campaign from December 1914 to
February 1915.43
The role o f militia units in recruiting for the CEF in 1914 was not a flash in the
pan and the practice continued for much of 1915, albeit on a more organized and
systematic basis for longer periods of time. In Ottawa, the Governor General’s Foot
Guards actively recruited for the 38th and 59th Battalions from February to July 1915.44
Further west, in Owen Sound, the 31st Regiment recruited for the 37th and 58th Battalions
in February 1915 and again from April to June 1915.45 In some cases, militia units were
literally manning depots in that they not only recruited men, but held them until drafts
could be assembled and dispatched to CEF units. In MD 3, the 57th Peterborough Rangers
provided men to the 39th and 80th Battalions from February to September 1915. For much
of this period, recruit drafts were forwarded weekly, but in September 1915, recruits were
forwarded on a daily basis to the 80th Battalion in Belleville. As a recruiting agency, the
57th was remarkably successful, bringing in as many as fifteen men a day and 198 in the
month o f September 1915.46
After the initial rush in 1914, the fixed affiliations between militia units and CEF
battalions were largely done away with and those enlisted by the militia were posted on
the basis o f need. In August 1915, for example, the 109th Regiment of Toronto, tasked to
recruit for the 84th Battalion could not find enough volunteers and a draft from the 108th
Regiment, intended for the 83r<? Battalion, was diverted to make up the shortfall. This was
not an isolated case. Men recruited by the Governor General’s Body Guard in Toronto for
the 75th Battalion were sent instead to the under-strength 58th Battalion. The shortfall in
the 75 was then made up when HQ MD 2 gave Toronto militia regiments a fresh quota
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of 255 men each .47 Not all of these quotas were needed by the 75th and by September
1915, local militia units were holding a substantial number of unallocated recruits leading
the District Commander, Colonel Logie, to request authority to raise another because
“There are at present about 2,500 recruits in this Division o f which I am handing over the
authorized establishment to the 81st Battalion .”48
Units in MD 6 (Atlantic Canada) had little confidence in militia recruiters. As a
company commander o f the 55 Battalion in New Brunswick explained in July 1915,
civilians were preferred because they would “do much better work than an Officer of the
Militia, who, as the people would say, should be away himself. Furthermore I consider it
has a dampening effect on recruiting to have in the centres Recruiting Officers who are of
age and are not volunteering for overseas service and have no intention of doing so .”49
HQ MD 6 shared this belief and by the end of July 1915 all but four militia recruiting
officers in New Brunswick had been sacked because they were unable to produce a
reasonable number of recruits .50 Civilians were appointed as recruiting agents in their :,
place but this led to other problems.
\

In Woodstock, five recruiting agents were appointed, including the town
constable, a bank manager (who was also head of the Woodstock Board of Trade), the
caretaker o f the Woodstock armoury, a Canadian Pacific Railway engineer and a private
from the 55th Battalion who was at home recovering from an appendectomy.51 But,
nobody was responsible for coordination and all enjoyed equal status. As well, none o f
these men were officers and could not attest recruits or provide them with public funds
for transportation to the nearest CEF unit. In the case of the armoury caretaker, the job :
was considered to be part of his normal duties and there was no increase to his pay. Not
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surprisingly, he tried “to make money out of the recruits indirectly through his pool
room .”52 Furthér north in Edmunston, a local commission merchant was considered well
qualified as a recruiter since he spoke both French and English,’was too old for military
service and had a son with the 55th Battalion. On the other hand, “he occasionally gets on
a drinking bout, which though over fairly quickly is pretty bad while it lasts .”53 The man
may have been well qualified, but he was a civilian and could not be controlled or
disciplined by the military.
Using militia units as recruiting agencies worked well in the short term, but in the
long term part-time staff could not sustain the pace since most militia officers and NCOs
had jobs and could not be called out for prolonged periods of time. The 28 Regiment in
y
'

th

Stratford was able to call out staff in July and August 1915 to recruit a draft for the 34
Battalion, but this was the last time the regiment was able to respond, although one :
subaltern and two sergeants were called out that autumn to assist the 71st Battalion.54

. ! By the fall o f 1915, militia units that had been foremost in recruiting had closed,
as those officers who had been instrumental in recruiting joined the CEF. In Alberta,
Major Stewart from Lethbridge joined the CEF in November 1914 and six months later,
Captains Oakes and Orr from Medicine Hat followed suit.55 There is no record of any
further drafts from either the 25th Independent Field Battery or the 21st Alberta Hussars.
Other militia units were in a similar position and by June 1916, most had lost a
large proportion o f their officers to the CEF: the 28 th Regiment in Stratford had lost nine
o f its eighteen officers, the 50th Regiment in Victoria had lost seven of its eleven officers;
the 8 th Regiment in Québec City seven out of fifteen and the 7th Company CASC in Saint
John, New Brunswick, five out of six officers.56 With so many key officers joining the
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CEF, many units stopped parading and were dormant by mid-1916. Their status was
acknowledged in August 1916 by the Militia Council, which approved a request from the
QMG to transfer stores and equipment from these units to district ordnance depots for
redistribution to CEF units .57
Despite the loss of key officers to the CEF, the militia continued to be involved in
recruiting. In Toronto, HQ MD 2 was given authority by Militia HQ in June 1915 to
recruit on a continuous basis. Militia units as such were not responsible for this but
instead, each provided one lieutenant and four sergeants to work for the Toronto
Recruiting Depot.58

s

With the end of militia recruiting, CEF infantry battalions started to recruit for
themselves. The concept was not new, but had been the custom in the peacetime militia
and was part of the prewar mobilization plan scrapped by Hughes in July 1914. No
instructions concerning recruiting were issued at the beginning o f the war, although it
seems to have been understood that militia units would be responsible for finding recruits
for the CEF. However, this changed 29 March 1915 when Militia Order 161 was issued
charging CEF commanding officers with the responsibility “for the recruiting,
organization, clothing, equipment and training o f their units.”59
CEF unit-based recruiting became the norm after the autumn of 1915, not only
because the militia was declining in strength but also because of two successive increases
to the CEF. The first increase, announced by Hughes on 30 October 1915, boosted the
CEF ceiling to 250,000 men, while the second, announced 1 January 1916 by Prime
Minister Borden, set an establishment of 500,000. In neither case was there much
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forethought. As one historian has remarked, Borden’s announcement in particular was
made “without any serious consultation with his [cabinet] colleagues. Certainly his

:

decision was made without the benefit of any planned study o f all that this large-scale
commitment of Canada’s manpower would involve .”60

;

The two announcements were a substantial headache for the Department of
Militia and Defence. The War Purchasing Commission, for example, was caught off
guard and did not discuss the purchase of additional uniforms, let alone other equipment,
until the end of January 1916. As late as 19 April 1916, contracts had not been let for the
kit needed to provide for Hughes’s increase announced in October 1915.6With only l91,654 officers and men with the CEF at the end of December 1915,
the new establishment announced by the Prime Minister was clearly unreasonable. After
factoring in the average monthly wastage rate for 1915, (1,918 men), the CEF would
have to enlist 26,613 recruits every month to reach Borden’s goal by the end of 1916.62 In
other words, the CEF needed a lot of men in a very short period o f time. Moreover, the
Prime Minister did not concern himself with details such as the desired establishment for
each corps! The result was, perhaps, inevitable. Recruiting offices had been created for
non-infantry corps, but they were small and few in number and the simplest way to meet
the Prime Minister’s goal was to create a large number o f infantry battalions with the
expectation that each could recruit its own men.

A

From November 1915 to July 1916 181,438 men were enlisted in the CEF, a large
number that placed a considerable strain on both Militia HQ and district headquarters
which had not been given any warning of the increases.63 A Recruiting Officer was added
to each district HQ in August 1916 but this appointment had little effect since

r
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responsibilities were largely advisory .64 In Toronto, Major-General Logie of MD 2
suggested in August 1916 that a system of deferred recruiting be adopted, patterned after
the earlier Derby Scheme in Great Britain .65 Militia HQ staff supported the idea and in
early September 1916 the AAG submitted a proposal to the AG calling for “enlistment
for the CEF on a deferred basis, i.e. subject to call for training and service on notice of
one, two or three months; the men remaining in their civilian occupations, but after
medical examination and acceptance, receiving say twenty-five cents a day, to be paid
when called and possibly receiving elementary training at night during the interim .”66

1

The proposal was then forwarded to districts for comment, but only four of the ten
districts were in favor and by the end of October 1916, the idea was effectively dead. The
concept may have been useful if it had been introduced to coincide with the increases
announced in October 1915 and January 1916 but, by the fall of 1916, as HQ MD 4
pointed out, there were not enough men to fill existing units and deferring recruiting,
therefore, did not make sense .67
Recruiting men for the new battalions was complicated by Hughes’s policy of
allowing units to recruit outside of their parent district without, however, coming under
command of the district commander concerned. The practice started in October 1915,
when the AG, probably at the behest of Hughes, announced that CEF battalions were free
to recruit outside of their parent district with no reference to Militia HQ. District
/o

commanders involved had to be notified, but not consulted.

The policy caused no end of

confusion and animosity and was cancelled in March 1916. However, specialist units
such as pioneer battalions, forestry units and tunnelling companies were still allowed to
recruit outside o f their area as were infantry units favoured by Hughes or, as the acerbic
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Director o f Mobilization later described them, “marginally Gilt edged Infantry
Battalions.”69
Even though the number of units allowed to recruit outside of their parent district
was limited, the policy still hampered local recruiting efforts. In December 1916, for
example, HQ MD 11 complained to Militia HQ that nine units from outside of British
Columbia were recruiting in Vancouver and Victoria: the 174th and 197th Battalions from
Winnipeg, the 230th Battalion from Brockville, the 236th Battalion from Fredericton, the
239th Battalion from Valcartier, the 244th Battalion from Montréal and the 253rd Battalion
from Kingston. To add insult to injury, several o f these units were Highlanders and
“Local Highland Regiments 50th and 72nd and 231st Battn strenuously protest against
236th and 253rd Highlanders coming here to recruit.”70 Further east, Major-General Logie
of HQ MD 2 had the same concerns and in December 1916 complained that six units
from outside o f his district were recruiting in Toronto. Commanding Officers of Torontobased units “have communicated to me that this recruiting by outside units is seriously
interfering with their recruiting campaigns,” noted Logie, who went on to add, “I would
ask that as many o f these units as possible be asked to cease further recruiting in this
District.”71' '

..
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Civilian agencies were also concerned about the effects of units recruiting away
from their home base. In October 1916, for example, the Nova Scotia Recruiting
Association complained that “recruiting appeals from outside the Province is not only a
mistaken policy but absolutely certain to result in confusion and harm.”

The following

month, the Union o f Alberta Municipalities went so far as to submit a resolution to Prime
Minister Borden complaining that a large number o f Alberta men had been allowed to
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transfer-to battalions in other provinces “which tends to retard our local battalions from
attaining full strength and battalions from other parts of Canada are permitted to recruit
men in this province.” The solution, the Union thought, was obvious, transfers should
cease and “no battalions organized outside the province be permitted to recruit men in r
"t0!

this province until all local battalions are up to full strength.” The policy of allowing
infantry battalions to recruit outside of their parent districts was clearly counter-.
productive. But it was not until Hughes resigned that the policy was cancelled. In January
1917 Militia HQ announced that units were forbidden to recruit outside of their parent
district and local commanders were able to restore some measure of control to the
recruiting process.74
s'

In keeping with peacetime militia habits, a few of the newly-formed units were
not above poaching recruits from other battalions. In one incident, Majors Hughes and
Knox-Leet from the Montréal based 199 Irish-Canadian Rangers boarded a troop train
at Smiths Falls, Ontario, and tried unsuccessfully to convince men of the 192 Battalion
from northern Alberta, to join the 199th. Despite this unsuccessful raid, another
detachment from the Irish-Canadian Rangers met the troop train in Montréal but, as the
199th recruiting officer noted, “not one man was persuaded to leave the 192nd, all seeming
to much prefer to remain with their own officers and men.”75 There were other attempts
at poaching, but none were as brazen as the 199th raid on the 192nd.
The confusion resulting from units recruiting in other districts was compounded
by Hughes’s willingness to accommodate local organizers. In October 1915, the 88

th

(New Brunswick) Battalion was renumbered as the 104 at the request of the CO of the
peacetime 88th Irish Fusiliers in Victoria, who had been charged with raising a CEF

137

battalion. The rationale for the CO’s request was simply that numbering his CEF
battalion to correspond with the militia regiment would boost recruiting by linking the
peacetime militia with the new CEF unit.76 In November 1915, Militia HQ authorized the
creation o f two new battalions; the 119th Battalion in Manitoulin District and the 134th in
Sault Ste Marie, Algoma District. Subsequently, W.R. Smyth, the Conservative M.P. for
Algoma East suggested to Hughes that a second battalion should be recruited in the
Algoma District. For some reason, Hughes did not approve the suggestion but on 27
November 1915, only three weeks after the 134th had been authorized, directed that the
two districts would constitute one recruiting area with only one battalion. The 119th then
absorbed the 134 and Smyth was commissioned by Hughes and appointed Chief
Recruiting Officer for the new 119th Battalion.77 The num ber‘134’ was allocated almost
immediately to a new battalion being formed in Toronto by the 48th Highlanders.78 In
October 1915, a deputation from Simcoe County, Ontario, visited Ottawa and received
Hughes’s permission to recruit a new battalion in Simcoe County; Known as the 122nd
Battalion, the new unit was commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel D.M. Grant, the
peacetime CO of the 35th Simcoe Foresters. Grant moved quickly. Seven recruiting
detachments were organized across the Simcoe County and by the end of November
1915, the 122

Simcoe Battalion had recruited 600 men. However, Hughes then decided

that a battalion should be recruited in the Muskoka District. Grant, who lived in
Huntsville, Muskoka District, was a logical choice as CO and he was therefore ..
transferred to the new unit together with the title ‘ 122nd Battalion.’ D.H. MacLaren, also
an officer with the 35 Simcoe Foresters, was then appointed CO of the Simcoe Battalion
which was henceforth known as the 157th.79 The effect of these changes on HQ MD 2 is
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unknown but must have been one of ‘order, counter-order and disorder,’ a state of affairs
that, to some degree, must have hindered recruiting.

„

"

During the winter of 1915-1916, recruits were billeted in their home towns,
provided that at least twenty-five men or more enlisted.80 The policy was probably the
result o f a general shortage of barrack accommodation, but there was also the hope that
potential recruits would be attracted by the sight o f local boys parading in uniform. The
concept was well-intentioned but inevitably, in some units, billeting areas were widely
dispersed. The 151st Battalion in Alberta had men quartered in eleven communities, a
state of affairs that lasted until the unit was concentrated at Sarcee in the spring of 1916.81
th

'' .

The 119 Battalion in the Algoma District of northern Ontario was even worse off, with
outlying detachments in fourteen communities spread out over 200 miles.

There were

some advantages to this policy, particularly when troops were billeted in communities
where there was no militia unit, a factor that the 135th Battalion historian thought
“undoubtedly helped recruiting to a considerable effect”83 On the other hand, routine
administrative suffered. Recruiting was difficult to coordinate, training could not be
supervised on a routine basis and quartermaster sergeants had to struggle to supply the
outlying detachments. Lastly, small detachments did not have medical officers or clerical
staff to process recruits and in many cases, detachment officers (if there were any) were
too junior to complete and approve attestation forms. The presence o f uniformed troops
may have attracted potential recruits, but delays created by administrative complications
may have deterred some prospective recruits.
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;-With the two increases to the CEF announced in October 1915 and January 1916,
the number of men joining every month increased steadily, reaching a peak of 33,960
recruits in March 1916.84 Combined with Hughes’s management style, the result was
chaos with new battalions being continually created, changes brought about after local
organizers petitioned Hughes directly with real or imagined grievances and the continual
competition with units from outside of the district who had been given special
dispensation by Hughes. In the end, a large number of men were enlisted in a remarkably
short time but only at the cost, as discussed in Chapters 4 and 8, of bringing in thousands
of men who were manifestly unfit and of swamping reserve units in England.
, District commanders tried to bring order to chaos although each adopted a
different solution. In eastern Ontario, Brigadier-General Hemming noted in August 1916
that there were nine well-defined recruiting areas within his district, six of which were
assigned to :newly-formed battalions. Rather than shuffle the recruiting areas to suit
existing units, Hemming requested that Militia HQ create three additional battalions. Not
surprisingly, the request was turned down by an unsympathetic AG who suggested a
QC

generic depot battalion to recruit in the three unallocated areas.
In Toronto, Headquarters MD 2 chose not to divide the city among the newly-,
formed battalions, but to restrict unit recruiting campaigns to specific periods. The 123rd
¿L

Battalion, for example, was allowed to recruit 6-26 December 1915, and the 124 from
27 December 1915 to 18 January 1916. However, the system fell apart when the 134

th

and 166th were authorized and allowed to start recruiting as early as 12 January 1916. By
the beginning o f March 1916, there were five battalions in Toronto competing for
volunteers as well as three battalions from nearby Peel County that were recruiting
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outside o f their assigned areas.86 Under the circumstances, any attempt to allocate
recruiting periods to each battalion was futile. As late as December 1916, Major-General
Logie complained that the 236th McLean Highlanders from Frederiction were recruiting
in the city although “my arrangement with the Commanding Officer was for him not to
recruit in Toronto until after .one month from the authorization of the 255 Overseas
Battalion CEF.”87
Headquarters MD 11 used several methods to control recruiting. In August 1916,
militia recruiters were instructed to operate only within their parent regiment’s district.
CEF units, on the other hand, could detail special recruiting parties to tour designated
AA

areas within the district.

Despite the apparent freedom given to CEF units, there was

little competition for recruits. Admittedly five battalions were recruiting simultaneously
in Vancouver and Victoria, but three had specialized interests: the 143rd was a bantam
battalion, the 211th an American Legion battalion and the 218th were railway troops. The
only real competition was in Vancouver where both the 158th and 231st Battalions were
trying to build up their strength.89
HQ MD 5 in Eastern Québec chose to divide the district into six recruiting areas,
each manned by militia officers. However, the officers proved to be inefficient and in
December 1915, the 57th, 167th, 171st and 189th Battalions were each assigned specific
districts.90 But with the departure of the 57th, 171st and 189th Battalions for England in
1916, the recruiting structure fell apart and the district had to be reorganized with a
Director o f Recruiting to control district recruiting detachments.91 Three primary district
offices were established at Québec, Lévis and Rivière du Loup with satellite offices at
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Chicoutimi and Grand Mère. Travelling medical boards were also created, each manned
by two CAMC doctors, to visit to visit recruiting offices as necessary.92
In Alberta, HQ MD 13 allocated specific areas to battalions and then tried to
suspend recruiting by new units until the existing ones were full. In January 1916, the
113th Lethbridge Highlanders had enlisted 350 men after a three-month recruiting
campaign. Despite this dismal showing, Hughes authorized two new battalions (the 191st
and 192nd) tò recruit in the same area as the 113th. Since there were now too many
battalions chasing too few recruits, the district commander, Brigadier-General
Cruikshànk, recommended to Militia HQ that recruiting be deferred for the 191st and
192nd until the 113th was up to strength. But his efforts were unsuccessful and Hughes
directed that the 191st and 192nd continue recruiting.93 Not surprisingly, none of these
battalions reached full strength. The 113th sailed in September 1916 with 883 men, the
192nd in October 1916 with 424 men and the 192nd followed in 1917 with a total of 316
men in two drafts.94

^

' Ì

¿

^

In some cases, battalions imposed controls on recruiting by the individual
companies. The 135th Battalion, for example, divided Middlesex County, Ontario into
company areas with Middlesex East allocated to B Company. But Middlesex East was a
rural area and only 10,666 males of all ages had been enumerated in the 1911 Census. B
Company was therefore allowed to recruit in the City of London where 21,901 males had
been counted in 1911.95 Other companies were apparently given the same privilege and
when the battalion embarked for England in August 1916,496 men or 54.5% of the
battalion had been enlisted in London.96 Needless to say, recruiting for the 142nd (City of
London’s Own), which was restricted to London, suffered and that unit embarked for
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England on 31 October 1916 with only 574 men, 95% of whom had been enlisted in the
city .97

.

■■
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Creating community-based battalions broadened the recruiting base with
impressive results but paradoxically reduced recruiting. In brief, all of these units were .
organized as conventional battalions with no allowance for recruiting officers and NCOs.
Recruiting, therefore, was done by officers and NCOs temporarily seconded from their
platoons and sections. As long as the units remained at their home station conducting
individual training, these individuals could be spared from their primary duties. But in the
spring o f 1916, the new battalions were removed from their home stations and
concentrated at central camps to conduct collective training from section to brigade level.
/

Officers and NCOs employed on recruiting, therefore, had to return to their platoons and
sections which meant that recruiting was effectively halted.

>

The removal o f battalions from their home stations in the spring of 1916 had a
significant effect on recruiting. In March 1916, 33,960 men enrolled and thereafter, the
numbers fell as battalions moved to central training camps: 20,200 in April, 14,572 in
May, 10,059 in June, 7,961 in July and 6,597 in August.
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While there may have been

other reasons for declining enrolments, a major cause was the removal of the battalions
from their home bases, a point made by Brigadier-General Hemming o f HQ MD 3
(Eastern Ontario) in August 1916. “With reference to the 130th, 136th, 139th and 146th
Battalions [from MD 3] at Valcartier” Hemming wrote to Militia HQ, “I have the honour
to state that it is impossible to recruit men for these units in view of their present
location .”99
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The 110th Battalion from Perth County, Ontario, enrolled 850 men between
November 1915 and May: 1916 while they were stationed in the County, but only thirtytwo after the battalion was concentrated, first at London on 22 May 1916 and then at
Camp Borden on 20 July 1916.100 Significantly twenty-one o f those enlisted after 22 May
1916 joined in London or Camp Borden while only eleven were enlisted in Perth
County. 101 In Saskatchewan, the diarist of the 232nd Battalion remarked that with the
unit’s move to Camp Hughes on 20 July 1916, the battalion recruiting campaign had t o »
be discontinued because “the movement [to Camp Hughes] necessitated the bringing in
of all our men from outlying points.” 102 The unit diarist did not exaggerate. O f the 450
men who sailed with the 232nd in April 1917, 380 had enlisted before the battalion went
/

to Camp Hughes while a further seventeen joined before the unit moved to winter
quarters at Battleford and North Battleford on 20 October 1916. Recruiting was resumed,
but the momentum had been lost and only fifty-three additional volunteers j oined the
battalion before embarkation .103
The policy o f creating new battalions ended shortly after Hughes resigned his
portfolio in mid-November 1916. His departure was not mourned at Militia HQ,
particularly by the CGS who openly deplored “the lack of well-regulated and firmly
administered system o f organization [that] has interfered with the provision of
reinforcements and impeded the upkeep of battalions overseas.” 104 As early as 29
November 1916, the AG rejected a request from HQ MD 10 for a new battalion in
Selkirk, Manitoba, because if additional units “were raised, they would merely be draftgiving Depot Battalions .” 105 A month later, in December 1916, the DG Mobilization,
Brigadier-General Gwynne, recommended that a proposal to raise another battalion in
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New Brunswick be scotched, adding that “No new battalions have been raised [since]
General Hughes left, and it would be fatal to once open the door again to do so .” 106
Gwynne’s recommendation was understandable, but the battalions being shipped to
England [Chapter 8 ] as soon as troopships could be organized, constituted the infantry
recruiting structure. Once they were gone, there was nothing.

Both Militia HQ in Ottawa and the newly-organized HQ of the Overseas Military
Forces o f Canada (OMFC) in London were well aware of the need for a new recruiting'
and reinforcing structure to replace the battalions being shipped overseas and there was
an exchange o f ideas between the CGS and Major-General R.E.W. Turner, the newlyappointed GOC Canadians in England . 107 Both felt that the infantry should be organized
on a territorial basis with three linked battalions: a recruiting unit or depot in Canada, a
training battalion in England, and a fighting battalion in France. The two differed only on
the details, with Turner recommending generic recruiting centres and Gwatkin favouring
militia units .108
Gwatkin’s trust in the militia at this stage of the war was odd, but with the small
staffs at both Militia and district HQ, creating a large-scale national recruiting
organization would have taken time whereas the militia was available immediately.
Linking militia regiments to CEF battalions, Gwatkin thought, might boost recruiting and
there was also the matter of the hard-won battle honours and achievements of CEF units
that should be perpetuated in the post-war army . 109 Others shared the CGS’s faith in the
militia and in January 1917, Colonel H. Osborne at Militia HQ wrote, “our greatest hope
in the present situation lies in the Militia of Canada. Although dormant, with the
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exception of a few Regiments at the present time, it is a powerful agency, if wisely
employed, not only for providing a defensive force, but also for furnishing recruits for
Overseas.” 110
Gwatkin’s faith in the militia seemed reasonable at the time since a number of
militia units had already succeeded in recruiting overseas contingents in 1915, as

.

discussed in Chapter 8 . Militia units had also been able to raise drafts; in 1915, for
example, the 79th Cameron Highlanders, 90th Winnipeg Rifles and 34th Fort Garry Horse
raised six overseas drafts of about 250 men each . 111 At the same time, the 6 6 th Regiment
in Halifax recruited a draft of 250 men while the 63rd, also from Halifax, recruited three
drafts of 100 men each.

With these examples in mind, the CGS circulated a proposal to

Militia HQ staff on 15 January 1917 to use militia units as recruiting agencies. In brief,
the CGS noted that sixteen infantry regiments were already recruiting for the CEF and
that an additional thirty-nine urban regiments should be invited to form “regimental
depots with a view to raising and training reinforcements for service overseas.”

There

was no disagreement with the proposal at Militia HQ and three days later, districts were
formally instructed to invite city regiments to form regimental depots to recruit and train
drafts for the CEF overseas. 114
Despite Gwatkin’s optimism, expectations were not high and regiments were
expected to provide small drafts rather than delay the movement of reinforcements until
company-sized drafts could be recruited. In February 1917, the 43rd Regiment in MD 3
was allowed to form a regimental depot, but drafts were limited to one officer and fifty
men .115 Similarly, in April 1917, the 32nd Regiment in MD 1 was given authority to
establish a depot in Walkerton, Ontario, to recruit reinforcements for the 160th (Bruce)
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Battalion, then serving with the 5th Division in England. But, as the AG noted when he
approved the new depot, “It is understood that if men are needed they will be sent over in
batches o f fifty under a lieutenant.” 116
The number of recruits obtained by the militia depots was disappointing. The 11

th

Regiment in Vancouver was able to find only fifty-one infantrymen, while in MD 1, the
District Commander reported in July 1917, that six militia regiments had provided drafts
but the number of recruits “is so small that it is impossible to train them separately and
get satisfactory results .” 117 The effort to maintain the regimental identity of the militia
drafts was obviously a lost cause and in August 1917, the AG directed that all recruits
should be posted to the newly-formed depot battalion in London and thus form part of the
/•

general reinforcement stream.

ItR

As discussed in Chapter 2, efforts were also made to use the militia to recruit men
for the Canadian Defence Force (CDF) for both home defence and the CEF overseas. But
there was little appetite in Canada for the CDF and even less in England where the War
Office was concerned that the new force would siphon off potential recruits for the
CEF . 119 It was widely expected from the start that the CDF would fail because the supply
of volunteers had long since dried up. The Director-General, Major-General S.C.
Mewbum, for one, was “convinced that it will be impossible to raise 50,000 men for the
Home Defence o f Canada on the voluntary enlistment plan .” 120 His sentiments were
shared by the CO o f the 53rd Regiment in Sherbrooke, Québec, who said flatly
“Compulsory training is the only way in which my Regiment can be gotten together.”
Further west in Winnipeg, the CO of the 174th Battalion wrote to Militia HQ that “this
latest scheme for mobilizing the Militia as the CDF is going to prove absolutely
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useless.”

But the concerns were disregarded since the CDF had a political as well as a

military purpose. “It has not been made clear to me” wrote the new Minister of Militia
and Defence to the CDF Director-General in March 1917, “why we should proceed by
force to enlist men for Home Defence. , .without first proceeding in a voluntary way .” 123
A sa recruiting venture, the CDF was a miserable failure. Forty-seven militia
infantry regiments organized depots, but managed to enlist only 565 men for the CDF
and 1,293 for the CEF after a three-month recruiting campaign. Some districts, such as
MD 5 (Eastern Québec) and MD 13 (British Columbia), were able to find recruits for the
CDF but not the CEF, while MD 6 (Nova Scotia, New Brunswick and Prince Edward;
Island) was unable to find volunteers for either component.124 However, a few units
enjoyed some success and by the end of June 1917, the 48th Highlanders in Toronto had
found 133 recruits: 116 for the CEF and seventeen for home defence. But the overall
quality o f applicants was poor. At least sixty-four had been rejected, a quarter of whom
were both underage and medically unfit - boys such as Harry Brennan, an under-sized,
fifteen-year-old labourer with lung cancer, and seventeen-year-old Victor Callebert who
weighed only ninety-five pounds. Underage recruits, particularly for the home defence
component, were also a problem and in June 1917, Lieutenant Haldenby o f the 48th wrote
“We are to have a medical board examine the Depot on Wednesday and I think we will
kiss the CDF good-by on Friday if they stick to the 18 [year-old] age limit.” 125 After
three months of effort, it became apparent that few Canadians were willing to volunteer
for the CDF and recruiting was therefore suspended on 22 May 1917. However militia
depots continued to recruit for the CEF and over the next three months, the recruits were
transferred to the newly-organized territorial depot battalions.126
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As the CDF and the militia depots wound down, Militia HQ took stock of CEF
manpower in Canada. The results were depressing. In May 1917, 6,407 men enlisted in
the CEF but only 1,208 in the infantry. Figures for June 1917 were similar with only
1,126 o f 6,363 volunteers choosing the infantry. It was clear that the pool of able-bodied
men in Canada willing to volunteer was virtually drained and that no recruiting
organization that relied on volunteers, no matter how efficient, would be able to produce
the numbers required. There; was some relief when the British-Canadian Recruiting
Mission was established in June 1917 (see Chapter 5) and thousands of American
residents joined the CEF, but this supply of manpower was dependent on the goodwill
and cooperation of the US Government.
M ilita r y S e r v ic e A c t.

The only solution was conscription under the

However, calling men up (a form of compulsory enlistment) was

not the responsibility o f the military but of the Military Service Branch of the Department
of Justice. Thus, for the final year of the war, the Canadian Forces lost control of the
principal means for finding recruits.

A vital part of the process of enlisting men was the conduct of medical
examinations, completion o f personal documentation and the issue of kit to the new
recruits. Initially this was done by militia regiments or CEF units, or a combination of the
two. But in practice, this arrangement could not have been very efficient. It is doubtful,
for example, that many militia units had adequate stocks of khaki service dress uniforms.
CEF units, on the other hand, could draw from district ordnance stocks. But with the
requirement to stock uniforms of various sizes, quartermasters inevitably held more
uniforms than there were soldiers in the battalion. With the overall shortage of uniforms,
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it made no sense to allow units to maintain a surplus. Unit medical sections and orderly
rooms, staffed to provide services to the unit, must have also been hard-pressed at times
to handle the influx o f recruits. Inevitably, the CEF started in mid-1915 to centralize
administrative recruiting functions.
The first recruiting depots were established in Toronto and Hamilton after the
introduction o f continuous recruiting in July 1915. The functions of these new depots, as
described at the time by the Toronto Star, were straightforward:
Recruiting is to go on even after the quotas for new units have been raised.
According to the present plans, the [militia] regiments will continue to gather
Men as rapidly as possible and send them to the central and permanent
Recruiting stations which are to be opened. From the recruiting depot these
Men will be sent to Niagara in batches to be trained there until formed into
battalions .128
Details of the actual process are sketchy, but in the case o f the 48 Highlanders,
recruiters filled out a regimental form for each recruit with the data needed for
documentation and then sent the man to the Recruiting Depot for a medical examination,
*
documentation, attestation and issue of basic kit. In some cases, 48 staff also ensured
that consent forms were completed by the next of kin of married men and minors. 129
Close ties were maintained between the depot and the militia units that provided the
recruits. The Hamilton Recruiting Depot, for example, had eight companies to hold
recruits, two for the infantry and the remaining six for the cavalry, artillery, engineers,
CASC and CAMC. Each company was affiliated with a specific militia unit.130
Other districts established recruiting centres as well. In Ottawa the MD 3 Base
Recruiting Office on Sparks Street under Captain A.H. Thobum opened in August 1915
with a staff of one medical officer, a stenographer (Miss B. Thobum) and four recruiting
sergeants. 131 MD 1 followed in the fall of 1915 with a recmiting depot in London and the
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following year established a district office in Windsor as well as the 1st Hussars

•

Recruiting Depot in Amherstburg that, despite the name, processed recruits for all
corps.

132

Further west, in British Columbia, HQ MD 11 opened the Vancouver Recruiting
Centre in the fall of 1915, under the command o f Charles Grant Henshaw, a local
commission merchant who retained his civilian status and was paid as a lieutenantcolonel. 133 His wife, Julia Willmothe Henshaw, was commissioned as a militia officer at
about the same time by Sam Hughes and called out on a permanent basis as a captain
with a vague mandate to promote recruiting. Captain Henshaw was later dismissed by the
Militia Council in October 1917, largely because it was not apparent what she did or who
/•

she reported to . 134 The Henshaws were, perhaps, the only officially sanctioned husbandand-wife recruiting team in either world war.
MD 10 under Brigadier-General H.N. Ruttan adopted a more systematic approach
to recruiting and in November 1915, with the approval of Militia HQ, established four
‘regimental areas’ with headquarters in Winnipeg, Dauphin, Moose Jaw and Prince
Albert. 135 Each area was responsible for establishing outlying detachments to find
volunteers and a central headquarters to process the new recruits. Recruiting Area ‘D’,
for example, had eight recruiting detachments and a central headquarters in Prince Albert
staffed by a Quartermaster, Medical Officer and Adjutant together with clerks and
storemen. The remaining three areas were similarly organized. Whether or not this
organization would have been an efficient means of recruiting is unknown since Hughes
almost immediately authorized new battalions to recruit in the same areas. The four areas
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were therefore disbanded in February 1916 and the men used to provide the nucleus for
the new battalions: 222nd (Area A), 226th (Area B), 188th (Area C) and 229th (Area D ) .136
By m id-1916, as discussed in Chapter 4, the number of unfit men sent overseas
had become a matter o f serious concern and Hughes appointed a newly-commissioned
CAMC officer, Colonel H.A. Bruce, as a ‘Special Inspector General’, to investigate the
situation in England.

The matter was politically sensitive and in August 1916, after '

reviewing a proposal from the AG, Prime Minister Borden suggested to F.B. McCurdy,
the Parliamentary Secretary to Hughes, that the Militia Council should establish
mobilization centres across the country to ensure recruits were medically fit. Militia HQ
reacted promptly, Hughes did not interfere, perhaps because he was in England, and three
weeks later, on 12 September 1916, the AG directed that all districts form mobilization
centres where recruits would be documented and medically examined. 138
The new mobilization centres were intended mainly to ensure that all recruits
were medically fit. Medical examinations by unit medical officers and civilian physicians
were regarded as preliminary only and the final decision regarding fitness was to be made
at the mobilization centre. Each centre was to be commanded by a combatant officer with
at least three medical officers, one o f whom had to be an eye and ear specialist. Recruits
determined to be fit would be returned to their parent unit while those who were unfit
would be compensated for their time and provided with free transportation home.

1 “i Q

In practice, districts were free to establish mobilization centres to suit local
conditions as they saw fit. In October 1916, the newly formed MD 12 (Saskatchewan)
created a total of eight centres across the province while MD 11 (British Columbia)
considered that centres were required only in Vancouver and Victoria. MD 5 (Eastern
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Québec) on the other hand was made up chiefly of rural parishes and from March 1917
onwards recruits were processed at the Recruiting Depot in Québec City. 140
In MD 2, four mobilization centres were formed to service specific regions. The
Toronto Mobilization Centre handled Peel, York, Simcoe, Halton, Norfolk, Ontario,
Dufferin and Grey Counties as well as the District of Muskoka, while the Hamilton
Mobilization Centre processed recruits from Wentworth, Dundas, Brant and Haldimand
Counties. Smaller offices were established in Sudbury to handle recruits from Northern
Ontario and St Catharines to process volunteers from the Niagara Peninsula .141
Temporary mobilization centres were also formed as necessary, such as the detachment
that operated in Owen Sound from April to June 1917 to process recruits for the 248

tVi

Battalion . 142
Unlike the early days of the war when militia units processed recruits in
peacetime orderly rooms, Mobilization Centres were both large complex organizations
that reflected the increased sophistication of the Canadian Forces. In June 1917, the
Toronto centre was staffed by 102 officers and men together with twenty female clerks.
The Sudbury Mobilization Centre was much smaller, but in June 1918 was staffed by
nine officers and men and one female clerk as well as two NCOs and ten men to escort
recruits to one of the depot battalions in Toronto . 143 The Toronto Centre had four
sections. The administrative section provided for the needs of the individual recruit and
consisted o f the Main Orderly Room with the OC, adjutant, paymaster and clerks as well
as quartermaster stores and an attestation room with six clerks. Another section was
responsible for medical examinations and consisted of thirteen ‘boards’, each with a
medical officer and an orderly. Lastly, there was a special duties section headed by the
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sergeant-major and a general duties section staffed with eight soldiers that looked after
routine fatigues. 144

In essence, recruiting was the means by which the CEF tapped the national
manpower pool. The extent to which this pool could be utilized, however, depended not
only the size of the pool but on the number of men who met the criteria for military
service.1These standards varied throughout the war and both the changes and the effect on
recruiting form the principal themes of Chapter 4.
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Co. Limited, 1920) p.71. The 63rd, 66th and 94th Regiments were fully occupied with home defence duties.
The remaining six militia infantry regiments in the province were rural units with detachments in forty-two
communities. It is likely that none of them were capable of recruiting drafts for CEF units. The 25th
Battalion opened recruiting stations in Sydney, Amherst, New Glasgow, Truro and Yarmouth; McGowan,
S. Douglas. New Brunswick’s Fighting 26th. (Saint John, New Brunswick: Neptune Publishing Co., 1994)
p.5 notes battalion recruiting offices in various communities, all of which had militia units; Saint John (HQ
62nd Regiment), Chatham (HQ-,73rd Regiment), Fredericton (HQ 71st Regiment), Charlottetown (HQ 82nd
Regiment), Newcastle (B Company of 73rd), Campbellton (F Company of 73rd) and Moncton (D and H
Companies of 74th). There is no evidence that the militia units were involved as such in recruiting for the
26th.
;
■
(29 Attestation papers of men enlisted in Edmonton for the 31st Battalion were signed off by Major Hewgill,
who also raised a draft for the 23rd Battalion; Edmonton Daily Bulletin 3 November 1914, p.l; 4 November
1914, pp.4, 8, 10; Quarterly Militia List Corrected to 1st July 1914 lists Major Hewgill with the ‘Reserve of
Officers’ for the 16th Light Horse; Canada, Department of Militia and Defence. Canadian Expeditionary
Force: 31st Battalion. Nominal Roll of Officers. Non-Commissioned Officers and Men. (Issued with Militia
Orders 1915) p.2 shows that Hewgill was taken on strength of the 3 Ist Battalion on 16 November 1914.,
30 LAC RG 24 Vol 1398 File 593-6-2 Vol 9, Hughes to AG 14 November 1915 directed that Morfitt be
selected to raise a battalion in Calgary. Most of the attestation forms for Calgary men recruited for the 3 1st,
56th and 63rd Battalions were approved by Captain Morfitt. _
31 Lethbridge Daily Herald 11 November 1914, p. 1: Medicine Hat News 19 November 1914 refers to Orr,
but not to Oakes; Attestation papers for 3 1st Battalion recruits in Lethbridge and Medicine Hat were
approved by the officers concerned.
;
3i LAC RG 9 II F6 Vol 68, pay sheets ‘Recruiting 2nd Overseas Expeditionary Force 22 October-4
November 1914’: Stratford Daily Herald 23 October 1914 p.l
33 LAC RG 9 IIF9 Vol 29 File ‘24th Regt Details August 1914 to October 1914’, paysheets for CO,
Adjutant and three sergeants 22 October-4 November 1914; LAC RG 9 IIF9 Vol 30 File ‘29th Regiment
Headquarters August 1914 to December 1914’ paysheets for 21 October-4 November 1914 with CO, MO,
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Orderly Room Sergeant and two privates; RG 9 II F9 Voi 31 File ‘33rd Regiment August 1914 to October
1916’ paysheets for CO, one major and one private at Clinton 23 October-4 November 1914, Despite the
title, this file also contains pay sheets for 27“*Regiment detachment of five at Sarnia 22 October-4
November 1914
34 LAC RG 9 IIF9 Vol 30 File ‘30th Regiment August 1914 to December 1914’ paysheets 24 October-3
November 1914 for Fergus (CO and one clerk) and Guelph (Adjutant, MO and Orderly Room Sergeant)
35 LAC R G 9 IIF 9 Vol 224'Files ‘MD 2 - 23rd Regiment Aug 1914-July 1915’ paysheets for unit staff and
recruits for varying periods 27 October-4 November 1914 and ‘MD 2 - 34th Regiment Aug 1914-April
1915’ paysheets for CO, MO, one captain and one sergeant 26 October-9 November 1914; RG 9 IIF9 Vol
31 Files ‘32nd Regiment September 1914 to June 1917’ paysheets for CO, MO and one private for varying
periods 26 October-3 November 1914 and File ‘47th Regiment October 1915 to November 1915’ Despite
the title, the file contains a paysheet for Captain Tronsdale of D Company, Napanee 1-31 October 1914.
36 LAC RG 9 IIF9 Vol 1535 File ‘MD 13 - CASC No 14 Company April 1914-July 1915’ paysheets 30
November-3 December 1914
37 Duguid. Official History of the Canadian Forces in the Great War 1914-1919, Chronology, Appendices
and Maps, pp.344-345, ‘Note on 22nd Battalion CEF’; Canada, Department of Militia and Defence.
Canadian Expeditionary Force: 23rd Battalion: Nominal Roll of Officers. Non-Commissioned Officers and
Men. (Issued with Militia Orders 1915); Canada, Department of Militia and Defence. Canadian
Expeditionary Force: 24th Battalion: Nominal Roll of Officers. Non-Commissioned Officers and Men.
(Issued with Militia Orders 1915); A total of 135 men with the 23rd Battalion were enlisted in Calgary or
Edmonton, the remainder were enlisted in the Province of Québec. In the 24th Battalion, one platoon was
enlisted in Lindsay, Ontario while the rest of the battalion enlisted in Québec. Reinforcements from MD 10
and 11, therefore, must have been militiamen when they travelled to Montréal for'attestation.1
38 Hunt. Nova Scotia’s Part in the Great War, p.41 notes that the 3rd, 4th and 11th CFA Brigades (Militia)
forwarded recruits for the 23rd and 24th Batteries (CEF) in Fredericton. There was no prewar militia battery
in Fredericton and the city was probably selected as a mobilization point because the PF barracks had been
vacated when the RCR were sent to Bermuda in September 1914.
39 Quarterly Militia List... corrected to 1st July 1916. pp, 191-210 shows location and date of establishment
of each militia battery; Strictly speaking, the 13th and 38th Batteries were located in Winnipeg, with the 36th
housed on the other side of the Red River in St Boniface (now kno wn as Saint Boniface). Nicholson. The
Gunners of Canada: Volume I. pp.236-238; Duguid. Official History of the Canadian Forces in the Great
War 1914-1919. Chronology. Appendices and Maps, p.373 lists date and place of mobilization for each
battery in the 2nd Divisional Artillery.
40 Carr, Lieutenant-Colonel N.O. ‘The Man Behind the Gun’ in Canadian Defence Quarterly Vol VIII
Number 3 (April 1931) p.374. Carr claimed that the battery’s outstanding maintenance record was entirely
due to CPR artificers. The author was a PF artillery officer who changed his name from Reiffenstein to
Carr after the war broke out.
41 Toronto Globe 8 August 1914 p.7 reported the initial offer from General Electric; LAC RG 24 Vol 4331
File 34-1-14, OA RCE Ottawa to CRCE 2nd Division 7 September 1914; GOC 2nd Division to Militia HQ
16 September 1914 explains that two men did not meet enrollment standards but were sent to Halifax
regardless. The file contains correspondence up to February 1916 regarding the replacement of GE workers
who were discharged or joined the CEF
~
42 LAC RG 24 Vol 1166 File 64-82-1 Vol 3, ‘Report of the Annual Inspection 1915 -Field Butchery Toronto’ 1 March 1915 commented on the technical skills of the NCOs; Canada, Department of Militia and
Defence. Canadian Expeditionary Force: Field Bakery and Field Butchery C.A.S.C.: Nominal Roll of
Officers. Non-Commissioned Officers and Men. (Issued with Militia Orders 1915); Collins, Major G.R.N.
Military Organization and Administration. (London: Hugh Rees Ltd;,T918) p.214 for a short explanation
on the function of a Field Butchery; Canadian Militia War Establishments (Provisional) 1914. p.94 notes
that a field butchery consisted of one officer and twenty men divided into three butchery squads capable of
killing and dressing sufficient meat for one division each day.
43 LAC RG 9 III D3 Vol 5021 File 784 Reel T-10906 ‘War Diary Number 6 Depot Unit of Supply’ 3
December 1914 and 20 January 1915.
44 LAC RG 9 IIF9 Vol 551 Files ‘MD 3 Governor General’s Foot Guards Nov 1914-Jan 1916’ and MD 3
Governor General’s Foot Guards June 1915 - July 1915’ with GGFG Regimental Order Number 15 of 11

157

June 1915 with a nominal roll of forty-three men under the heading ‘The following men enlisted for
Overseas Service were transferred to 59th Battn CEF, Barriefield [Kingston], on 8* June 1915’. Pay lists are
stamped ‘GGFG (Recruits CEF)\
45 LAC RG 9 IIF9 Vol 224 File ‘MD 2 - 3 1 st Regiment Overseas Contingent Sept 1914’ with pay list ‘31st
Regt quota of 37th Provisional Bn Feb 1915’, and File ‘MD 2 - 3 1st Regiment Apr 1915-June 1915’ with
pay lists of men recruited for the 37th and 58th Battalions.
6 LAC RG 9 IIF9 Vol 563, Data taken from pay lists in files ‘56th Regiment (A & E Company) MD 3
Daily Orders March-December 1915’, ‘57th Regiment Overseas Detachment MD 3 Daily Orders Aug 1914Aug 1915’ and ‘57th Regiment Overseas Detachment MD 3 Daily Orders Sept 1915-April 1917’. The latter
file contains a note that HQ MD 3 had instructed that all recruits for the 80th Battalion would be transferred
as soon as enlisted. The file also contains 57th Regiment Daily Orders for September 1915 showing men
sent to the 80th.
47 Toronto Star 5 August 1915 p.2
48 LAC RG 24 Vol 1397 File 593-6-2 Vol 8, OC 2nd Division to Militia HQ 27 September 1915 ^
49 LAC RG 24 Vol 4552 File 125-1-13, OC Depot Company 55th Battalion to AAG 6th Division 31 July
1915 ■:
'
'
■
. .
50 LAC RG 24 Vol 4552 File 125-1-23, GOC 6th Division to Militia HQ 20 July 1915 pointed out that .
between 19 June and 3 July 1915, Lieutenant-Colonel J.D. McRae, for example, received $132 for pay and
expenses, but failed to secure any recruits. It is perhaps significant that permission was required from
Militia HQ to relieve recruiting officers. AG to GOC 6th Division 28 July 1915 approved firing all but four
officers employed on recruiting duties.
51 LAC RG 24 Vol 4552 File 125-1-13, Provincial Recruiting Officer to AAG 6th Division 12 August 1915
52 LAC RG 24 Vol 4552 File 125-1-13, Lieutenant-Colonel Armstrong to AAG 6th' Division 12 August
1915, Armstrong to AAG 6th Division 17 August 1915
53 LAC RG 24 Vol 4552 File 125-1-13, Lieutenant-Colonel Armstrong to AAG 6th Division 14 August
1915.
54 LAC RG 9 IIF9 Vol 30, Pay sheets ‘Recruiting for CEF July.2, 1915 -July 27, 1915’ and ‘Recruiting for
CEF August 6, 1915 -August 30. 1915’: Stratford Daily Beacon 4 September 1915 p.l; LAC RG 9 IIF9
Vol 30, Pay sheets ‘Recruiting Men for 71st Battalion’ 23 September-9 November 1915 and 2-21
September 1915
55RG 150 acc 1992-93/166 Vols 7487 (H Orr), 7393 (HK Oakes) and 9318 (JW Stewart). ■
56 Quarterly Militia List Corrected to 1st July 1916 pp. 262.288. 317 and 409
57DHHKE6848 A329 C3Q9 Minutes of the Militia Council 1916 p;196 lOAiigust 1916.
58 LAC RG 24 Vol 1396 File 593-6-2 Vol 4, AG to Minister of Militia and Defence 28 June 1915 ;
recommended that Logie’s earlier request (not on file) should be granted. A marginal note says ‘Yes. SH’;
Toronto Star 21 August 1915 p.5
59 Militia Order 161 of 29 March 1915
^Nicholson. Canadian Expeditionary Force 1914-1919. p.216
61 Canada, War Purchasing Commission. Report of the War Purchasing Commission: Vol 2. Minutes from
Minute No. L M av4 1915 to Minute No 6616. April 28. 1916. (Ottawa: King’s Printer, 1916) pp.603-605,
QMG to War Purchasing Commission 19 April 1916 referred to Borden’s announcement of an additional
| 250,000 men for the CEF
~
[ 62 DHH 74/672 (Edwin Pye Fonds) Box 5 Folder 20 File ‘Statistics’. Wastage is not confined to battle
i casualties but includes losses from all causes.
63 Nicholson. Canadian Expeditionary Force, p.546
,
64 LAC RG 24 Vol 4508 File 17-1-49 Vol VI, AG to GOC MD 5 31 August 1916 enclosing a copy of PC
10944 of 16 August 1916 allowing the Governor in Council to appoint a director of recruiting in each
district; TNA CO 42/994 contains a copy of PC 2688 of 23 September 1916 concerning the same issue.
65 LAC RG 24 Vol 858 File 54-21-12-33, GOC MD 2 to Militia HQ 26 September 1916 referring to an
earlier proposal of 9 August 1916 which was not retained in the file.
66 LAC RG 24 Vol 858 File 54-21-12-33, AAG(l) to AG 8 September 1916 outlining the scheme. District
returns commented on an AG circular letter of 21 September 1916 but no copy of this letter has been found.
67 LAC RG 24 Vol 858 File 54-21-13-33, AG to Parliamentary Secretary 30 October 1916 comments that
only MD 1,2,10 and 11 were in favor; GOC MD 3 to Militia HQ 25 September 1916 and 13 October 1916
recommended compulsory callout under the Militia Act, GOC MD 4 to Militia HQ 10 October 1916 noted
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that existing units were short 3,570 men and went on to recommend conscription or some form of
compulsory service. The file ends 30 October 1916 and it appears no further action was taken. •
68 RG 24 Vol 4552 File 125-1-23, AG Circular Letter 1 October 1915 saying, in part, “Officers
Commanding Divisions or Districts will, however, be responsible for seeing that no Unit in their Command
takes steps for recruiting in another Division or District before the Officer Commanding such other
Division or District has been furnished with information to this effect.”
69 LAC RG 24 Vol 6600 File 1982-1-24 Vol l, Director of Mobilization to AG 27 December 1916
commenting on Hughes’s favored infantry battalions and AG circular telegram 8 March 1916.
70 LAC RG 24 Vol 6600 File 1982-1-24 Vol 1, DOC MD 11 to Militia HQ 6 December 1916
71 LAC RG 24 Vol 6600 File 1982-1-24 Vol 1, GOC MD 2 to Militia HQ 5 December 1916
72 LAC RG 24 Vol 6600 File 1982-1-24 Vol 1, Nova Scotia Recruiting Association to OC 6th Division 30
October 1916, GOC MD 6 to Militia HQ 1 November 1916 saying in part “...I am in sympathy with the
stand taken by this Association.”
73 LAC RG 24 Vol 6600 File 1982-1-24 Vol 1, Union of Alberta Municipalities to Sir Robert L. Borden 9
November 1916
74 LAC RG 24 Vol 6600 File 1982-1-24 Vol 1, AG Circular Telegram 2 January 1917 directing that the
174th, 197th, 223rd, 236th, 244th and 253rd Battalions confine recruiting to their own district after 15 February
1917; LAC RG 9 IIA2 Vol 33 ‘Minutes of the Militia Council 1916’, p.439 with decisions of 27 December
1916. Six battalions (174th, 197th, 223rd, 236th, 244th and 243rd) lost the right to recruit outside of their
district.
75 LAC RG 24 Vol 1402 File 593-6-2 Vol 21, Captain G.S. Balfour, i/c Recruiting Detachment to OC 199th
Battalion Irish-Canadian Rangers 30 October 1916 :
76 LAC RG 24 Vol 1397 File 593-6-2 Vol 7, AG to Director of Mobilization 20 October 1915 saying that
Hughes had authorized a battalion in Victoria to be known as the 88th and that the 88th (New Brunswick)
Battalion would have to be renumbered, AG to OC 6th Division 20 October 1915 saying that the 88th
Battalion would now be known as the 104th Battalion.
77 LAC RG 24 Vol 1397 File 593-6-2 Vol 8, AG to 2nd Division 6 November 1915 directing that a battalion
be raised in Sault Ste Marie and asking the District Commander to recommend a suitable CO; LAC RG 24
Vol 1398 File 593-6-2 Vol 9, Hughes to AG 27 November 1915 directing the 119th and 134th Battalions be
amalgamated with the title of 119th, the appointment of W.R. Smyth and adding that the number ‘134’
should be used elsewhere; LAC RG 9 III D1 Vol 4700 Folder 70 File 20 ‘ 119th Battalion’, ‘Provisional
Major’ Smyth was the recruiting officer and the first recruiting meeting was held in Sault Ste Marie 27
December 1915. Smyth was a fifty-eight year old lumberman and former member of a Volunteer unit in
Scotland; He formally joined the CEF in June 1916, when he became the CO of the 238th (Forestry)
Battalion.
78 LAC RG 9 III D1 Vol 4700 Folder 72 File 12, ‘134th Battalion Historical Records’ completed 8 January
1917 noting that the battalion had been authorized 4 December 1915
:
79 LAC RG 9 III D1 Vol 4700 Folder 71 File 6, ‘122nd Battalion’ with historical summary produced 3 July
1917 by the CO, Lieutenant-Colonel D.M. Grant: Quarterly Militia List corrected to 1st July 1916. p.197:
LAC RG 150 acc 1992-93/166 Box 3726 personnel file Lieutenant-Colonel D.M. Grant, Box 7015
personnel file Lieutenant-Colonel D.H. MacLaren
80 University of Western Ontario Area Research and Collections Centre Box 5100, Divisional Ordersissued
by Colonel L.W. Shannon, Administering the 1st Divisional Area 27 November 1915 quoting instructions
from Militia HQ.
81 LAC RG 24 Vol 1583 File 683-239-5, ‘Report of the Annual Inspection 1916 of the 151st Overseas
Battalion CEF, Sarcee Camp 23 September 1916
82 LAC RG 9 III D1 Vol 4700 Folder 70 File 20 ‘119th Battalion’, Historical summary prepared by
Lieutenant-Colonel T.P.T. Rowland 16 May 1917.
83 LAC RG 9 III D1 Vol 4700 Folder 72 File 14 ‘135th Battalion’, Canadian War Records Office
questionnaire complete by Captain J.H.C. Woodward 21 March 1917.
84Nicholson. Canadian Expeditionary Force, p.547.
85 LAC RG 24 Vol 1401 File 593-6-2 Vol 19, GOC MD 3 to Militia HQ 22 August 1916 outlining his
proposal which based on the premise that areas with an approximate population of 80,000 should constitute
a battalion area, AG to GOC MD 3 30 September 1916 rejecting the proposal and suggesting that a base
battalion could be formed to help fill existing infantry battalions which were all under strength.
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86 LAC RG 9 III DI Vol 4700 Folder 71 File 8 (123rd Battalion) and Folder 71 File 11 (124th Battalion;
Toronto Globe 1 March 1916 p.8 noted that five battalions were recruiting in the city; Morton. When Your
Number’s Up: The Canadian Soldier in the Great War, p.59
87 LAC RG 24 Vol 6600 File 1982-1-24 Vol 1, GOC MD 2 to Militia HQ 5 December 1916 '
88 LAC RG 24 Vol 4670 File 99-4-7 Vol 3, AAG i/c Administration to Militia HQ 30 August 1916.
89 DHH 74/672 (Edwin Pye Fonds) Box 13 Folders 143, 158, 172,211,218 and 231
90 LAC RG 24 Vol 4508 File 17-1-49 Vol III, OC 5th Division to Militia HQ 16 November 1915 lists six
officers recruiting in Eastern Québec. Judging by the surnames, five were French-Canadian. Three of the
officers, Lieutenants PJC de Gruchy, Levi Bourassa and E. Jalbert did not serve in the CEF. Major P.A.
Piuze of the 20th (Québec) Battery joined the CEF in September 1916 while his brother, Captain Azarie
Piuze of the 89th Temiscouta and Rimouski Regiment was attested in the CEF in April 1918. The last,
Captain Abel Whitehead of the 7th Hussars in Bury, joined the 117th Eastern Townships Battalion in
September 1916; LAC RG 24 Vol 4509 File 17-1-49 Vol XV, GOC MD 5 to Militia HQ 18 January 1917
outlines the history of recruiting in the District from 1915 onwards.
91 LAC RG 24 Vol 4509 File 17-1-49 Vol XV, GOC MD 5 to Militia HQ 18 January 1917
92 LAC RG 24 Vol 4509 File 17-1-49 Vol VIII, GOC MD 5 to Militia HQ 22 September 1916 and GOC
MD 5 to Militia HQ 11 November 1916 outline Fages’s intent and the final results.
?3 LAC RG 24 Vol 1398 File 593-6-2 Vol 11, DOC MD 13 to Militia HQ 26 January 1916, AG to Minister
28 January 1916 asking if the 191st and 192nd should be allowed to recruit and undated minute by Hughes
saying ‘Go ahead”, AG to DOC MD 13 3 February 1916 directing the 191st and 192nd to continue
recruiting.
94 DHH 74/672 (Edwin Pye Fonds) Box 12 Folder 113, Box 13 Folders 191 and 192; Canada, Department
of Militia and Defence. Canadian Expeditionary Force: 191st Battalion 1st and 2nd Reinforcing Drafts.
Nominal Roll of Officers. Non-Commissioned Officers and Men. (Issued with Militia Orders 1917)
95 LAC RG 9 III D 1 Vol 4700 Folder 72 File 14, Canadian War Records Office questionnaire completed 21
March 1917 by the former adjutant of the 135th Battalion; Canada, Dominion Bureau of Canada. Fifth
Census of Canada 1911: Areas and Population bv Provinces. Districts and Subdistricts. (Ottawa: King’s
Printer, 1912) pp.80-81
96 Canada, Department of Militia and Defence. Canadian Expeditionary Force: 135th Battalion. Nominal
Roll of Officers. Non-Commissioned Officers and Men. (Issued with Militia Orders 1917)
97 DHH 74/672 (Edwin Pye Fonds) Box 13 Folder 142; Canada, Department of Militia and Defence.
Canadian Expeditionary Force: 142nd Battalion. Nominal Roll of Officers. Non-Commissioned Officers and
Men. (Issued with Militia Orders 1917)
98 Nicholson. Canadian Expeditionary Force 1914-1919. p.546 99 LAC RG 24 Vol 1402 File 593-6-2 Vol 21, HOC MD 3 to Militia HQ 26 August 1916
100 London Free Press 22 May 1916 p2: St Marvs Argus 20 July 1916 p .l:
101 Canada, Department of Militia and Defence. Canadian Expeditionary Force: 110th Battalion: Nominal
Roll of Officers, Non-Commissioned Officers and Men. (Issued with Militia Orders 1915). Despite the
publication date, the embarkation roll is dated 31 October 1916 ; LAC RG 9 IIB10 Vol 22, ‘110th Battalion
Canadian Roll’ with weekly returns of recruits 26 November 1915 to 29 October 1916.
102 LAC RG 24 Vol 4680 File 18-29-2 ‘Historical Record of the 232nd Overseas Battalion CEF’
103
LAC RG 24 Vol 4680 File 18-29-2 ‘Historical Record of the 232nd Overseas Battalion CEF’ The 232nd was based in North Battleford but had outlying detachments in Saskatoon, Rosetown, Wilkie,
Kerrobert and Kindersley; DHH 74/672 (Edwin Pye Fonds) Box 13 Folder 232; Canada, Department of
Militia and Defence. Canadian Expeditionary Force: 232nd Battalion. Nominal Roll of Officers. NonCommissioned Officers and Men. (Issued with Militia Orders 1917)
104 LAC RG 24 Vol 413 File 54-21-1-20 Vol 1, draft ‘Statement by Department of Militia and Defence
From 1st February to 31st December 1916’ signed by CGS 1 December 1916
105 LAC RG 24 Vol 1402 File 593-6-2 Vol 21, AG to DOC MD 10 29 November 1916 after reviewing a
proposal to raise a battalion in Selkirk, Manitoba.
106 LAC RG 24 Vol 1402 File 593-6-2 Vol 22, DG Mobilization to CGS 30 December 1916
107 Turner was promoted to Lieutenant-General in June 1917 and later became CGS for OMFC.
108 LAC MG 27 IID9 (Albert Edward Kemp Fonds) Vol 73 File 68, Summary of memorandums from
Gwatkin and Turner compiled by the Parliamentary Secretary 15 January 1917. The original ^
correspondence from Gwatkin and Turner has not been found.
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109 LAC RG 24 Vol 413 File 54-21-1-20 Vol 1, draft ‘Statement by Department of Militia and Defence
From 1st February to 31st December 1916’ signed by CGS 1 December 1916
110 LAC MG 27 IID 9 (Albert Edward Kemp Fonds) Vol 73, Colonel H. Osborne to A. Claude Macdonnell
M.P. 18 January 1917
111 RG24 Vol 1819 File GAQ 4-124, Edwin Pye to DHS 3 December 1940
112 Canada, Department of Militia and Defence. Canadian Expeditionary Force: 66th Regiment Reinforcing
Draft: Nominal Roll of Officers, Non-Commissioned Officers and Men Issued with Militia Orders 1918
and Canada, Department of Militia and Defence. Canadian Expeditionary Force: 63rd Regiment 1st. 2nd and
3rd Reinforcing Drafts: Nominal Roll of Officers. Non-Commissioned Officers and Men Issued with Militia
Orders 1918. The 66th Regiment draft sailed 22 January 1916 and the 63rd drafts sailed 22 January 1916,26
February 1916 and 15 July 1916; Hunt Nova Scotia’s Part in the Great War, p.261 discusses the 66th .
Regiment draft with dates and strength.
113 DHH 74/672 (Edwin Pye Fonds) Box 4 Folder 13 File ‘CDF’, CGS to AG 15 January 1917
114 DHH 74/672 (Edwi Pye Fonds) Box 4 Folder 13 File ‘CDF’, AG Circular Letter 18 January 1917.
115 LAC RG 24 Vol 1403 File 593-6-2 Vol 21, AG to GOC MD 3 5 February 1917. The 43rd was given
permission to “..form a regimental depot for the purpose of raising and training drafts.”
116 LAC RG 24 Vol 4257 File 6-14-10, AAG MD 1 to OC 32nd Regiment 28 February 1917 referring to a
resolution passed by the officers of the 32nd Regiment, OC MD 1 to Militia HQ 30 March 1917 asking for
approval and AG to OC MD 1 4 April 1917 granting authority.
;
lf7 Canada, Department of Militia and Defence. Canadian Expeditionary Force: 11th Regiment 1st ,
Reinforcing Draft: Nominal Roll of Officers. Non-Commissioned Officers and Men. Issued with Militia
Orders 1917. The draft sailed from Halifax 2 June 1917; LAC RG 24 Vol 336 File 33-2-117, OC MD 1 to
Militia HQ 15 May 1917, OC MD 1 to Militia HQ 10 July 1917 reporting that drafts from the 7th, 21st, 22nd,
25th, 32nd and 108th Regiments were training in London. 118 LAC RG 24 Vol 336 File 33-2-117, AG to DOC MD 1 23 August 1917
119 TNA CO 42/1004, War Office to Under Secretary of State for the Colonies 9 May 1917
120 LAC MG 27 IID 9 (Albert Edward Kemp Fonds) Vol 73, Colonel S.C. Mewbum to Kemp 6 March
1917. :■
; .
121 LAC R 24 Vol 5872 File 7-55-23, OC 53rd Regiment to GOC MD 4 30 March 1917 .
122 LAC RG 24 Vol 1403 file 593-6-2 Vol 25, OC 174th Battalion to DG Mobilization nd but late March
1917, ;
. .
V
123 Archives of Ontario Sydney Chilton Mewbum Fonds, Ms 798 Reel 1, Series 1, Kemp to Mewbum 8
March 1917
124 DHH 74/672 (Edwin Pye Fonds) Box 4 Folder 13 File ‘CDF’, summary prepared by Edwin Pye 25 ,
March 1943
>
12548th Highlanders of Canada Regimental Museum Box ‘CDF’, R.E. Haldenby.to Mr. White 17 June
1917,48th Highlanders ‘Semi-Monthly Statement of Strength of Canadian Expeditionary Force’ 30 June
1917, the box also contains forms for unsuccessful applicants such as Harry Brennan.
l26LACRG24 Vol 4547 file 78-1-1, AG circular letter 22 May 1917; 48th Highlanders Regimental ;
Museum Box ‘CDF’, Daily Orders Part II Number 83 of 12 August 1917 noted that 287 men with the CEF
Company had been posted to 1st Depot Battalion of the 1st Central Ontario Regiment as instructed by HQ
MD 2 on 2 August 1917; Depot battalions were authorized by General Order Number 89 of 1 September
1917, but had been formed some weeks before.
127 LAC MG 27 IID 9 (Albert Edward Kemp Fonds) Vol 116 File 6, GOC MD 11 to Militia HQ 5 July
1917 reporting that 95% of the recruits for June 1917 had been found by the British Canadian Recruiting
Mission
128 Toronto Star 20 July 1915 p.2
129 48th Highlanders Regimental Museum Box ‘CDF’ contains the regimental forms for 203 men who were
rejected between May 1915 and June 1917. The forms were originated by unit recruiters and subsequently
annotated by officers from the Toronto Recruiting Depot. The dates suggest the form was first used by unit
recruiting parties prior to the opening of the Toronto Recruiting Depot. Several of the forms have the
written consent of wives or parents attached.
130 Hamilton Spectator 6 August 1915 pp. 1 and 14
131 LAC RG 24 Vol 4425 File 26-5-64-2 Vol 1, GOC MD 3 to Militia HQ 1 June 1917 noted that Miss
Thobum had been working at the Ottawa Base Recruiting Office since August 1915. The general comment
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regarding staff is taken from scattered correspondence in RG 24 Vol 4425 Files 26-5-64-2 Vols 1-3. In
May 1917, Miss Thobum complained that her pay had been reduced to $1.70 a day, but with a reduction in
staff, she was now doing jobs formerly done by sergeants. Since she was now doing the work of a sergeant,
Miss Thobum felt she deserved the same rate of pay..
132 LAC RG 9,11 F9 Vol 39 File ‘Recruiting March 1916 to November 1916’. Pay lists exist for the London
Recruiting Depot 1 October 1915 to 30 November 1916, the Windsor Recruiting Officer for September
1916 and the Windsor Mobilization Centre 1 October 1916 to 31 October 1917; LAC RG 9 IIF9 Vol 39
File ‘Recruiting March 1916 to November 1916’ contains pay lists for the ‘I®*Hussars Recruiting Depot’ in
Amherstburg 1 July-30 November 1916; London Advertiser 29 December 1916 p .ll describing the work
of the 1st Hussars Depot
133 LAC RG 9 II F9 Vol 1383 File ‘MD 11 Recruiting Staff Nov 1915-March 1917’ contains monthly pay
lists for Mr Charles Henshaw, Recruiting Officer, from 1 November 1915 to 31 March 1917. Henshaw
received the same pay as a lieutenant-colonel. There may be additional pay lists for Henshaw which have
not survived. Parker, C.W. Who’s Who in Western Canada: A Biographical Dictionary of Notable Living
Men and Women of Western Canada. (Vancouver: Canadian Press Association Limited, 1911) p.205
described Charles Henshaw as a commission merchant.
134 DHH ‘Minutes of the Militia Council 1917’ p.l 172, Henshaw had been a lieutenant and captain in the
militia and CEF since 20 September 1915 with the approval of Sam Hughes. On 18 October 1917, the
Deputy Minister pointed out that she had been paid $3 per diem since then, as well as field pay and
subsistence allowance when absent from home. Her services were terminated 1 November 1917 and she
was directed to cease wearing uniform
135 LAC RG 24 Vol 4593 File 20-10 Vol 10, AG to GOC MD 10 4 November 1915 granting approval and
referring to the original proposal dated 25 October 1915 which, unfortunately, is not in the file.
136 LAC RG 9 II F9 Vol 1296, Files ‘MD 10 Recruiting Area B February 1916’, ‘MD 10 Recruiting Area C
December 1915-January 1916’ and ‘MD 10 Recruiting Area D November 1915-February 1916’; LAC RG
9 II F9 Vol 1297 ‘MD 10 Recruiting Area D February 1916’; LAC RG 24 Vol 4593 File 20-10 Vol 10,
AAG i/c Administration HQ MD 10 to OC 188th Battalion 10 February 1916 instructing him to absorb all
recruits in Area C and OC D Recruiting Area Moose Jaw to AAG i/c Administration HQMD 10 21
.February 1916 asking that his area be authorized as a CEF battalion; The commanding officers of Areas A,
B and D went on to command CEF battalions. ;
137 Macphail. Official History of the Canadian Forces in the Great War 1914-1919: The Medical Services.
p.154 ■ ’ .
, . ;v- .
-■ .
:
38 LAC RG 24 Vol 1311 File 593-3-7, Prime Minister to F.B. McCurdy 18 August 1916 referring to an
earlier proposal from the AG concerning mobilization centres (not in the file) and asking if Militia Council
had considered the idea, AG to Militia Council 23 August 1916 noting the Prime Minister’s approval and
AG Circular Letter 12 September 1916 instructing districts to establish mobilization centres;
139LAC RG 24 Vol 4311 File 34-1-59-M; AG Circular Letter 12 September 1916 ‘Mobilization Centre,
Administration o f
140 LAC RG 24 Vol 1311 File 593-3-7, DOC MD 12 to AG 25 October 1916 noting that funds had not been
allocated to rent accommodation for centres in Regina, Saskatoon, Prince Albert, Battleford, Moosimin,
Moose Jaw, Swift Current and Weybum, OC MD 11 to Militia HQ 28 September 1916; LAC RG 24 Vol
4509 File 17-1-49 Vol XII, GOC MD 5 to Militia HQ 29 March 1917 explaining that MD 5 was largely
rural and a central depot was more efficient and less expensive.
141 Toronto Star 1 February 1917 p.14 announced the Depots would be replaced by ‘Mobilization Centres’;
LAC RG 24 Vol 4311 File 34-1-59-L contains an undated list probably from the spring of 1918 showing
the three original mobilization centres as well as one in St Catharine’s.
142 LAC RG 4311 File 24-1-59-M Vol 1, OC 248th Battalion to Chief Recruiting Officer MD 2 23 April
1917
: 143 LAC RG 24 V oi4311, File 34-1-59-M Vol 1, OC Toronto Mobilization Centre to DAA & QMG MD 2
28 November 1917 and File 34-1-59-L, MD 2 to Militia HQ 18 July 1918 reporting the manning of the
<’Sudbury Mobilization Centre
144 LAC RG 24 Vol 4310 File 34-1-59 Vol 2, OC Toronto Mobilization Centre to AAG MD 2 20 August
1917
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Chapter 4
Recruiting Criteria

Chapter 3 discussed the CEF recruiting structure from mobilization in 1914 to the
influx of draftees under the M

ilita r y S e r v ic e A c t

(MSA) in 1918. The period was one of

constant change and turmoil with recruits being enlisted by militia units, CEF units and
district offices at various times and places, sometimes simultaneously. Some of these
changes were the result o f snap decisions by the erratic Minister of Militia and Defence,
Sam Hughes, while other changes were introduced by the staff in Ottawa and at the
district headquarters to impose order on the whole system.
Throughout the change and turmoil, recruiters were expected to enlist men who
met standard criteria, which also changed and evolved as the war went on. While some of
✓

these changes increased the number of men eligible for combatant service, other changes
simply increased the number available for administrative duties. Some of the criteria
were also based on national prejudices although as the war progressed, these were
discarded and aliens, visible minorities and natives came to be viewed as valuable
additions to the manpower pool. The recruiting criteria were also ignored by thousands of.
men who were anxious to serve and deliberately lied in order to enlist.

At first glance, the criteria were the model of simplicity. Men had to be between
the ages o f eighteen and forty-five, a standard consistent with K
O r d e r s f o r

th e

C a n a d ia n

M ilitia

i n g ’s R e g u l a t i o n s a n d

(KR&O) . 1 Boys were excluded although KR&O allowed

fourteen-year-olds (and thirteen-year-olds in exceptional cases) to join the militia with
their parents’ or guardian’s consent. These boys were excluded from the CEF, but
peacetime habits died hard and in August 1915, Militia HQ modified the age standard to
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allow fourteen-year-olds to enlist as bandsmen, drummers, buglers and trumpeters. The
reduced aged standards did not last long and were cancelled in January 1917 because
juveniles were o f no use as reinforcements for units m France.

•y

The upper age limit was amended in June 1916 to allow forestry workers to enlist
up to age forty-eight because they were “labourers only, and are not to be considered as
enlisted for General Service overseas.”3 In January 1917, the same age range was
extended to skilled railway workers, although medical officers were reminded that “the
apparent age rather than the age given is to be taken into account and the condition of the
arteries o f all men 41 years of age and over is to determine acceptance or rejection.”4
Those men serving with combatant units who were overage but managed to reach
England were not returned to Canada, but were drafted to labour units providing they .
were medically unfit for the trenches.5
Canadian age standards created problems in England where the CEF was
governed by British regulations. British policies were quite clear; active service in France
or Belgium was restricted to those between the ages of nineteen and forty-two .6 The
effect o f this was that on arrival in England, those between thirteen and eighteen were too
young for active service and those between forty-two and forty-five were too old.
Canadian authorities in England were initially unconcerned with the conflict in
age limits. In December 1916, Sir George Perley advised Prime Minister Borden that
there was “No maximum age limit for Canadian soldiers proceeding from England to
[the] seat of war .”7 However, the staff at HQ OMFC was not as sanguine and in January
1917, the Surgeon-General noted the discrepancy between British and Canadian age
limits.8 Militia HQ also picked up the matter and both the DGMS and AG expressed
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[L of C] were held at the appropriate base depot while those who had arrived in the front
line could remain with their units but not in the trenches. The latter policy was clearly
impractical. Infantry battalions had enough on their hands without worrying about young
soldiers in the transport lines and, in any event, the possibility of long-range shelling
meant the boys were exposed to danger. In November 1916, therefore, GHQ directed that
soldiers who were eighteen or younger would be returned by their units to the appropriate
base depot where they would remain until of age . 13 The policy was further modified in
May 1917 when boys between the ages of eighteen and nineteen were allowed to serve
with one of the many army schools, forward o f the base depots but still within the L of C.
The policy was firm and a proposal from the Canadian Corps in August 1918 to employ
minors with a demonstration platoon at the Corps railhead (forward of the L of C) was
firmly scotched by HQ OMFC . 14
Underage soldiers in France who concealed their age remained with their units,
unless angry parents or guardians produced birth certificates. But these cases were
relatively few and there is no record of a concerted effort to weed these minors out. In
V

January 1918, HQ OMFC authorized Canadian Corps HQ to transfer 500 men under the
age of eighteen years and six months to Britain but judging by unit war diaries, there was
no mass exodus o f juveniles . 15 Regimental histories support this. In 1917-1918, for
example, the 85th Battalion lost seventeen minors, the 102nd Battalion lost twenty-one and
the 18th and 72nd Battalions lost twenty-four teens each . 16
At the other end of the spectrum were the older men who could not be drafted to
France. Many were identified by medical boards before embarkation to Britain and
retained in Canada or discharged. However, some were not identified until they arrived in
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England and these men were employed on general duties with reserve battalions. But it
was illogical for seniors to serve with units whose sole purpose was to feed
reinforcements to Canadian units in France or Belgium and in November 1916, these men
were posted to the 37th Reserve Battalion.17
The 37th was not a conventional infantry battalion, but became the basis for the 1st
Canadian Labour Battalion, which was posted to France in 1917 where it was joined by
three other labour battalions. These units were not composed exclusively of overage men,
but rather o f those whose medical categories (including age) precluded front-line
service.

IQ

Still, it is striking that o f the 106 Canadians from various labour units who are

buried in France or Belgium, thirty-two were over forty-two years of age.19
Not all seniors who served in France or Belgium did so with labour units. Railway
troops, for example, were exempt from the upward age limit of forty-two, although the
Canadian General Base Depot in France insisted on rejecting Canadian Railway Troops
(CRT) reinforcements over forty-three “unless they looked young and were going to a
specialized job.”

There were also, men with front-line units who were retained by their

units. Peter Comego, a forty-seven year-old native soldier, and Johnston Paudash, a fiftytwo-year-old native soldier, for example, were retained by the 21st Battalion because both
were accomplished scouts and snipers. Others, such as Sergeants Geddes and Ritchie of
the 78 Battalion, were removed from their units but retained in the forward area with the
4th Divisional baths and the 4th Division entrenching battalion respectively.21
These then were the policies and procedures concerning those who were over or
under age. But these policies were frequently ignored, either because individual recruits
were anxious to serve or because commanding officers were trying to fill the ranks. In all,

*
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it is estimated that more than 33,000 men who were too young or too old enlisted in the
CEF. While some o f these men made a valuable contribution to the war effort, others
instead became a significant administrative burden.
A total of 6,548 underage soldiers were discharged from the CEF during the
war.

But these were only the ones who were detected. The total of those who served is

unknown although a reasonable estimate can be made using Commonwealth War Graves
Commission [CWGC] cemetery and memorial registers. These registers were compiled
in the 1920s and about 61% o f the entries in these registers include the age on death
provided by the soldier’s next of kin. The information provided by the next of kin is
likely correct - why would they lie?23 There are 1,412 men listed who were under the age
of nineteen when they died.24
Table 14
Estimated Total Underage Enlistments 1914-192025
Age on Death

' CW GÇ Registers

Estim ated Deaths

Estimated
Enlistments

15
14
.
!
16
75 :
'
’
17
296
18
1,027
Totals
1,412
2,315
24, 369
Notes: (1) The overall death rate for all ages was 9.5% and it is assumed this
applied to underage soldiers as well.26
(2) Estimated deaths and enlistments are slightly overstated. Non-battle
A deaths for the CEF as a whole amounted to 13% of all deaths. The average
age of the CEF was 26.3 years, a cohort with an annual death rate of 3.9
per thousand in 1921. However, the annual death rate for male teens was
slightly less at 3.1 per thousand.27
There were at least two ten-year-olds, both of whom enlisted in March 1916:
Wesley Mickey, a schoolboy from Wadena, Saskatchewan, and Reuben Rosenfield, a
bugler from Winnipeg who enlisted to be with his father, Sergeant Arthur Rosenfield of
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the 10.1st Battalion.28 Neither Mickey nor Rosenfield served overseas, either in Britain or
on the continent.
The youngest to serve in Flanders was probably William Hutchison of Vancouver
who enlisted in the 211 Battalion at the age of twelve and was discharged in Vancouver
as underage on 2 December 1916. However, Hutchison’s mates were reluctant to lose
their battalion ‘mascot’ and were able to smuggle him to England where he somehow
managed to join the 8th Battalion, CRT and at the age of thirteen, was sent with his new
unit to Belgium.

OQ

•

The youngest who died in France was fifteen; there were eight with

that melancholy distinction while six others died in Britain or Canada.
Table 15
Underage Fatalities
Estimated Age on Enlistment80
Estimated
Enlistment
Age
13
14
15
16
17
Total
Proportion

1915
;
,
> i

'

'

V

.

1916

1917

1918

Totals

/

'
k
'

L
'

Proportion
,

‘

\

’ (

<

1

3
8
32
57

1
9
71
175
261

1
10
61
194
193

2
2
26
52

1
10
12

100
8.5%

517
43.8%

459
38.9%

82
6.9%

23
1.9%

2
24
143
437
575

0.2%
2.0%
12.1%
37.0%
48.7%

1,181

Notes: (1) A few of the attestation forms are marked with the soldier’s true date
o f birth but in the majority of cases, the age on enlistment had to be
estimated based on length of service. A boy who died at seventeen, for
example, with more than two years of service was probably fifteen years
old or younger when he enlisted.
(2) It is acknowledged that the longer a boy served, the more likely he was
to die.
Attestation papers show that 1,025 (86.8%) of the teens included in Table 14
claimed to be eighteen or older when they enlisted, which suggests the boys were anxious
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to go while recruiters were willing to look the other way.

*31

Surprisingly, more of these

boys enlisted in 1914-15 when volunteers were plentiful than in 1916-17 when there was
a shortage of recruits. A total of 156 boys (13.2%) admitted they were seventeen or
younger when they enlisted. But the majority o f these self-confessed minors (134)
enlisted between August 1915 and January 1917 when boys were allowed to join with
: their parent’s consent as bandsmen, drummers, buglers and trumpeters.
At the other end of the spectrum were the older men, those over forty-five, some
of whom were able to enlist because seniors were welcomed, at least for home defence.
duties. A total of 226 militiamen on full-time service, for example, died during the war
and are buried in Canada. A third of these men were too young or too old to enlist in the
CEF and the average senior was 53.6 years old.33 In Toronto, twenty-one men served
with the District Sanitary Corps. Seventeen of these men were between the age of fortyeight and seventy-five with an average age of 54.5 years.34 These soldiers were not
members of the CEF until July 1918 when all militiamen on full-time service, including
seniors, were transferred to the CEF.35
No record was kept of the number of men over the age of forty-five who enlisted.
Post-war tabulations showed that 1,471 men were released as overage, but there must
have been many others who were not discharged.

However, as with the minors, CWGC

records can be used to provide an estimate of the overall number.
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Table 16
Estimated Overage Enlistments 1914-1920
A g eo n D eath

:

47-50
51-55
56-60
61-65
66-68
Totals
Notes:

CW GC Registers

Estim ated Deaths

Estimated
Enlistments
331
543
5,712
135
221 :
2,330
75
46
794
15
25
259
6
10
104 .
874
533
9,198
(1) Table 16 is based on those who died and not those who enlisted.
Estimates are therefore approximate and not absolute.
(2) Estimated deaths and enlistments are slightly understated. Non-battle
deaths for the CEF as a whole amounted to 13% o f all deaths. The average
age o f the CEF was 26.3 years, a group with a natural death rate of 3.9 per
thousand. The 48-55 cohort, however, had a natural death rate
that was somewhat more at 8.4 per thousand.37
(3) The majority of those who died at age forty-six or forty-seven (144)
likely enlisted at age forty-five. They have therefore been excluded from
Table 15.
(4) Rounding off has produced a discrepancy of ten estimated enlistments.

In terms of individuals, the oldest man to offer his services was probably ninetytwo-year-old Sir Mackenzie Bowell, a former prime minister who offered to join the
224 (Forestry) Battalion in 1916 as a lance-corporal although this was probably a
publicity stunt to shame younger men into joining.38 The oldest to actually enlist was
probably eighty-year-old Alexander Muir, an ex-soldier of the British 11th Hussars who
joined the GASC Detachment at Militia HQ in June 1916. He was demobilized in 1920 at
the age o f eighty-four.

The oldest soldier buried in France is probably Sapper John"

Kirkwood o f the 4th Field Company who died in July 1917 at the age of sixty-eight.40
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Table 17
Enrolment
Overage Soldiers
/ ‘ AgC V;,
Cohort •
47-50
51-55
56-60
61-65
66-67

1914
44
13
3 ■ ■'

*1915
^r *t

133
44
10
1
1

r

1916
,

,

100
44
20
8
2

1917

»

:

23
10
2
1
1

1918

Totals

12
6
3

312
117
38
10
4

:

Proportion
64.9%
24.3%
. 7.9%
2.1%
0.8%

Totals
60
189
174
37
21
481
Proportion
12.5%
39.3%
36.2%
7.7%
4.4%
Notes: (1) Based on CWGC cemetery and memorial registers.
(2) Thirty-eight men who died at the age of forty-six have been excluded
since they were probably under the age of forty-five on enlistment.

A total of 458 or 86% of the men listed in Table 17 claimed .to be forty-five years
or younger when they enlisted in the CEF. In theory these lies should have been picked
up during the enrolment medical, but birth certificates were not required; doctors noted
the ‘apparent age’ only and most felt they had “no option but to accept the statement [of
age].”41 In any event, recruiting staff were often willing look the other way. In May 1917,
for example, Charles Harrigan joined the Canadian Forestry Corps at Revelstoke, British
Columbia. His date o f birth was given as November 1869 and his ‘apparent age’ as fortyseven. Harrigan also claimed to have served with the militia during the 1870 Fenian raids
when he was only one year old according to his declared date o f birth. Neither his age nor
his former service was challenged by the recruiters.42
The enrolment o f older men suggests efforts to address a shortage of recruits, but
more seniors enlisted in 1915 at a time when there were plenty of recruits, which suggests
that the motivation was a product of enthusiasm and not the need to fill the ranks one way
or another. The reasons why the older men chose to join up can only be guessed at -
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patriotism, the need for a job and, for the old soldiers, a chance to return to a settled life
with known expectations. The latter was not an inconsequential factor; 263 of those who
died, or more than half, were ex-servicemen while 67 others were current members of the
militia. In round numbers, about two-thirds o f the seniors were already familiar with
military service when they enlisted in the CEF. There was also, like today, an unwritten
obligation to help deserving ex-soldiers and there were cases of commanding officers
who went out o f their way to accommodate the old sweats who wanted to soldier again.43
Together, more than 33,000 men who were outside of the normal age range
enlisted in the CEF; about 5 % of all recruits - a significant addition to the manpower
pool, although not all served in France or Flanders. About 84% of the underage soldiers
who died were buried in France and Flanders, 5% in Britain and 11% in Canada. On the
other hand, 34% o f the overage men who died were buried in France or Belgium, 14% in
Britain and 51.9% in Canada.44 It would be reasonable to conclude, therefore, that a much
larger proportion o f the underage soldiers saw active service
,

•■, From an administrative point o f view, the need to cater to the under-age and over\

age soldiers detracted from their usefulness. Both juveniles and seniors in England or
France had to be combed out and returned to Britain or repatriated to Canada where they
were discharged. It is true that many of the young soldiers eventually reached nineteen
and were deployed to France, but had they been enlisted at the proper age, a great deal of
administrative effort could have been saved. In the case of the older men, particularly in
England, it can be argued that their presence freed up younger men for service in France.
However, these jobs could have been done by substitutes such as those who were unfit
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for service at the front and women. On the other hand, those who concealed their age,
perhaps as many as 20,000 were a genuine addition to the manpower pool.

Age was not the only criteria for enlistment. Men also had to be medically fit and
Militia HQ continually altered the standards throughout the war in an effort to expand the
manpower pool. Medical fitness is a multi-faceted subject, but height requirements,
dental health and eyesight serve as useful proxies.

;

,

The initial standard, announced on 17 August 1914, was 5’ 3” for all corps with
the exception of artillery (5’ 7”), engineers (5’ 4”) and CASC horse transport drivers (5’
5”).45 The standard for infantry lasted less than a year, however, and in July 1915, was
’

/

*r

reduced to 5’ 2”, a reduction that has been attributed to a shortage of recruits.

However, this was not the case. In brief, Major Francis Milton, a militia officer serving
with the 44th. Battalion in Winnipeg, wrote to" Sam Hughes and suggested that a new
battalion should be raised of men under the regulation height. Hughes was enthusiastic
about the proposal but the AG noted in June 1915 that there was no need “for. herding
. '

V .

them [undersize soldiers] in separate battalions” and suggested that it would be better to
reduce the minimum height to accommodate shorter men. The district commander
responsible for the 44th Battalion (Colonel H.N. Ruttan) was then consulted and he
recommended a one-inch reduction in the minimum height. Hughes accepted the advice,
recruiting regulations were amended and as of 21 July 1915, the minimum height for
infantrymen was 5’ 2”.47

•

Later reductions after the summer of 1916 were directly related to declining
enlistment figures.48 In December 1916, the minimum height for infantrymen was
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reduced to five feet and a year later, the standard for non-combatants was dropped to 4 ’
11”, four inches shorter than the minimum height established in August 1914.49 The
artillery was also affected by the slump in recruiting and in June 1917, the requirement
for artillery drivers was lowered to 5’ 3”, to be followed in September 1917 by a another
reduction to 5’ 2”.50 Also in September 1917, the height standard for field gunners was
lowered to 5’ 6” (a reduction o f one inch) but garrison and siege gunners had to be at
least 5’ 7”.51All of these changes were part of a deliberate effort to enlarge the pool of
potential recruits.

'

Was the reduction of the infantry height standard to five feet a profitable change
to the medical standard? The experience of the bantam units suggests that the benefits, if
/

any, were limited.

The idea o f bantam battalions was not original, but an imitation of the British
bantams, originally formed in the fall of 1914 when the 15th and 16th Battalions of the
Cheshire Regiment were raised in Birkenhead from men standing 5’ to 5’ 3” (later 5’
2”).

The concept was a popular one in Britain and by mid-1916, there were two bantam
V

divisions serving in France. Neither division, however, was composed wholly of
bantams; those serving with artillery, engineer, pioneer and signals units had to meet
normal height standards.

Bantams were not intended to supplement the British

manpower pool but reflected popular enthusiasm for the war effort by providing shorter
men with an opportunity to serve their country.
Not surprisingly the CEF followed suit in 1916 by raising the 143rd and 216th
Bantam Battalions as well as a bantam company for the 167th Battalion.54 As with the
British bantams, neither o f the two battalions were created because of a recruiting

c

175
shortfall but instead resulted from lobbying by two enthusiasts who were captivated by
the notion of something new .55 Both Captain A.B. Powley of Victoria (OC 143rd
Battalion) and Major F.L. Burton of Toronto (OC 216th Battalion) had served in France
and likely both had first-hand knowledge of the British bantam divisions.56 Both the 143rd
and 216th were formed at a time when there was no shortage of recruits. On the other
hand, the bantam company of the 167 Battalion was authorized in November 1916 at a
time when recruiting, especially for Québec-based units, had fallen off sharply.57
The concept of bantam battalions was contrary to Militia HQ’s preference for
homogeneous units that could be shipped overseas and absorbed by any battalion that
required reinforcements. Perhaps for this reason, no one in Ottawa laid down a uniform
height requirement for Bantams, unlike in Britain, where standards were laid down by the
War Office. Instead, the height standard reflected the commanding officer’s preference.
The,2 16threcruited men who stood 5’ to 5’ 1 V z

\

the 143rdaccepted those who were 5’ 4”

or shorter and the 167 was willing to take volunteers under 5 ’ 2”.
The bantam concept was not as popular in Canada as it was in Britain and some of
the men in the 143rd considered ‘bantam’ to be a pejorative term .59 Both battalions,
iL

therefore, had to recruit outside of their parent districts to find enough men. The 216
recruited mainly in MD 2, but 29% of its strength came from four other districts in
Eastern Canada. Similarly, the 143rd recruited primarily in MD 11, but also enlisted 125
men or 10.6% in MD 13.60 The idea did not find favor with Militia HQ, however,
probably because of the cost of transporting recruits from Alberta to British Columbia
and from March to May 1916 the 143rd had to confine its activities to MD 11.61
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.On the surface, the two battalions were successful and recruited almost a thousand
men who were not part o f the potential manpower pool by virtue of their height.
However, not all of these men were a useful addition to the reservoir. There were 163
recruits who could not be posted to infantry battalions overseas because they stood less
than five feet tall. Three of these men were only 4 ’ 7”. There were also 141 boys between
the ages of twelve and seventeen, many of whom were under the minimum height for
bantams.62
Some of the Bantams seem to have been stunted and not merely short and in July
1916, almost two hundred unfit men from the 143rd were weeded out by medical officers
at the Sidney Mobilization Camp in British Columbia.63 Later, in England, the battalion
was examined again and at least 155 men were consigned to the Canadian Railway
Troops Depot as unfit for the infantry .64 The 216th had problems as well and in May
1917;' doctors with the 1st Canadian Reserve Brigade at Shomcliffe declared 217 men
unfit for the infantry .65 This was just the beginning and ultimately, 300 bantams from the
/
216th were transferred to the Forestry Corps.66 Obviously these men were not an efficient
addition to the manpower pool.
Table 18
Personnel Disposition - Bantam Battalions
^^D isposition ;
'
IrCW
* 1f-! ■
.

143rd

tj

216tn

Total

Proportion
O f Enlistments

2,297
1,174
1,123
Recruited
1 ,666
51%
783
883
Sailed to UK
922
40%
604
318
Served in France
Note: The 216th provided two hundred drivers to the Reserve Brigade CFA in
June 1917.68 These men have been included in ‘Served in France’.
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Would bantams have been useful in the front lines? In the British army the 35
(Bantam) Division found that trench parapets had to be lowered to allow men to shoot,
meaning that conventional units relieving the bantams had to rebuild the parapets.
Eventually, the 35th had to issue a divisional order requiring every man to carry two
sandbags to build up the fire step. Bantams also had difficulties handling the service rifle
(Lee-Enfield) because of its length and a special butt one inch shorter than normal was
eventually produced in 1918.69 Presumably Bantams also had the same problem handling
the Lewis gun, but there is no evidence that the gun was ever modified.
It was also difficult to find physically fit reinforcements. In August 1916, the ;
GOC 105th (Bantam) Brigade wrote that most of the new arrivals were underdeveloped
men “who were unfitted, both morally and physically to take their places in the fighting
ranks o f the British Army .”70 Subsequently in December 1916, medical boards inspected
the 35th Division and found 2,784 men with “Deficient Physique - physical incapacity to
perform the normal duties of a soldier in the fighting line.”71 The evidence is indirect, but
the experience of the 35th Division suggests that throwing open the CEF to shorter men
was of minimal benefit.
Dental standards were relaxed as well to allow men with faulty teeth or dentures
to enlist. The changes started in March 1915 when the ADMS at HQ MD 2 directed that
men with defective or deficient teeth would be retained in Canada for treatment,
“including the provision of such artificial dentures as are necessary to admit of efficient
mastication .”72 The policy made sense and in May 1915, Militia HQ directed that men
with partial plates or who required dental treatment could be enlisted, a regulation
modified in August ! 915 to allow men with full dentures to join the CEF .73 Oddly
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enough, dental care was not mandatory and those who refused treatment were passed as
‘fit’, “provided they are not suffering from malnutrition or digestive trouble, and are
otherwise physically fit .”74
To meet the increased demand for dental services, the Canadian Army Dental
Corps (CADC) was established in April 1915, but for overseas duty only. Districts were
authorized to appoint dentists to the CAMC on a temporary basis, but this was evidently
unsatisfactory and in July 1916, CADC detachments were formed in every district.75 The
detachments, however, were used to treat serving soldiers and not to screen recruits. The
determination of dental fitness remained the purview of the medical officer conducting
the examination.
Did the relaxation of dental standards and the creation of the" CADC add.
significantly to the number of men who joined the CEF? In December 1916,20,365
Canadian soldiers at Shomcliffe, Seaford and Crowborough were classified,by medical
boards and 8,385 or 41.2% were found to be dentally unfit.

77

There is no evidence that

the findings of the medical boards reflected Canadian oral health in general, but it seems
V

reasonable to conclude that the relaxation of standards and the provision of dental care
allowed several hundred thousand men to join the CEF who might have been rejected in
1914;
Vision standards were modified as well. Initially recruits had to have D 15/20 in
the right eye and D30/20 in the left eye .78 In November 1915, the regulations were
modified. Recruits with D60/20 in either eye (uncorrected) were fit for general service
while those with D120/20 in the right eye could be enrolled in the CASC, CAMC and
COC .79 The following year, recruiting slumped and the standards were relaxed even
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further. In August 1916, the general standard was lowered to D80/20 for all and D200/80
for drivers. Those with only one eye were routinely turned away until January 1917 when
they were allowed to enlist in pioneer, labour, construction, forestry and railway units
•

•

provided that the missing eye had not been lost because of an organic disease.

O rt

Enrolling recruits with poor eyesight implied that eyeglasses had to be provided
and from March 1915 onwards, men posted to Flanders were issued with two pair as
required .81 But, this applied only to those serving overseas and recruits in Canada were
expected to provide their own glasses, an illogical policy that was corrected in May 1916,
when the Militia Council decided to provide glasses to all those who needed them.
The initial dental and vision standards were simple and straightforward but
significantly reduced the pool of potential recruits. Changes to these standards allowed
more men to join the CEF but the need to provide dentures and eyeglasses increased the
administrative overhead. Regardless of this, the changes more than benefited the CEF.

: Not all o f those who joined were employed with infantry units, but it took almost
two years before Militia HQ recognized that skilled workers who did not meet infantry
standards were useful in specialist corps. From June 1916 onwards, Forestry Corps
recruits missing no more than one finger on each hand (other than thumb and forefinger)
and one or two toes on each foot (other than the great toe) were acceptable. At the same
time, the maximum age limit for skilled forestry workers such as millwrights and saw
filers was extended from 45 to 48.83 Men with flat feet were unacceptable to the infantry
but Militia HQ made an exception for the Skilled Railway Employees because “Any men
0/1

who are good enough for the railway companies are good enough for us.”
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. Not all o f these changes were beneficial and overlooked the fact that forestry
recruits, for example, were expected to work “harder than infantry in the trenches, as far
as the physical end is concerned .”85 Railway troops were able to cope with flat feet but
according to the Senior Medical Officer of the CRT Depot in England, most of those over
forty-two or forty-three who were posted to France could not physically cope with the job
■ •-

Q/*

.......................

while those with only one eye had difficulties with night operations.
Many o f those who joined the CEF were unfit on enrolment and were
subsequently discharged. But, the designation as ‘unfit’ was relative and it has to be kept
in mind that standards were relaxed throughout the war. Arguably a man judged to be
unfit in 1914 could very well have been declared fit in 1918. Fitness was also a function
of the man’s corps and those discharged from infantry battalions might very well have
been fit for the CASC or another specialist branch of the service.
The number o f men released as medically unfit is not certain. In September 1916,
Colonel Bruce produced a scathing report on the problem of unfit men in England, but
although he gave numerous examples in his report he did not indicate the extent of the
problem .87 In a postwar speech in Montréal, General Sir Arthur Currie claimed “ 100,000
no

men were enlisted and sent to England who were of no use to us in the field” but the
source o f his data is unknown. In any event, although General Currie and Colonel Bruce
may have exaggerated their claims, the problem was still a serious one. Between 6
October and 5 November 1916 alone, almost one in six of all infantrymen who arrived in
England were found to be medically unfit.89
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Table 19
Unfit Recruits 1914-191890

Description

Served Canada only
(actual)
'
(2)
42,897
859

Served overseas
(estimate)91
(3)
33,155
■ 21

Total

’
,
(1)
(4)
76,052
Unfit
880
Found unfit by unit
MO
• . 15 v. • v
4,316
4,301
Found unfit within 3
months o f enrolment
16
70
54
Found unfit on
reaching 18
v go
41
131
Unfit for his special
duties
33,248
81,449
48,201
Totals
Notes: (1) The term ‘unfit for his special duties’ presumably refers to those who were
unfit for their corps.
(2) Column 3 applies to those who served in England but not in France or
Flanders. It is appreciated that some of these men may have been injured in
training accidents.
,
The medical conditions that resulted in the release the men in Table 19 are
unknown although Annex A lists some of the leading causes. Regretfully it has not been
possible to determine if these causes were due to nutritional, occupational, environmental
or hereditary factors.
There were other factors that resulted in unfit men being enlisted, according to a
well-reasoned report produced in October 1916 by Colonel Marlow, ADMS MD 2:
“Careless examination by medical officers or civilian practitioners, undue pressure-on the
part o f commanding or recruiting officers anxious to increase the number in their units,
attestation without further medical examination, and retention of men at small billets.”
There were other reasons as well which Colonel Marlow did not comment upon.
The prewar CAMC was small and there were too few medical officers to cope with the
flood o f recruits, a problem recognized on the eve of war by the ADMS of MD 6 .
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Hiring civilian physicians made up for the lack o f medical officers, but this in turn helped
to increase the number of unfit recruits.
Physicians were paid fifty cents for each recruit examined and not all doctors
considered the tariff to be acceptable.94 Some refused to examine recruits while others, at
least in MD 5, openly said that a fifty-cent fee warranted a fifty-cent examination .95
There was also a shortage o f civilian physicians in remote areas who were willing to
examine recruits. In the Gaspe, for example, there was only one doctor available. For
some reason, he was willing to examine recruits but not sign the attestation forms.96
Even if physicians were willing to examine recruits, they sometimes applied their
own standards. In the Algoma District of Northern Ontario, the 119 Battalion
complained of local doctors who either misunderstood or ignored CAMC instructions.97
Further south in Victoria County, the ADMS of MD 3 reported that civilian physicians
also ignored instructions, preferring to judge a man’s fitness by his ability to do a day’s
work .98 CAMC medical officers would have resolved these problems, but there were only
a few hundred available on the outbreak of war and most of them were absorbed by the
\
greatly expanded medical establishment overseas. In any event, the dispersal of the CEF
in small detachments scattered across the country in the winter o f 1915-1916 meant that
there was no choice but to rely on civilian practitioners.
Medical officers and civilian physicians were hampered by an absence of
diagnostic tests and medical examinations depended to a large extent on the candor of the
recruit. In 1917 the GOC MD 11 noted that “many men are reported to be untruthful.
Such men may very easily escape the notice of the Medical Officer of the Unit for a
considerable time .”99 Alcoholics, drug addicts, epileptics and men with chronic
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conditions, anxious to serve their country, were therefore able to enlist, although in many
cases, the stress of military life brought their condition to the notice of the authorities.
For the most part, doctors conducted external examinations only. To some degree,
this was not important since most physicians could recognize obvious signs of disability
such as irregular heartbeat, chronic rheumatism or weeping chancres. But detecting other
diseases called for specialized tests. Tuberculosis tests were available, but cost three
dollars (almost three times the daily pay of a private soldier) .100 Wasserman tests for
syphilis were also available and by 1916 were common enough that the Toronto General
Hospital routinely screened all admissions.101 Whether or not every recruit could have
been screened by these tests is uncertain, at least during the wintér of 1915-1916 when
detachments were scattered across the country. It would have been impossible for the
119th Battalion in the remote Algoma District of Ontario, for example, to send blood
samples to a laboratory (probably in Toronto) for analysis. However, by the end of 1916,
centralization o f units in Canada and the creation of mobilization centres meant that
standing medical boards were able to make use of specialized equipment such as x-ray
machines.
;There were also the mentally disabled who were able to hoodwink the doctors and
enlist in the CEF. In all, a total of 1,486 men were released because of mental disorders.
Presumably these were cases of insanity and do not include the mentally deficient and .
learning disabled. A handful of examples of the latter categories are known such as the
soldier with the 4th Divisional Train in British Columbia who had been “given a great
deal of individual attention and instruction but does not seem to be able to absorb v
anything and has shown no improvement whatever.” 102 Another soldier from the 181st
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Battalion was examined by a medical board in England and found to be “a high grade
imbecile, his intelligence is weak, memory of defective(sic) and he is untidy and dirty in
his habits .” 103 Obviously neither man was of any benefit to the CEF.
These unfortunates were an added burden on units in England and France and in
1916-1917 there were complaints that newly arrived reinforcements were suffering from
‘senility, ‘dementia’, ‘mental deficiency’ and ‘delusional insanity . ’ 104 The number is not
certain, but a total of 6,828 men were hospitalized or released with mental disorders not
related to battle. There were also 6,432 men discharged as ‘inefficient & undesirable’
without leaving Canada and some of these may have been mentally deficient.105
Together, the mentally disabled and the mentally handicapped probably accounted for
about 2% of all enlistments, a lower rate than Canadian males in general. 106 The ratio was
roughly consistent with the American Expeditionary Force [AEF] which found that about
1.5% of all draftees were either mentally deficient or suffering from some form of mental
disease . 107

'

The lack of testing was not because Canadian psychiatrists were unaware of the
V

problem. Clearly they were and in 1917, the AEF adopted psychological testing based, in
part, on recommendations from Canadian doctors who “indicated the urgent desirability
of the application of psychological methods in the selection of recruits and in the
studying o f incapacitated soldiers.” 108 But there was no psychiatrist with the DGMS staff
at Militia HQ and thus no advocate for testing. In any event, intelligence tests would have
been problematic with the CEF dispersed across the country in small detachments, a
problem not faced by the AEF, which concentrated large numbers of recruits in relatively
few central camps.

!
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Despite the absence o f formal testing, authorities were concerned with mental ••;
health and medical officers were reminded in 1917 that “Great care is to be taken in
ascertaining the mental capacity of a recruit.” 109 Training officers were required to assess
the mental capacity of recruits and classify their intelligence as above average, average or
under-average, while remembering that “a man may be naturally intelligent although
owing to lack o f educational opportunities he may appear stupid .” 110 Those classified as
below average in intelligence were to be referred by the training officer to the medical
officer for observation and subsequently, if necessary, to a standing medical board for
disposal. 111
Mental health was not assessed and medical officers were cautioned in October
1917 that it was unwise to ask men if they had ever been admitted to a psychiatric
institution. Despite this, medical officers were expected to scrutinize recruits carefully for
mental disorders, although the DGMS admitted this would be fruitless if the individual
was in remission .112 The Military Service Branch of the Department of Justice, however,
had no concerns about mental health and in June 1918 MSA registrars were instructed to
i

ascertain the names of potential draftees confined to “asylums, institutions for the feeble
minded [and] hospitals .” 113 At least one psychiatric hospital in Ontario is known to have
forwarded a list of suitable inmates but there is no evidence that men were removed from
hospitals and placed in uniform .114
The number o f unfit men sent overseas to England was considerable, and by mid1916 had become something of a scandal, so much so that Militia HQ directed that
special medical boards be formed in every district to review unit medical examinations
that were to be regarded as preliminary. These boards had the authority to alter the
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original-findings o f the unit medical officer or local physician and direct that men be sent
overseas, discharged or transferred to duties in Canada more suited to their physical
capabilities. 115 This did not solve the problem entirely but kept the number of unfit men
embarking for England to a minimum.

Initial criteria published in 1914 did not stipulate that recruits be British subjects,
perhaps because they were drawn from the militia which accepted British subj ects
only. 116 Nor was citizenship a formal requirement for the 2nd Division authorized in
October 1914, perhaps because the units were declared to be temporary corps of the
Active Militia . 117 However, not all units raised in the fall of 1914 were part of the 2nd
Division and the matter was finally codified for the CEF in August 1915 by a general
1 1o

order requiring aU recruits to be British subjects.
More than 500 men in the First Contingent were from non-English-speaking
countries and since the majority of the foreign-born in the general population had been
naturalized (see Chapter 5), most were probably British subjects. 119 A total of thirty-eight
men were from enemy states or were thought to be German sympathizers. Described as
‘undesirables’, these men were returned to Canada in November 1914.120 None of the
others were repatriated, however, perhaps because the CEF in Britain was subject to the
iot

British A

r m y A c t

which allowed one man in every fifty to be an alien.

Canadian requirements, however, were more stringent than British. In October
1914 Militia HQ directed that “it is considered inadvisable to enlist persons of foreign
birth or nationality .” 122 Specific nationalities were singled out. In November 1914, Militia
HQ announced that Russian subjects could not be enlisted and those who had been
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attested were to be discharged forthwith. A few months later, in February 1915, HQ MD
10 advised the 105th Regiment in Saskatoon that CEF recruits bom in the United States
had to be naturalized British subjects and of British descent, an interesting exercise in
genealogy. 123
Given the decentralized nature of the Canadian Forces and the relative autonomy
of military districts, regulations regarding aliens were not uniformly applied. At one end
of the spectrum was HQ MD 2 which in early 1915 ordered the discharge of all Italians,
Danes, Greeks and Russians serving with Second Contingent units in Toronto. At the
same time, militia units recruiting on behalf of the CEF in St Catharines and Brantford
were forbidden to enlist foreigners while the 51st Regiment in Sault Ste Marie was
instructed to release all CEF recruits from Belgium, the United States, France and
Russia .124 The policy was firmly applied and of twenty-six Russians with the 37th
Battalion, only two, presumably British subjects, sailed to England in August and
November 1915.125
Not all districts were as hard-nosed as MD 2. In eastern Ontario (MD 3), the 59th
Battalion enlisted more than sixty Russians, virtually all of whom sailed to England with
the battalion or in one of two reinforcing drafts. 126 In MD 5, the 57th Battalion at Québec
City enlisted about a hundred Russians; sixty-four sailed to England. In total, 27.2% of
the men in the 57th Battalion were not British subjects by birth . 127 The 41st Battalion, also
from Québec City, was able to reach full strength only because of a company of Russianborn recruits from Western Canada . 128 A total o f 221 men who were not British subjects
by birth sailed in 1915 with the main body of the 41st or the reinforcing draft - about 20%
of the unit .129 But even in Québec, the policy was not consistent. Kostos Bastas, bom in
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Greece, enlisted in the 24th Battalion in 1914 but was discharged because he was an alien.
A determined man, Bastas immediately applied for naturalization and in March 1915,
was able to join the 41st Battalion as a newly-minted British subject. 130
As the war, with its interminable demand for men, ground on, every district found
it increasingly difficult to recruit. In Alberta, for example, Brigadier-General Cruikshank
noted the shortage of recruits in January 1917. A large proportion of the British subjects
living in MD 13 had already enlisted while up to 50% of those applying to district
mobilization centres were medically unfit. Farmers were actively discouraging recruiting
while high wages, bumper crops and an increased demand for labour all combined to
keep men at home . 131 Not surprisingly, recruiters became more ready to accept foreigners
/

without inquiring too closely into their status as British subjects.
The formation of the 97th (American Legion) Battalion brought the first changes
to citizenship criteria. Intended to attract Americans domiciled in Canada, it quickly
became apparent that potential recruits were discouraged by the need to be British
subjects. In November 1915, therefore, citizenship requirements were waived for the 97 ,
and eventually other American Legion battalions were accommodated as well.

With

the American Legion battalions as a precedent, it was only a matter o f time before other
aliens were also accepted.
Recruiting regulations were not formally amended, but the idea that aliens were
acceptable in the CEF was finally recognized in April 1917 when an Order-in-Council
was issued authorizing a revised form of enlistment oath for men who were not British
subjects because o f “the large number of men [enlisted who are] not Citizens of Canada,
or British subjects.” 133 Neither KR&O nor the

G e n e r a l O r d e r

of August 1915 was
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formally suspended or amended, but the Order-in-Council was a de facto admission that
foreign-bom soldiers were welcome in the CEF.
There was a further change in 1918 with the introduction of conscription under
the M

ilita r y S e r v ic e A c t 1 9 1

7. In brief, draftees were required to be British subjects.

Immigrants who had not been naturalized could still be drafted, but only for noncombatant service. Since the demand was for infantrymen, it can be safely assumed that
relatively few non-British subjects were drafted . 134
A number of those drafted in 1918 were enemy aliens from Germany or the
Austro-Hungarian Empire. An apparent contradiction of previous regulations, the
provision was consistent with the spirit of the N

a tu r a liz a tio n A c t 1 9 1 4

which reminded

/

those naturalized that they were “subject to all obligations, duties and liabilities to which
a natural bom British subject is subject.” 135 The sentiment was repeated in the
E le c tio n s A c t

W a r tim e

:

of 1917 which disenfranchised all those bom in enemy countries

naturalized after. 31 March 1902 but allowed those who had joined the CEF or who had
been rejected as medically unfit, together with their families, to retain the vote .136 In
effect, citizenship with its attendant rights carried with it an obligation to serve the state.
Eligibility for the CEF was clouded by the fact that foreign nations felt free to
control immigrants resident in Canada. Italy allowed Italian citizens living in Canada to
join the CEF but only after obtaining a Consular certificate that they were exempt from
service in the Italian army. Serbs and Montenegrins were also allowed to enlist, but were
subject to recall by their home countries for military service. 137 In Ottawa, the 5th Field
Company had to release seven Belgians in January 1915 after representations from the
Belgian Consul.

On the other hand, Frenchmen were not claimed by their parent

c
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country unless they were reservists, in which case they were expected to report to their
unit regardless o f whether or not they were naturalized British subjects. Those serving
with the 1st Division, such as Major Raymond Brutinel, were faced with the prospect of
arrest if they deployed with their units to France. The issue was quickly resolved,
however, when the French government agreed that those serving with the CEF would not
b e ‘bothered ’. 139
: Enlistment o f Russians was a bureaucratic nightmare mainly because of
conditions imposed by their home country. In October 1914, the Russian ambassador in
Washington notified the Montréal consulate that Russians living in Canada who had
fulfilled their military obligation were free to join the CEF. But this may have been an
s

error and a few days later, the consul notified External Affairs that the policy applied
only to Russians living in Britain or France. Those living in Canada, therefore, could not
enlist in the CEF and those who had should be discharged forthwith.
Militia HQ promptly notified all districts and only twenty-two Russians are
known to have been enlisted in November and December 1914, mainly in the Maritimes
and Western Canada. However, judging by a request from the Russian attaché in London
in December 1914 to allow twenty-nine Russians with the 1st Division to attend Greek
Orthodox services, the restriction did not apply to those serving overseas. 140
The Russian government insisted on maintaining a grip on all Russians, regardless
of individual circumstances and Canada’s status as a nation. In March 1915, the CEF
recruiting officer in Humboldt, Saskatchewan, asked if Russians who came to Canada as
young children could enlist in the CEF. The response from the consul was swift: these
men were expected to return to Russia to perform their military service. “ The
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communications between 1Russia and Canada have never been interrupted,” wrote the
consul, and “they are able to reach Russia, by their own means .” 141 Similarly, in June
1915 Sergeant-Major Haynes o f Roblin, Manitoba, was advised that former members of
the Russian army living in Canada were not allowed to join the CEF but were expected
“to join their own regiment in Russia, and have to go there by their own means.” 142
: The Russian policy was clearly impractical because of the closure of the Baltic
and Black Sea ports and the difficulties of an ocean voyage from Canada to Archangel or
Vladivostok. In July 1915, the Imperial Russian Consulate in Montréal notified External
Affairs that the Czar had issued a decree on 18 June 1915 authorizing Russian subjects in
Canada, including reservists and territorials, to .enlist in the CEF. But, the edict
announced, these men had to apply to the Consulate for an identification certificate in
order to enlist.143 To obtain this certificate, men had to produce Russian identification
papers (passport, military booklet or birth certificate), provide a photograph and pay
consular fees of $1.63 - more than a day’s pay for a private soldier.144 Not surprisingly,
Canadian authorities were not consulted in the process of modifying CEF enlistment
procedures. Nor is there any record of any arm of the Canadian government protesting
what amounted to an infringement of Canadian sovereignty.
Inevitably there were problems with the process put in place by the Russian
consul apart from the volume of requests (more than 6,600 Russians enlisted in the CEF).
In March 1916, the CGS noted that a number of Russian subj ects in Saskatchewan had
lost or destroyed their papers and feared that “good men and true may be lost to the
Canadian Expeditionary Force because they have the misfortune to be without papers.” 145
He suggested that Hawryl Slipchenko in Saskatoon could verify they were genuine

c

.

■

192
Russians, but the consul dismissed the idea and insisted that local authorities at the
recruit’s place of birth in Russia would have to investigate the man’s claims.146 For their
part, some o f the Russian-born soldiers who enlisted detested the requirement for a
certificate from the consul, were reluctant to provide their photograph to Russian
authorities and were opposed to letting the consul know they were members of the
CEF .147 The system was cumbersome, and in practice amounted to an inefficient farce
despite the avowed purpose of weeding out enemy aliens trying to pass themselves off as
bona fide Russians.

148

Enemy aliens, those bom in enemy countries, were automatically suspect and all
concerned understood that these men could not be enlisted. But the policy was not
applied uniformly and a handful of those with former service in the Canadian Forces
were allowed to join the CEF. Examples include George Merkel from Bamburg, a skilled
harness maker who had served with the PF in the Canadian Ordnance Corps since 1906,
and Rudolph Back from Magdeburg who had served for eighteen years with the militia
and had fought in South Africa with the 2nd (Special Service) Battalion of the RCR .149
Aliens were barred from enlistment on the basis of nationality and not ethnicity.
Andi Brod from Berlin, for example, was discharged from the 5 Battalion because he
was German-bom. However, both Adolph Messerschmidt, a Baltic German, and
Reinhold Krinke, a Volhynia German, were technically Russians and therefore
acceptable .150 There was a tacit recognition that some ethnic groups from enemy
countries could be safely enlisted: those from Alsace-Lorraine, the Balkan provinces of
the Austro-Hungarian Empire, Bohemia, Moravia and Christians from the Ottoman
Empire.
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Initially immigrants from non-English speaking countries found it difficult to join.
But starting in the second half of 1915 the proportion of immigrants enlisting exceeded
comparable rates for the CEF as a whole as shown in Table 20. In other words, these men
found it easier to enlist which suggests that recruiters were not as zealous in enforcing
citizenship requirements as they were in 1914 and the first half of 1915.

. Table 20
Sample of Foreign Bom Enlistments 1914-1916151
Born

1914

’ % - - . ~ Aug-Dee;,
*,
Belgium
France
Denmark
Greece
Holland
Iceland
Italy
Japan
Montenegro
Norway
Romania
Russia
Serbia
Sweden
Switzerland
..****, ' r\
Totals

108
78
53
13
26
5
29
1
14
42
9
110
-■ 13
50
14

Increase
1915
-.1 9 1 5
Jan-Jun ' „over
JuL-Dec
Recruits ■previous Recruits
6 months *
73 .
85
37
5

68%
109%
70%
39%
92%
140%
200%
200%
7%
76%
44%
112%

109
113
123
35
53
42
227
3
24
116
12
906
32
181
31
5
2,007

Increase
; over
previous
6 months
149%
133%
332%
700%
221%
600%
391%
150%
2400%
363%
300%
737%
800%
503%
258%
-I
■„
399%

Increase
1916
Jan-Jun over Recruits previous
6 months
298
227
242
55
102
182
338 .
59
14
616 ■
74 :
2,029
75
457
55

273%
201%
197%
157%
193%
433%
149%
1967%
58%
531%
617%
224% ,
234%
253%
177%

1916
Jui-Dec
Recruits
-94
100
115
65
22
7
120
118
33
138
58
870
43
131
... 23
. _ ' *:
. 1,937
.. -

Increase
_ over
previous
6 months
32%
44%
46%
118%
22%
4%
36%
200%
236%
22%
78%
43%
57%
29%
42%
-- V „ 40%

Sample
Size

682
603
570
173
227
243
772
183
86
944
157
4,038
167
855
135

24
7
58
2
1
32
4
123
4
31%
36
72%
12
86%
‘
r-* * _
\
. *- . 240%
9,835
503
89%
s4,823
565
- 9l
„ _ »
36,007
133,614
133%
27%
378,557
91%
100,678
195%
56,584
51,674
CEF - All
Notes: (1) Percentages have been rounded off to the nearest whole number.
(2) Nations and regions not specified in Table 20 are: Albania, Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria, Central America, Cuba, Germany, Luxembourg, Mexico,
North Africa, Ottoman Empire, Portugal, South America and Spain.
..
■
k.
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In theory, Chinese recruits had to be British subjects, of age and medically fit.
However, they were not wanted and there may have been specific rules to prevent them
from joining. In April 1917, the AAG at HQ MD 2 wrote that “regulations do not permit
of the enlistment of Chinamen into the Canadian Expeditionary Force.”

The

regulations invoked by HQ MD 2 have not been found, but a Military Service Branch
Circular in August 1918 notified local registrars that the Department of Militia and
Defence policy was not “to enroll men with the CEF, who are obviously Chinese.” 153 The
Circular also noted that depot battalions had been instructed to return Chinese-Canadian
draftees to the Registrar’s records (i.e. discharged). Whether the exclusion of Chinese
Canadians was a regulation or an informal policy is not certain. Either way, it is quite
clear that these men were not welcome in the CEF.
Not surprisingly, very few Chinese Canadians joined the CEF. Marjorie Wong
has estimated that about three hundred enlisted, but this is clearly an exaggeration and to
date, only five men have been identified. 154 Three were bom in Canada: Frederick Lee
from Kamloops, who was killed at Hill 70 in August 1917; Wee Tan (William Thomas)
Louie, who was drafted into the Alberta Regiment; and Wee Hong (Walter Henry) Louie,
who joined the Canadian Forestry Corps in April 1917.155 Two were bom in China: Tung
On Hong from Haileybury, who joined the Canadian Forestry Corps in May 1917;_and
Victor Fong, a Quebec City student who enlisted in the 248th Battalion in October 1917
and then promptly deserted .156 There may have been a few others. In 1920, Hugh Guthrie,
the Minister of Militia and Defence estimated that about a dozen Chinese Canadians had
enlisted in the CEF . 157
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- ' ;■.■; ' Japanese immigrants also had difficulties with recruiting criteria. Many were
transient and intent on earning sufficient money to purchase a farm or house in Japan. No
doubt, many of these men were not British subjects. Language was also an issue. Militia
HQ was adamant that recruits had to speak English or French but,;as late as 1924-1926,
almost 74% of Japanese immigrants in British Columbia were unable to read, write or
understand English .158 Most of them lived in British Columbia where the provincial
government discouraged enlistment which could lead to enfranchisement, a sentiment
echoed by the CGS who thought that “when the war is over & demobilization sets in,
those o f them who served in the CEF will make themselves a nuisance. Après nous, le
Déluge” .159 Elsewhere there were no objections to recruiting Japanese Canadians; in
March 1916, the men of the 216th Battalion in Toronto were asked if they would welcome
a Japanese company and “Every hand in the battalion went up in the affirmative.” 160
In Vancouver, the Canadian Japanese Association in Vancouver offered to raise a
battalion while others offered to raise an independent company. The battalion was

.v

rejected by Militia HQ because there were doubts that the manpower supply was
adequate to form and sustain the unit. The proposal was passed to Britain and Japan, but
neither government replied and the Militia Council decided not to proceed with forming
the battalion . 161 The independent company was also quashed because the idea of a
company that could not be broken up for reinforcements was anathema to Militia HQ.

1¿ 0

Japanese applicants living in the United States were banned from enlisting with
the British Canadian Recruiting Mission, although at least nine were able to join.
Ethnicity was not a bar to conscription and at least twenty-four Japanese Canadians or
Nisei were drafted under the MSA - almost 11 % o f all known Japanese enrollments.
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Surprisingly, eighteen were residents of British Columbia or the Yukon which formed
part o f MD l l . 164

;

Sikhs also received short shrift. Almost 99% of them lived in British Columbia
where they were regarded with suspicion and contempt although they had been bom in a
British colony and in many cases anxious to enlist. 165 There were no objections to Sikhs
enlisting provided they did so in the Indian Army and not in the CEF. In September 1914,
W.P. Archibald, the Dominion Parole Officer, for example, reported that he had
interviewed a number of ex-members of the Indian Army in the British Columbia
Penitentiary and recommended that they be allowed to join the Indian Corps in France:
“These men have every appearance of strength and manhood and I am sure they are
anxious to serve their country .” 166 Archibald missed the point: the men in question were
living in Canada and not India.
I;

;A few months later, in December 1914, a deputation of East Indians approached

the premier of British Columbia, Sir Richard McBride, with an offer to raise a contingent
of ex-Sepoys.167 McBride passed the proposal to Prime Minister Borden, but it was
rejected, in part because the CGS believed that finding reinforcements would be difficult
and because of concerns “these men are not of the tribe or race of Sikhs who are
considered the best fighters in India .” 168 The proposal was then passed by Borden to the
Governor General in February 1915 with a suggestion that the War Office pick up the
offer o f Sikh recruits from British Columbia. 169
The number o f East Indians who managed to enlist in the CEF is unknown and
one historian has gone so far as to say that none were accepted.

However, a search of

on-line attestation forms has turned up sixteen men who were clearly not Anglo-Indians
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or the sons of British expatriates. 171 The first East Indian joined the 24th Battalion at
Montréal in January 1915 while the last volunteered at Ottawa in October 1918.172 The
sample reflects the general dislike of East Indians in British Columbia where the
overwhelming majority lived. Only two men were residents of British Columbia while
one, who joined the British Columbia Regiment, was a California Jew born in India who
had been enlisted by the British-Canadian Recruiting Mission .173 At least one Sikh
enlisted at Vancouver under an assumed name . 174 In total, seven volunteers enlisted in
Ontario, two in Québec, three in Manitoba and three in British Columbia. As with
Chinese Canadians, East Indians were not supposed to be conscripted under the MSA,
but there was at least one Sikh, Ram Singh of Grand Forks, who was drafted into the
.

/

British Columbia Regiment in December 1917.175
There were no regulations preventing blacks from enlisting, but many had
difficulties. As the AG noted in October 1915 “The final approval o f any man, regardless
of colour or other distinctions, must, of course, rest with the Officer Commanding the
unit.” 176 Enlistment, then, depended on the bias (if any) of the recruiter or his
commanding officer.
There is an abundance of anecdotal evidence concerning the experiences of
individual blacks who were rejected by recruiters and these examples have been used by
historians to present a bleak picture of universal racism.

Less well known are the

experiences of blacks who enlisted as volunteers and served overseas, men such as Miles
Dymond from Fredericton who joined the 1st Field Company at Valcartier in 1914, John
Granito, a sergeant with the 54th Battalion, Curley Christian, Canada’s only quadruple
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amputee, and James Post, an underage black with the 4 Canadian Mounted Rifles who
was awarded the Distinguished Conduct Medal.

.

Also unreported are efforts by authorities to ensure that blacks were able to enlist.
In November 1915, for example, there were complaints that blacks had been turned away
by recruiters in MD 2, and Sam Hughes demanded an explanation. The reply from the
district commander was unequivocal: “Last summer [the] question arose here and I ruled
they [blacks] must be accepted .” 179 The district commander’s reply was not a pro forma
denial. A few days later, the AAG of HQ MD 2 wrote to the Toronto Recruiting Depot,
“If the practice of refusing to accept colored men has been followed, it must be
discontinued at once.” The reply from the depot was succinct: “We make no
discrimination here as to color or creed .” 180
Elsewhere authorities were adamant that there should be no institutional
discrimination. In July 1916, the commanding officer of No. 1 Construction Battalion
wrote that the designation of a black unit as No. 2 Construction Battalion had resulted in
complaints from his men who were upset at being associated with blacks. The reply from
the AG was blunt and direct. Those joining No. 2 Construction Battalion were both
British subjects and Canadians. Coloured troops were “recognized as comrades in arms
both in France and England. It is for you, therefore, to .inspire your men with correct
ideas on the subject.”
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Still, attitudes in the CEF (and Canada for that matter) were ambivalent. In
November 1915, J.R.B. Whitney, publisher of the blackjoumal

C a n a d ia n

O b se rv e r ,

wrote to Sam Hughes asking if the CEF would accept a company of blacks recruited in
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Ontario; Hughes was taken by the suggestion but substituted a black platoon grafted on to
• 1S')
an existing battalion. The proposal was then passed to HQ MD 2 for review.
HQ MD 2 queried thirty-seven battalions, all of which refused to accept the
platoon .183 Nineteen battalions considered that black soldiers would deter recruiting or
would be unpopular with the officers and men, with the 147th Battalion in Grey County
reporting that “prejudice against negroes in this County is extremely bitter” and the 114
Battalion commenting that a black platoon would cause serious friction and discontent
within the unit. Twelve battalions reported they were up to strength and did not need
recruits while the CO of the 169 noted that his unit was up to full strength but he was
willing to offer eight blacks in his battalion to help build up the platoon. Three battalions
replied that they were recruiting only to fill up existing platoons while the 133rd and 177th
were willing to accept blacks, but only if they were residents o f Norfolk or Simcoe
County respectively.
The replies reflected CEF ambivalence towards blacks. Prejudice existed but there
! were military factors as well. Battalions were formed by selecting commanding officers
who then appointed a complete slate of officers, including platoon commanders, before
starting their recruiting campaign . 184 The addition of a black platoon to an existing
battalion, therefore, required the unit to be reorganized. Commanding officers were (and
still are) very busy people. Reorganizing the battalion to accommodate a black platoon
and then finding reinforcements to keep the platoon up to strength were added burdens .
that the commanding officer could do without. The platoon may have advanced the status
of blacks within Canada but would have been an added complication for over-worked
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commanding officers who were under considerable pressure to complete their
battalions.185
The number o f blacks who managed to satisfy both social and military criteria for
enrolment is unknown, although the Governor General’s military secretary noted in
October 1915 that His Royal Highness had inspected a number of units and “come across
quite a good number o f coloured men .” 186 However, a sample of 1,090 men who were
probably black has been compiled based on those who served in No. 2 Construction
Battalion, a handful who joined other units and men bom in the West Indies'187 The
sample suggests that more than 1,200 blacks served in the CEF.
Table 21
:
Black Soldiers - Sample
»’Group

West Indians
Known
Canadian
Blacks
No. 2
Construction
Battalion
Total
CEF

Sample

440
45

’’ , M ean1
Enlistment
Date
January 1918
March 1918

605

1,090

' 'U S ..
Residents

Proportion 'MSA

us •

Proportion
of MSA

72
4

Residents
16.4%
0.9%

183
26

41.6%
58.8%

October 1916

167

27.6%

N/A

N/A

December
1916
March 1916

243

22.3%

209

19.2%

10 %

21%

Not all of those who enlisted lived in Canada. American blacks accounted for at
least 243 men, or 22.3% o f all blacks who enlisted - more than one in five as compared to
the CEF average o f 10%. If only those living in Canada are considered, the enlistment
rate was 9.4%, slightly below the Canadian-bom rate of 11.2%. The mean enlistment date

\
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for all blacks was December 1916, nine months after the CEF average while 19.2% were
conscripts, slightly lower than the national average.
However, these statistics are skewed by the all-volunteer construction battalion
recruited between July 1916 and March 1917. If only the West Indian sample is
considered, then the mean enlistment date was February 1918 w ith ! 83 draftees
accounting for 40.7% of all enlistments. Admittedly these numbers are soft. Attestation
forms did not specify ethnicity and perhaps there were a few men in the sample groups
who were not black. The sample groups themselves are also incomplete. Still, the
evidence strongly suggests the mean enlistment date for blacks was significantly later
than the GEF as a whole and the MSA rate was somewhat higher. Clearly the CEF was
s

ambivalent about accepting black recruits, an attitude summarized by the AG in April
1918: “We are not hunting for coloured recruits but merely making a place for them as
they come in .” 188

:

Specific criteria were also applied to natives by Sam Hughes, at least in MD 1,
from August 1914 to December 1915. In brief, natives were forbidden to enlist for
overseas service. The restriction was not a reasoned and deliberate policy but rather a
hasty response to a query from MD 1 on whether Indians were eligible for the CEF. Both
the query and the response were dated 8 August 1914. That the policy was a spur of the
moment decision is supported by the fact that Hughes’s military secretary wrote to the
Ontario M.P.P. for Huron County on the same day assuring him that natives in his riding
who wished to enlist could apply to the 32nd Huron Regiment which was recruiting for
the First Contingent. 189

r
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Strictly speaking, Hughes’s policy applied only to MD 1 which contained 4,240
natives - about 4 % of all natives in Canada. 190 There is some indication that the
restriction was applied in MD 2 in February 1915, but this is far from certain . 191 In any
event, the policy was not publicized and no evidence has been found o f a Militia Order,
General Order or circular instruction concerning the matter. Admittedly the Department
of Indian Affairs was notified, but not until October 1915 and only in response to a
specific question.

In any event, the restriction was formally rescinded in December

1915 after MD 1 and MD 2 requested authority for the newly-authorized 114th and 135*
Battalions to recruit natives.

10'!

The effect o f the supposed ban on native enlistments was limited. In November
y

1914, the 20th Battalion in MD 2 had an Indian company from the 37th Regiment as well
as two lieutenants, both o f whom were status Indians. 194 In 1915, before the restriction
was lifted, natives openly enlisted in other MD 2 units including the 58th, 76th, 81st and
84th Battalions as well as the Canadian Mounted Rifles Depot in Hamilton. 195 The honour
roll of native fatalities published by Fred Gaffen shows seventy-two men who enlisted
V

between September 1914 and the beginning of December 1915 when the restriction was
lifted.* Only three were from MD 1, all of whom joined the First Contingent in
September 1914. The remaining sixty-nine came from every other district in the country
and enlisted at various times between September 1914 and November 1915.196 It seems
apparent, therefore, that Hughes’s direction had little effect outside of MD 1.
, The number o f natives who joined is unknown although the generally accepted
estimate is 3,500 to 4,000 men .197 Virtually all were status Indians or Métis. Only one

* A cursory search of embarkation rolls turned up an additional 128 Natives who enlisted priuor to
Deember 1915.
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Inuk is known to have joined the CEF although there were two men with the 228
Battalion who may have also have been Inuit.

1QR

Canadian historian Fred Gaffen has compiled an honour roll of 336 fatalities,
mainly status Indians although a few Métis are also included .199 The roll contains errors
and omissions and after these are taken into account, the total is 314 natives who died
during the war .200 Given the overall death rate o f 9.6% in the CEF, this number suggests
that only 3,271 natives were enlisted. But the honour roll is probably not complete and
the commonly accepted estimate of 3,500 native enlistments seems reasonable. Assuming
that 3,500 natives joined, the enlistment rate was 6.5% of all males or 7.6% if those living
in the Northwest Territories are excluded (no recruiting parties are known to have visited
/

this region .)201 In comparison, the enlistment rate for Canadian-born males was 11.2%.
Part o f this difference may be due to the fact that status Indians could be
conscripted into non-combatant corps only, at least from 17 January 1918 onwards.

fyy

Since there was little demand for men in non-combatant corps, it is likely that few natives
were drafted. Only four men of the men on Gaffen’s honour roll, or 1.2% of all deaths,
were draftees. In contrast, to pick four regions at random, 67 or 4% of the 1,676 CEF
men commemorated on cenotaphs in Perth, Oxford, Huron and Middlesex counties in
Ontario were draftees.
Informal rules were set by some reserves that saw the war as a chance to advance
their cause. On the Cape Mudge Reserve of British Columbia, an impromptu gathering of
young men on 6 January 1916 resulted in a declaration that “as the Indians were not
voters, and as they had not been consulted either with regard to the taking away of their
original heritage, or in the formation of any o f our [Canadian] laws they did not feel
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called upon to take up arms for the flag .”204 Other bands supported the notion that their
young men were free to decide if they should leave the CEF after enlisting, or, in other
words, desert. At Caughnawaga, Québec, residents were sufficiently militant that Indian
Affairs advised Militia HQ that military police should not enter the reserve to apprehend
deserters, thus creating a safe haven on Canadian soil.

In British Columbia, some,

natives could not enlist unless they had permission from their chief, leading one volunteer
to retort in 1917 “that the only chief he recognized was King George V .”206
Many reserves were isolated. Recruiting parties could not visit on a routine basis
and would-be recruits had difficulty reaching recruiting stations. The 228th Battalion, for
example, enlisted at least seventeen men at Moose Factory, Ontario, accessible at the
time only by water. In Manitoba, a recruiting party from the 203rd Battalion probably
used a lake steamer to secure sixteen native recruits at Norway House in June 1916. In
August 1917, Forestry Corps recruiters enlisted John Semple, a native from Berens River
“On the S.S. Wolverine on Lake Winnipeg .”207 Communities on James Bay and
Hudson’s Bay were also difficult to reach and in 1917 Lieutenant C.M. McCarthy hired a
‘gasoline boat’ at an estimated cost of $1,500 to go down the Albany River and recruit
forty-five men at Attawapiskat, Albany River and Fort Albany.
Militia HQ constantly made efforts throughout the war to expand the pool of
potential recruits but their efforts were inconsistent and unfocussed. Asians were
routinely turned away while no attempt was made to tap the black community. Some
remote reserves were visited by recruiting officers but there was no concerted effort made
to enlist natives who did not live in southern Canada. In all, the reluctance to enlist
minority groups probably cost the CEF about 8,500 recruits, as shown in Table 22.
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Table 22
Sample - Visible Minorities209
Group
Chinese
East Indians
Japanese
Blacks

’Males of all
' ' -Ages
26,813
2,315
7,522
8,807

Actual .
Recruits
5 (minimum)
16 (minimum)
227 (minimum)

Proportion
of all Males
> 0 . 1%
0 .6 %

1,312

1,200

13.6%
7.8% -8.9%

5.5%

=Potential
Recruits
3,995
345
1,121

Natives

44,939

6,695

(estimated)
3,500-4,000
(estimated)

Total

90,396

13,468

4,948

CEF

3 %

539,210
14.9%
3,626,621
10
were
American
residents
or who
Notes: (1) CEF enlistments exclude those w
were enlisted outside of Canada.
(2) Natives in the Yukon and Northwest Territories have been excluded
since there was no active recruiting with the exception of the Yukon
Infantry Company.
(3) The number of black and native enlistments is based on estimates.
(4) Chinese and East Indian enlistments include men who were Chinese or
East Indian as well as those who were bom elsewhere but were obviously
Chinese or East Indian in origin.
(5) Japanese recmits include two men bom in Korea which was then
a Japanese possession.
(6 ) Men whose parents were British or Canadian expatriates have not been
included regardless of their birthplace.
Recruiting criteria were continually modified throughout the war. A number of

changes were initiated by Militia HQ in an effort to broaden eligibility for enlistment, but
not all changes were productive. The reduction in height standards for the infantry, for
example, produced few soldiers who were fit for the trenches. Other changes, such as the
age range, failed to take into account British standards that governed the CEF overseas.
Other criteria that inhibited recruiting and regulations concerning non-English speaking
immigrants and visible minorities probably turned many would-be recmits away.

c
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-Militia HQ was not a passive participant in the effort to find recruits but actively
sought to modify criteria to suit changing circumstances. The evolving changes had ,
effects on the manpower pool and these effects are examined in Chapter 5.
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.Annex A
Chapter 4
Medically Unfit
Pre-Enlistment Chronic Conditions
The general state of health of Canadian males during the First World War is not
certain, but without a detailed description of underlying causes, it is difficult to draw any
conclusion other than there were a large number of men enlisted who were unfit for
military service.
Table 23
Releases - Other Ranks210
Description
Canada Only .
; Overseas'
Total
Medically unfit
85,673
42,897
128,570
Rejected by unit MO
7
746
753Rejected by unit MO although
14
113
127
accepted elsewhere
Unfit within three months of
15
4,301
4,316
enlistment
Unfit on reaching 18 years of
54
70
16
age
Totals
85,725
48,111
133,836
Note: Those who were wounded or injured in France and Belgium are included with the
medically unfit who served overseas.
In considering specific causes of medical unfitness, a clearer picture emerges that
illustrates aspects o f public health in general. It is probable that most o f the diseases
shown in Table 23 were acquired in civilian life and were not the result of military
service, although only an examination of individual personnel files would prove this.
Diagnostic tools available in 1914-1918 could have detected some of these
conditions such as defective teeth, nutritional and metabolic disorders, anemia, foot
deformities, mental disorders, parasites, tuberculosis, gonorrhea and syphilis. However,
the general lack of laboratories and the dispersal of many units in small detachments
l
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throughout rural areas made any sort of systematic testing difficult, if not impossible.
Many of the diseases listed are readily treatable today and it is difficult to imagine
soldiers being released in modem times because conditions such as venereal diseases or
parasites.
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^ r Table 24
Chronic Diseases - Selection
Other Ranks of CEF211

,

Heart and pericardium
Defective teeth
Stomach inflammation and
ulcers
Other stomach diseases
Liver disease
Hernia
Gall and bladder disease
Pancreas
Ductless glands
Nutritional and metabolic
disorders
Tumors (general) and cysts
Diseases o f reproductive system
Anemia and other blood
disorders
M uscles and fascia
Spinal diseases (excluding
cerebral spinal disease)
Bones and periosteum
Flat foot
Other foot deformities
Diseases o f lymphatic system
Spleen
M ental disorders (including
suicides)
Epilepsy
Other diseases o f the nervous
system
Parasites (including scabies)
Alcoholism
Other intoxicants and drugs
Tuberculosis (lung)
Other tubercular diseases
Gonorrhea
Tertiary syphilis
Rheumatism (acute or chronic)
Totals
N otes: ( ! ) M en tal disorc

Deaths

Discharges

Condition

Total
>s. >

Percentage
of all
diseases
18.1%
0.5%
4.8%

f

323

3,502
I0 l

959

45

22

233
88

6
15
13
6
2
8
62

84
824
73

21

1,153
56

;

3,825
101
1,004
•28
36
1,166
62

:

,

0.1%
0.2%
5.5%
0.3%

•2...
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i:i%

150

0.7%

19
17
29

103
84 Y
102

0.5%
4%
0.5%

200
79

1
1

201
80

1%
0.4%

1,729
414
402
147
5
1,486

6
2
7
1
123

1,735
414
404
154
6
1,609

8.2%
2%
1.9%
0.7%

629
829

16
93

645
922

3.1%
4.4%

357
70
81
2,602
292
1,804
11
1,446
13,885

63
54
376
101
22
2
9
627

357
133
135
2,978
393
1,826
13
1,455
21,121

1.7%
0.6% '
0.6%
14.1%
1.9%
8.6%
0.1%
6.9%

■x

7.6%

ers exclude m en su fferin g fro m shell sh o ck or

neurasthenia.
(2) Men with below average intelligence were released as ‘unlikely to
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become an efficient soldier’, a catch-all description that included a wide
variety o f causes.212 A total of 6,700 other ranks were discharged as
‘inefficient & undesirable.’
(3) Not included are cases of cancers, new growths and tumors. A total of
360 men were discharged under these categories and 197 died for a total
o f 557 soldiers.
However, Table 24 shows those who were accepted for enlistment and were then
subsequently discharged. In other words, the table may not accurately reflect the general
medical state of Canadian males between the ages of eighteen and forty-five. Regretfully
no comprehensive statistics appear to exist, since medical care was not centralized.
However, an intriguing picture emerges from a report prepared by an enterprising
medical officer in Ontario (probably Windsor) of 889 men who applied for enlistment. A
total o f 289 men or 32.5% o f those who applied were rejected for reasons set out in Table
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Table 25
Medical Rejections - Ontario - 1917213
Number
Percent of all Rejections
Reason for Rejection
42
14.5%
Hernia
38
13.1%
:
Underweight or undersized
9.7%
Deformed - old accident or disease
28
7.3%
21
Hemorrhoids
6.9%
Mental Deficiency
20
Varicose veins
20
6.9%
6 .2 %
Tuberculosis
18
Asthma
4
1.4%
1.4%
Osteomyelitis [bone infectionl
4
Old Pott’s Fracture [ankle]
1%
3
Grave’s Disease [hyperthyroidism]
1%
3
1%
Defective knee joints
3
Rheumatic Fever
3.8%
11
Chronic otorrohea [chronic ear discharge]
3.5%
10
3.5%
Valvular disease of the heart
10
Defective sight or hearing
3.1%''
9
Various amputations
3.1%
9
Infantile spinal paralysis [Poliol
5
1.7%
Epilepsy
5
1.7%
Stammering
0.7%
2
Active syphilis
0.7%
2
Underage
2
0.7%
Overage
0.3%
1
Anal fistula [abscess]
1%
3
Chronic eczema
2
0.7%
0.7%
Diseases of the spine
2
0.3%
Congenital torticollis [wryneck present at birth] 1
1
0.3%
Discharging neck sinus [Pilonidal cyst]
0.3%
Chronic laryngitis
1
0.3%
Chronic gonorrhea
1
0.3%
Scoliosis [curved spine]
1
0.3%
Insanity
1
0.3%
1
Diabetes
0.3%
Night blindness
1
0.3%
Tachycardia [rapid heart beatl
1
0.3%
1
Deaf mutism
0.3%
Extensive foot calluses
1
0.3%
Prolapsed rectum [protrusion of lower bowel
1
through the anus]
32.5%
Total
289
Note: The table does not include multiple causes o f cisability.
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- The majority o f conditions described were chronic or long-standing, a disturbing
view o f Canadian manhood in 1917. The reasons for these conditions are uncertain,
although some were probably related to economic status and the availability of medical
care. Assuming that literacy is a rough proxy for social class, many of those rejected must
have been lower class or working-class men who could not afford adequate medical care,
a telling comment on public health at the beginning of the twentieth century. Only 29 or
4.8% o f the 600 recruits accepted were illiterate whereas 71 or 24.6% of those rejected
were illiterate.
A somewhat different picture emerges from a small sample of men recruited by
th

the 48 Highlanders who were rejected by the Toronto Recruiting Centre.

c

214

Table 26
Medical Rejections - 48th Highlanders
1915-1917214
Number
Proportion of Sample
Cause of Re jection
29.7%
35
Eyesight and squint
8.5%
Varicose veins
10
8
,
6 .8 %
Hernia
6 .8 %
Poor development
8
: . 6 .8 %
Underweight
8
Flat feet
6
' , 5.1%
5.1%
Heart defects
6
4.2%
5 .
Requires operation
Deformed
4
3.4%
4
3.4%
Hammertoes
Underage
3.4%
' 4
Rheumatism
2.5%
3
2 : •
1.7%
Epilepsy
Old injury
2
1.7%
1.7%
Overage
2
Tuberculosis
........
2
1.7%
1.7%
Undersized
2
0
.8 %
Asthma
' 1"
0 .8 %
1 •.
Bunions
C ancer-lung
0 .8 %
' 'I' 1
0 .8 %
1
Goiter
0 .8 %
1
Measles
0 .8 %
1
Spinal defect
0 .8 %
Tubercular right elbow
1
118
Total
Note: some men had multiple defects. Harry Brennan, for example, was rejected
not only because he had cancer but because he was 17 years-old. Medical conditions only
are listed to give an indication of public health at that time.

Some of the defects listed in Table 26 were probably the result of inadequate
medical care. Certainly bunions, goiters, measles and tuberculosis could have been
treated while those with hernias could be given trusses. The number of men who were
rejected as poorly developed or underweight (13.6% o f the sample) also suggests poor
nutrition while the old injuries and perhaps the deformities suggest work-place injuries
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I King’s Regulations and Orders for the Canadian Militia 1910 paragraph 252 specifying an age range of
eighteen to forty-five and King’s Regulations and Orders for the Canadian Militia 1917 paragraph 299 with
the same age limits.
2LAC RG 24 Vol 1311 File 593-3-7 Vol3,General Orders 13 August 1915 with recruiting regulations;
LACRG 24 Vol 4509 File 17-1-49, AG Circular Letter 18 January 1917 directing that boys under the age
of eighteen were not to be enlisted as buglers or drummers.
3 LAC RG 24 Vol 4642 File 99-4-62, AG Circular Letter 16 June 1916
4 LAC RG 24 Vol 4509 File 17-1-49 Vol IX, AG Circular Letter 22 January 1917. This age limit applied
only to the four sections of Skilled Railway Employees.
5 LAC RG 9 III B1 Vol 439 File E-102-1, DAG OMFC to HQ Canadian Troops Brighton 4 December
1916'
6 King’s Regulations and Orders for the Canadian Militia 1910 paragraph 252 specifying an age range of
eighteen to forty-four; TNA WO 293/4 ACI 1186 of 13 June 1916 codified age limits; With regards to
those under nineteen, there are numerous references in OMFC file. See also TNA WO 293/3, War Office
Instruction 46 of 6 September 1915; Messenger. Call to Arms: The British Army 1914-1918. p75 quoting
an ACI of 23 December 1914; Van Emden, Richard Bov Soldiers of the Great War: Their Own Stories for
the First Time (London: Headline, 2005) p.27 suggested that the restriction on soldiers younger than,
nineteen serving abroad had been adopted before the war but did not provide a source.
*
•J
7 LAC RG 24 Vol 6600 File 1982-1-78, Perley to Borden 21 December 1916
8 LAC RG 9 III B2 Vol 3483 File 10-14-1 Vol 2, Surgeon-General to OMFC 29 January 1917
9 LAC RG 24 Vol 6600 File 1982-1-78, DGMS to AG 3 February 1917 and AG to Militia Council 8
February 1917 concerning the discrepancy in age limits. The files contains a number of queries from
Militia HQ to HQ OMFC which were never definitively answered; Military Service Act 1917 article 3(1);
LAC RG 9 II B3 Vol 77, CEF Routine Orders, Number 83 of 22 January 1918, Number 330 of 19 March
1918.
:; ! ;
10LAC RG 9 II B3 Vol 77, CEF Routine Orders, Number 83 of 22 January 1918, Number 330 of 19 March
1918; TNA WO 114/35 Weekly Returns of the British Army and Dominion Contingents at Home other
than the Territorial Force 26 August 1918 showing 2,087 trained soldiers under the age of nineteen.
II LAC RG 9 III A1 Vol 90 File 10-12-8, AG Canadians to Secretary OMFC 23 February 1917with the
policy that boys under 16 14 would be repatriated; LAC RG 9 III A1 Vol 53, File ‘Monthly Reports: July
1917’, Progress Report of AG Branch for July 1917 advised that boys under 17 would be returned to
Canada, those between 17 and 18 !4 would be posted to the ‘Boys’ Battalion while those over 18 !4 would
be retained by a reserve battalion until they turned 19.
12 Militia Order 146 of 22 May 1917 paragraph VIII. Special Service Companies were general duty men
assigned to duties by District HQ as required.
13 TNA WO 123/200, BEF GRO 1754 of 24 August 1916. The policy of leaving underage soldiers with
their units was cancelled by GRO 1963 of 25 November 1916 which directed that underage soldiers would
be returned to the appropriate base depot.
14 LAC RG 9 III D3 Vol 5046 File 910 Reel T-10938, War Diary Canadian Section GHQ 3rd Echelon, 20
May 1917 noting instructions from the AG dated 20 April 1917 and from the DAG dated 29 April 1917,1
January 1918 noting OMFC concurrence with the proposed evacuation to England of five hundred minors;
LAC RG 9 III D3 Vol 5047 File 911 Reel T-10939, War Diary Canadian Section GHQ 3rd Echelon; 13
August 1918 noting rejection of an earlier proposal from Corps HQ.
15 LAC RG 9 III D3 Vol 5046 File 910 Reel T-10938, War Diary Canadian Section GHQ 3rd Echelon 1
January 1918; LAC RG 9 III B3 Vol 3765, Strength as at end-January 1918. No record has been found of
the actual number of minors evacuated following the OMFC decision.
16 University of Western Ontario, Area Research and Collections Centre. 18th Battalion Record Book.
(Compiled by 18th Battalion Orderly Room 1916-1919). This book consists of a nominal roll of all
reinforcements who arrived between July 1916 and December 1918 and has been augmented by Daily
Orders Part II September 1915 to June 1916 in LAC RG 9 III D3 Vol 5046 File 910; Details concerning the
72nd and 85th Battalion were taken from nominal roils published in regimental histories: McEvoy, Bernard
and Finlay, Captain A.H. History of the 72nd Canadian Infantry Battalion; Seaforth Highlanders of Canada.
(Vancouver: Cowan & Brookhouse, 1920), Hayes, Lieutenant-Colonel Joseph. The Eighty-Fifth in France
and Flanders. (Halifax: Royal Print & Litho Limited, 1920) and Gould, L. McLeod. From B,C. to Baisieux:
being the narrative history of the 102nd Canadian Infantry Battalion. (Victoria: Thos. R. Cusack Presses,.
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1919). Bennett, Captain S.G. The 4th Canadian Mounted Rifles 1914-1919. (Toronto: Murray Printing
Company Limited, 1926).
17LAC RG 9 III B1 Vol 420 File E-102-1, A/OC Canadians Shoreham to HQ Canadians Brighton 29
November 1916 reported that the overage battalion had arrived, DAG OMFC to HQ Canadian Troops
Brighton 4 December 1916 noted the 37th was intended to be a collecting agency for overage men who
would be then be posted to labour units.
18 LAC RG 9 III B 1 Vol 420 File E-102-1, DAG OMFC to HQ Canadian Troops Brighton 4 December
1916. Overage men with ‘B’ categories were posted to the 37th for eventual service in France with labour
units while those w ith ‘C’ categories would be employed in England.
19 Starling, John and Lee, Ivor. No Labour, No Battle: Military Labour During the First World War.
(Stroud, Gloucestershire: The History Press, 2009) p.252; Canadian Labour Corps fatalities from the
Canadian Virtual War Memorial at http://www.vac
acc.gc.ca/remembers/sub.cfm?source=collections/virtualmem
20 LAC RG 9 III C7 Vol 4470 Folder 7 File 8, SMO CRT to OC CRT 8 October 1917.
21 LAC RG 9 III B1 Vol 1004 File R-7-3, HQ 12th Canadian Infantry Brigade to HQ 4th Canadian Division
24 August 1917; Canadian Section GHQ 3rd Echelon to HQ Canadian Corps 18 August 1917 referring to
Sergeants Geddes and Ritchie of the 78th Battalion who were both too old to withstand the trenches and
were therefore employed in the 4th Canadian Entrenching Battalion and Divisional baths respectively; LAC
RG 9 III B1 Vol 1004 File R-7-3, HQ 12th Canadian Infantry Brigade to HQ 4th Canadian Division 24
August 1917; OC 21st Battalion to HQ 4th Canadian Infantry Brigade 26 January 1917 concerning Paudash
and Comego, Canadian Section GHQ 3rd Echelon to HQ Canadian Corps 18 August 1917 with details
concerning Johnston Paudash, a fifty-two year old native sniper with the 21st Battalion. It was eventually
decided that he was physically fit and should therefore remain with the 21st despite his age; LAC RG 150
acc 1992-93/166 Box 1899 personnel file 59191 Peter Comego and Box 7655 personnel file 59799
Johnston Paudash. Both men were eventually repatriated to Canada in 1918 and discharged as medically
unfit.
22 DHS 74/672 (Edwin Pye Fonds) Box 1 Folder 3 ‘Disposition on Discharge’
23 Van Emden. Bov Soldiers of the Great War p.316. Some of the ages for BEF soldiers appear to have
been rounded up.
24 Commonwealth War Graves Commission. Annual Report 2006-2007. (np, c2007) Section VI; I am
indebted to Ms Johanna Neville of the Commonwealth War Graves Commission, Canadian Agency for
providing the initial list of overage and underage soldiers based on Commission records. The list included
fifteen militiamen on active service. Her enthusiasm and co-operation is typical of the Canadian Agency in
Ottawa. Thanks are also due to Major (Retired) Brad Hall, C.D., formerly Secretary-General of the
Canadian Agency and now Director of the Commission’s Outer Area (East). A review of all 3,190
surnames beginning with ‘Me’ indicated that 61.1% of all entries had personal information. It is therefore
safe to say that about 61% of all entries in cemetery registers included age on death.
25 A preliminary estimate with somewhat different figures was provided to Doctor Tim Cook of the
Canadian War Museum and used (with acknowledgements) in ‘He was determined to go: Underage
soldiers in the Canadian Expeditionary Force’ in Histoire Sociale-Social History Vol 41 Number 81 (May
2008) pp.41-74. The same information appeared in Doctor Cook’s book Shock Troops: Canadians Fighting
the Great War 1917-1918. (Toronto: Viking Canada, 2008) p.591 citing the article as the source. 26 Nicholson. The Canadian Expeditionary Force, pp.520, 523. A total of 56,555 other ranks died of the
598,020 men who were enlisted.
27 Shock Troops: Canadians Fighting the Great War 1917-1918. (Toronto: Viking Canada, 2008) p.xxxiii;
Nicholson The Canadian Expeditionary Force 1914-1919 p.523; Morton When Your Number’s Up p.279
28 LAC RG 150 acc 1992-93/166 Box 6153 (267541 Wesley Mickey) and Box 8464 (701232 Reuben
Rosenfield). Rosenfield was discharged as underage on 11 March4916, nine days after he enlisted while
Mickey served in Canada untiM7 October 1916; Morton When Your Number’s Up. p.279 suggests that
only one ten year was enrolled.
29LAC RG 150 acc 1992-93/166 Box 4663, personnel file 258572 William Henry Hugh Hutchison,
Director of War Service Records to Department of Veterans Affairs 26 November 1953; DHH Minutes of
the Militia Council 2 January 1918 p.21 concerning Hutchison’s pay; LAC RG 9 III A1 Vol 90 File 10-128, PC 83 of 12 January 1918 authorizing back pay; Hutchison had been discharged from the 211th Battalion
in December 1916 but was smuggled on board the troopship as a form o f ‘mascot’. On arrival in England,
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he was posted to the 8th Battalion Canadian Railway Troops. After being repatriated to Canada, Hutchison
was discharged as underage on 31 March 1918. The issue with pay arose because he had been formally
discharged on 2 December 1916. He subsequently served with the 11th Canadian Garrison Regiment from
February to July 1919. Hutchison died in Vancouver 23 November 1969.
30 Based on attestation forms available at http://www.collectionscanada.gc.ca/databases/cef7001042-100.01e.php
' ' .'
31 LAC RG 24 Vol 4376 File 34-7-61 Vol 2, AG Circular Letter 9 August 1917 noting that “In most of the
cases these boys enlist giving a false age.” ;;
32LACRG24 Vol 1311 File 593-3-7 Vol3,General Orders 13 August 1915 with recruiting regulations;
LAC RG 24 Vol 4509 File 17-1-49, AG Circular Letter l8 January 1917 directing that boys under the age
of eighteen were not to be enlisted as buglers or drummers. /
33 Details from the CWGC at http://www.cwgc.org/debt_of_honour.asp?menuid=14.
34 The LAC website at http://www.collectionscanada.gc.ca/databases/cef/001042-100.01-e.php was
searched for men with service numbers ranging from 2607022 to 2607049. Twenty-one attestation forms of
militiamen transferred to the CEF in May 1919 were found.
35 LAC RG 9 III A1 Vol 91, CEF Routine Order 795 of 12 July 1918 repeating Order in Council PC 1569
of22 June 1918
36 DHS 74/672 (Edwin Pye Fonds) Box 1 Folder 3 ‘Disposition on Discharge’
37 Canada. Dominion Bureau of Statistics. Vital Statistics 1923: Third Annual Report. (Ottawa: King’s
Printer. 1925) p.xxxiii: Nicholson The Canadian Expeditionary Force 1914-1919 p.523: Morton When
Your Number’s Up p.279
38 Toronto Globe 10 March 1916 p.9. It is difficult to believe Mackenzie Bowell’s offer was anything more
than a publicity stunt to shame younger men into enlisting.
■'
39 LAC RG 150 acc 1992-93/166 Box 6459 1282269 Alexander Muir. A former member of the British 11th
Hussars and the Canadian 5th Princess Louise Dragoon Guards, Muir was old enough to have served in the
Crimea although his name does not appear on the roll for the Charge of the Light Brigade in 1854. He was
demobilized in June 1920 at the age of eighty-four.
v
40 LAC RG 150 acc 1992-93/166 Box 5206, 505381 John Webster Kirkwood; The CWGC lists his age as
sixty-eight while the Veterans Affairs website at http://www.vacacc.gc.ca/remembers/sub.cfm?source=collections/virtualmem claims that Kirkwood’s age on death was 44;
The same website gives Hunter’s age as forty-seven while the CWGC and British Columbia Archives agree
he was sixty-seven.
41 LAC RG 24 Vol 1144 File 54-21-51-9 Vol 1,ADMS MD 10 to AAG i/c Administration MD 10 11
January 1917
42 LAC RG 150 acc 1992-93/166 Box 4076,2368456 Charles Frederick Harrigan. Not surprisingly, the
medical board noted that Harrigan had grey hair. His true age on enlistment was sixty-seven according to
his death registration at the British Columbia Archives website at http://search.bcarchives.gov.bc.ca/sn22E55/gbsearch/
1
43 LAC RG 150 acc 1992-93 boxes 330 (9759 Edward Bacon), 1792 (602397 William Clements) and 8193
(189701 William Rendle); LAC RG 9 III B 1 Vol 412 File D-52-1, OC CDD to Director Recruiting and
Organization 30 June 1916; Canada, Canadian Contingent Pay and Record Office. List of Officers and Men
serving in the First Canadian Contingent of the British Expeditionary Force 1914. (London: Pay and ;
Record Office, cl915) p.42; Quarterly Militia List,..l July 1916 p.289. Sixty-eight year old Edward Bacon,
a member of the 2nd Queen’s Own Rifles was enlisted by his peacetime commanding officer, LieutenantColonel Rennie. On arrival in England, Bacon was employed as the F Company cook. Seventy-nine year
old William Clements was not only the ex-RSM of the 30th Wellington Rifles, but had formerly served with
Royal Artillery. He must have been well known to senior officers of the 34th such as Major W.M. Head
who had been with the 30th since 1892. On arrival in England, Clements was employed as an officer’s
servant. Fifty-five year old William Rendle, a member of the 25th Elgin Regiment and a former gunner of
the Royal Field Artillery, enlisted in the 91st Battalion commanded by the CO of the 25th Elgins.
44 One boy died in a prisoner of war camp and is buried in Germany. Another died with the Canadian
Siberian Expeditionary Force and is buried in Russia.
45LAC RG 24 Vol 4536 File 3-1-143, AG to OC 6th Division 6 Augustl914, AG Circular Letter 17 August
1914 with an advance copy of a Militia Order 372 setting out the standards.
;i
46 Morton When Your Number’s Up p.56
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47LACRG24 Vol 1396 File 593-6-2 Vol 4, Major Milton Francis to Sam Hughes 15 June 1915, Sam
Hughes to AG 22 June 1915 saying “I think it a good idea.”, AG to Private Secretary 23 June 1915 saying
that there was no need “...for herding them [shorter soldiers] in separate battalions” and suggesting it would
be better to reduce the height standard in general; DOC MD 10 to AG 10 July 1915; LAC RG 24 Vol 4593
File 20-10 Vol 10, AG Circular Letter 21 July 1915
48 DHH 74/672 (Edwin Pye Fonds) Box 1 Folder 3 ‘Dates of Enlistments’ notes that the number enlisted
steadily increased to a peak of 33,960 men in March 1916 and then fell off to 7,961 recruits in July 1916.
49 LAC RG 24 Vol 4509 File 17-1-49 Vol VIII, AG to GOC MD 5 22 December 1916 with advance
notification of a forthcoming Circular Letter; RG 24 Vol 1836 File GAQ 9-25, AG Circular Letter 8
December 1917 announcing new height standards. The non-combatant corps referred to were the CAMC,
CADC, Pioneers, labour units, construction units, forestry units and skilled railway workers.
50 LAC RG 24 Vol 4510 File 17-1-49 Vol XV, AG Circular Letter 3 September 1917;There were concerns
about artillery recruiting as early as October 1916. See LAC RG24 Vol 1402 File 593-6-2 Vol 21, Inspector
of Artillery to Militia Council 12 October 1916 with recommendations for a reorganization of depot
batteries to facilitate recruiting
51 LAC RG 24 Vol 4510 File 17-1-49 Vol XV, AG Circular Letter 3 September; repeated in LAC RG 24;
Vol 1836 File GAQ 9-25, AG Circular Letter 8 Dec 1917
52 Allinson, Sidney. The Bantams: The Untold Story of World War I. (Oakville, Ontario: Mosaic Press,
1983) pp.38-44; The maximum height for bantams was lowered to 5’ 2” in June 1915. See TNA WO 162/6
‘Headquarters: Directorate of Organization 1914-1918, p.89
53 Davison, Lieutenant-Colonel H.M. History of the 35th Division in the Great War. (London: Sifton, Praed
& Co. Ltd., 1920) p.3
54 LAC RG 9 III D1 Vol 4701 Folder 73 File 9, ‘143rd Battalion Historical Records’ and RG 9 III A1 Vol
49 File 8-5-122, CO 143rd Battalion to R.F. Green, M.P. 5 October 1916. The battalion was authorized 29
November 1915 but recruiting did not start until 20 February 1916 because barracks were not available;
LAC RG 24 Vol 1398 File 593-6-2 Vol 11, AG to OC 2nd Division 17February 1916 advised that the
Minister of Militia and Defence had authorized the immediate formation of the 216th Bantam Battalion;
LAC RG 24 Vol 1403 File 593-6-2, AAG(l) to GOC MD 4 7 November 1916 authorized a bantam
company for the 167th Battalion.
55 Both the 143rd and 216th were enlisting men before recruiting peaked in March 1916.
56 LAC RG 150 accl992-93/l66 Box 7950, personnel file Lieutenant-Colonel A.B. Powley and Box 1324,
personnel file Lieutenant-Colonel F.L. Burton. Ironically both men stood 5’ 9”
^ LAC RG 24 Vol 1403 File 593-6-2, AAG(l) to GOC MD 4 7 November 1916 referred to an earlier
request from the district for a bantam company for the 167th.Battalion. : ■ ;
58 LAC RG 9 III D1 Vol 4701 Folder 73 File 9, ‘143rd Battalion Historical Records’; LAC Rg 24 Vol 1398
File 593-6-2 Vol 11, AG to OC 2nd Division 17 February 1916; LAC RG 24 Vol 1403 File 593-6-2,
AAG(l) to GOC MD 4 7 November 1916
59 LAC RG 9 III D1 Vol 4701 Folder 73 File 9, ‘143rd Battalion Historical Records’
60 Composite nominal rolls of the 143rd and 216th Battalions were compiled based on attestation forms with
service numbers in the blocks 826001 to 829000 and 273001-276000.
61 LAC RG 24 Vol 4741 file 448-14-275, HQ MD 13 to 137th Battalion 16 March 1916 advising that
Militia HQ had cancelled all transport for 143rd Battalion recruits, HQ MD 11 to HQ MD 13 4 April 1916
noting that the 143rd was restricted to MD 11, Militia HQ to MD 11 20 May 1916 authorizing the 143rd to
recruit in Alberta
62 Based on a survey of 2,297 attestation forms of men enlisted in the 143rd and 216th Battalions. Unless
otherwise noted, personnel statistics are based on this survey.
63 RG 24 Vol 365 File 33-95-7, OC MD 11 to Militia HQ 21 December 1916
64 LAC RG 9 III C7 Vol 4470 Folder 6 File 6, ADRTO CRT to GOC CRT GHQ 12 March 1917. The letter
noted that with the exception of 155 bantams who had been retained by the CRT Depot, all bantams serving
with railway units had been ‘traded’ for full-sized reinforcements from the 211th Battalion
65 LAC RG 9 III B1 Vol 687 File E-266-2; ‘Battalions Recently Arrived From Canada in 1st Can Reserve
Brigade at May 17th 1917’
66 DHH 74/672 (Edwin Pye Fonds) Box 13 F ile‘216th Battalion’
67 Figures taken from DHH 74/672 (Edwin Pye Fonds) Box 13 File ‘143rd Battalion’; Box 13 File ‘216th
Battalion’
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68 LAC RG 9 III B1 Vol 1539 File T-103-7, DAA & QMG Shomcliffe to HQ 1st Canadian Reserve Brigade
16 June 1917
69 Davison. History of the 35th Division, p.9: Revolds. The Lee-Enfield Rifle p. 120
70 Quoted by Davison. History of the 35th Division. The comment was made following the failure of a raid
by the 14th (Bantam) Battalion, Gloucestershire Regiment on 21 August 1916.
71 TNA WO 95/2472, War Diary ADMS 35th (Bantam) Division 9 December 1916. Diary entries 9-15
December 1916 noted that 1,439 bantams were found to be unfit. Davison History of the 35th Division p.82
noted that 2,784 bantams were found to be unfit by the ADMS during inspections 8-21 December 1916.
72 LAC RG 24 Vol 1144 File 54-21-51-9 Vol I, MD 2 24/Gen No 3600 (AMD 2) 1 March 1915
73 LAC RG 24 Vol 4507 File 17-1-149 Vol 1, AG Circular Letter 19 May 1915; LAC RG 24 Vol 4507 file
17-1-149 Vol II, AG to OC 5th Division 13 August 1915
74 LAC RG 24 Vol 1144 File 54-21 -51 -9 Vol I, MD 2 24/Gen No 4113 (AMDS 2) 6 August 1915
75 Militia Order 162 of 19 March 1915 allowed dentists to be appointed to the militia on a temporary basis;
Payment for civilian dentists was evidently slow. Doctor R.J. Pennal of Winnipeg, for example, was not ^
paid for services in 1915 until June 1917. See Minutes ofthe Militia Council 1917 Vol L p.785 8 June
1917; Militia Order 219 of 29 April 1915 provided the establishment for the CADC overseas; Militia Order
287 of 31 July 1916 authorized CADC detachments in Canada ,
76 Canada, Department of Militia and Defence. Physical Standards and Instructions for the Medical
Examination of Recruits for the Canadian Expeditionary Force and for the Active Militia of Canada.
(Ottawa: King’s Printer, 1917) p. 6
77 LAC RG 9 III B 1 Vol 789 File R-42-2 with reports on various units; Further returns are available in LAC
RG 9 III B1 Vol 395 File C-70-1
78 Canada, Department of Militia and Defence. Regulations for the Canadian Medical Service 1914.
(Ottawa: Government Printing Bureau, 1915) p.46. This pamphlet was probably written in late 1914.
Militia Order 149 of 22 March 1915 announced the pamphlet had been received from the printer and was
now available for distribution.
79 LAC RG 24 Vol 4508 File 17-1-49 Vol III, AG to 0 0 5 th Division announcing new standards. Artillery
and engineer drivers were on the same footing as the CASC. I am grateful to Doctor L.M. Newell, O.D. of
Courtice for pointing out that by today’s standards, a driver with D120/20 would be considered to be
visually impaired.
80 LAC RG 24 Vol 4508 File 17-1-49 Vol VI, AG Circular Letter 24 August 1916; RG 24 Vol 4509 File
17-1-49 Vol XI, AG Circular Letter 22 January 1917.
81 Macpherson, Major-General Sir W.G. History ofthe Great War based on official documents: Medical
Services General History Vol 1. (London: HMSO, 1921) p. 136; This was a British policy but presumably
applied to the CEF as well. See Macphail Official History of the Canadian Forces in the Great War. 19141919: The Medical Services p.282
82 DHH KE 6848 A329 C309 Minutes ofthe Militia Council 1916, p.82 16 May 1916; DHH KE 6848
A329 C309 Minutes of the Militia Council 1917, p.671 12 April 1917 concerning PF soldiers and
militiamen on active service; LAC RG 24 Vol 4510 File 17-1-49 Vo! XIII, AG Circular Letter 31 March
1917 reminded all concerned that members of the CEF were entitled to glasses, AG Circular Letter 17
April 1917 authorized glasses for militiamen on active service, AG Circular Letter 4 May 1917 authorized
glasses for members of the PF; The idea of infantrymen wearing glasses caused some concern in England.
See LAC RG 9 III B 1 Vol 711 File 1-27-2, 1st Canadian Reserve Brigade HQ to HQ Canadian Training
Division 11 January 1917 noted that the newly arrived 142nd Battalion had an unusually high proportion of
men wearing glasses.
83 LAC RG 4642 File 99-4-62, AG to OC MD 11 16 June 1916
84 LAC RG 24 Vol 1402 File 593-6-2 Vol 22, DG Mobilization to AAG(l) 2 January 1917 concerning
recruits for Number 1 Section Skilled Railway Employees
85 LAC RG 24 Vol 1437 File 593-6-31 Vol 1, OC Forestry Depot to OA RCE Militia HQ 29 January 1918
86 LAC RG 9 III C7 Vol 4470 Folder 7 File 8, SMO CRT Depot to Officer i/c RTS Canadians 1 December
1917, SMO to OC CRT Depot 8 October 1917
87 Bruce, Colonel Herbert A. Report on the Canadian Army Medical Service' (London: np, 1916). The
report made one recommendation concerning medical examinations in Canada and twenty
recommendations concerning the overseas administration and organization ofthe CAMC. ^ ■ '
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88 LAC RG 24 Vol 1813 File GAQ 4-12 ‘Gen Currie’s Speeches’, typed mss of a Montreal Gazette article
of 12 September 1924 reporting a speech by Currie to the Citizens’ Research Institute of Canada
89 LAC RG 24 Vol 1842 File GAQ 10-16, DHS to C of S 13 January 1925 noting that 32,200 infantrymen
arrived in England between 6 October and 5 November 1916 of whom 5,000 were medically unfit.
90 DHH 74/672 (Edwin Pye Fonds) Box 1 Folder 3; TNA WO 114/30 Weekly Returns of the British Army
and Dominion Contingents at Home other than the Territorial Force 28 August 1916,25 September 1916,
30 October 1916, 27 November 1916 and 25 December 1916; TNA WO 114/3 Y Weekly Returns of the
British Army and Dominion Contingents at Home other than the Territorial Force 29 January 1917, 26
February 1916 and 26 March 1916; TNA WO 114/32 Weekly Returns of the British Army and Dominion
Contingents at Home other than the Territorial Force 30 April 1917 and 28 May 1917
91 There were 85,673 men who served outside of Canada and were discharged as medically unfit. Available
figures do not discriminate between those who were unfit because of wounds and those who had been unfit
on enrolment. However, by using strength returns in WO 114, it is possible to arrive at an approximate
estimate. Between August 1916 and May 1917, strength returns submitted to the War Office listed the total
of all men with Category E including those on strength of the Canadian Casualty Assembly Unit (CCAC).
The CCAC was a holding unit for all men in England who had been admitted to hospitals or convalescent
centres. Virtually all of these men had been wounded in action. By subtracting the number of unfit men
with the CCAC from the total number of unfit with the Canadian contingent it is possible to determine the
number of men who were unfit for non-battle related reasons. The average proportion of those who were
unfit because of wounds was 61.3%. This proportion was then applied to the total number who had served
outside of Canada and were unfit, to produce a total of those repatriated because of wounds. The balance,
presumably, was made up mostly of men who had been medically unfit on enrolment. I appreciate that the
numbers produced are inexact. But, the numbers produced are a useful estimate and reflect the anecdotal
evidence available.
92 LAC MG 27 II D9 (Albert Edward Kemp Fonds) Vol 74 File ‘Marlow Report 1917’, Marlow, Colonel
F.W. Report to the Honourable the Minister of Militia Upon the Medical Service of Canada Generally and
in Respect to the CEF Particularly 20 October 1916 p.4; Canadian Medical Association Journal Vol VI,
Number 12 (December 1916) p. 1108 noted that medical officers allowed themselves to be overruled by
anxious commanding officers and claimed that civilian physicians were unduly careless.
93 Grant, Lieutenant-Colonel J.A. ‘The Medical Profession and the Militia’ in The Canadian Medical
Association Journal Vol IV Number 9 (September 1914) p.763. Grant read the paper to the Canadian
Medical Association at Saint John, New Brunswick on 7 July 1914
94 Militia Order Number 87 of 28 February 1916 authorized fifty cents for each recruit examined
95 LAC RG 24 Vol 1144 File 54-21-51-9 Vol 1, GOC MD 5 to Militia HQ 9 January 1917
96 LAC RG 24 Vol 4509 File 17-1-49, OIC Recruiting Bonaventure and Gasp6 to OIC Recruiting MD 5 24
December 1916
97 LAC RG 24 Vol 4380 File 34-7-91 Vol 1, OC 119th Battalion to AAG MD 2 3 May 1916
98 LAC RG 24 Vol 1401 File593-6-2 Vol 18, ADMS to GOC MD 3 21 August 1916
99 RG 24 Vol 1144 File 54-21-51-9 Vol 2, OCMD 11 to Militia HQ 19 April 1917
100 Morton. When Your Number’s Up. p.60
101 Cassel, Jay. The Secret Plague: Venereal Disease in Canada 1838-1939. (Toronto: University of Toronto
Press, 1987) p.19. A short summary of detection of the gonococcus and the use of the Wasserman test can
be found on pp.41-43.
102 LAC RG 24 Vol 4642 File 99-4-55, OC 4th Company 4th Divisional Train to AAG MD 11 3 may 1916.
The man concerned was released as unlikely to become an efficient soldier.
103 LAC RG 150 acc 1992-93/166 Box 8677 personnel file 865774 George Sawyer. The quote is taken from
‘Medical History of an Invalid’ 6 February 1918. Sawyer enlisted in 1916, but it was not until 1918 that he
was released into the care of his father at Gilbert Plains, Manitoba.
104 LAC RG 24 Vol 1836 File GAQ 9-25, AG OMFC to Militia HQ 16 January 1917 with list of mentally ‘
ill or deficient soldiers; LAC RG 9 III B1 Vol 552 File U-4-1, ADMS 3rd Canadian Division to DDMS
Canadian Corps 24 June 1916 complaining of six newly-arrived reinforcements with ‘senility’; LAC RG 9
III Cl Vol 3483 File 10-14-1 Vol 2, OIC Moore Barracks Hospital to ADMS HQ Canadians 8 January
1917
105 DHH 74/672 (Edwin Pye Fonds) Box l Folder 3, Statistics compiled by Brigadier J.A. Linton M.C. Op
cit. The total given excludes shell-shock.
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106 Fifth Census of Canada: Vol II. Table XLVI p.640 shows 1,324,563 men between the ages of 20 and 39.
The proportion o f ‘idiots’ was 10,327 per thousand and the proportion of insane was 19,598 per thousand.
In round numbers, 39,473 men or 3% had some form of mental disability.
107 Love, Major Albert G. and Davenport, Major Charles B. Defects Found in Drafted Men: Statistical
Information compiled from the Draft Records. Showing the Physical Condition of the Men Registered and
Examined in Pursuance of the Requirements of the Selective Service Act. (Washington: Government
Printing Office, 1920) p.l 24 gives a ration of 15.08 per thousand for all cases of mental alienation, a term
which included constitutional psychopathic states, mental deficiency (the largest category with 12.06 men
per thousand), dementia praecox or schizophrenia (second leading category with 0.06 men per thousand),
psychasthenia, psychoneurosis, psychosis, manic-depressive and ‘general paralysis of the insane’.
*08 Yerkes, Robert M.(ed) National Academy of Sciences: Vol XV. Psychological Examining in the United
States Army. (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1921) P.9
109 Physical Standards and Instructions for the Medical Examination of Recruits for the Canadian
Expeditionary Force, p.3
;
110 LAC RG 24 Vol 4615 File IG 206 Subfile 206-10, AG Circular Letter 6 March 1918
111 LAC RG 24 Vol 4615 File IG 206 Subfile 206-10, AG Circular Letter 6 March 1918
!12 LAC RG 24 Vol 4343 File 34-3-105-1 Vol 1, DGMS Circular Letter 27 October 1917
113 LAC RG 24 Vol 4547 File 79-1-1, Department of Justice Military Service Branch Circular
Memorandum #2 24 June 1918.
114 Archives of Ontario RG 8-5 Box 78 File ‘Military Service Act’, Superintendent Hamilton Hospital for
the Insane to Provincial Secretary July 1918 reporting a list had been forwarded as requested, Provincial
Secretary to Ontario Registrar MSA 11 July 1918 reporting that a list of all provincial institutions had been
forwarded to HQ MD 2; Archives of Ontario RG 10 Reel Ms 640 #3 ‘Statistic Register Queen Street
Mental Hospital Centre Toronto’ and RG 10 Reel Ms640 #5 ‘Brockville Asylum Admission and
Deportation Ledger 1911-1924’ as well as RG 10-302 (Penetanguishene) Vol 1 ‘Probation 1905-1958’, Vol
2 ‘Patient transfers to other asylums 1904-1947’, Vol 4 ‘Discharges 1905-1963’ and Vol 5 ‘Elopements
[escapes] 1905-1966’ do not list any patients who were discharged to join the CEF. However, a number
were discharged as cured and no doubt, some of these may have enlisted.Tam grateful to the Archives of
Ontario for negotiating a research agreement to allow me to gain access to these records which are
restricted and to Ms Sarah Fontaine for her assistance.
115 LAC MG 27 IID 9 Albert Edward Kemp Finds, Vol 73 File 63, ‘Report to the Honourable the Minister
of Militia Upon the Medical Service of Canada Generally and Respect to the CEF Particularly by Colonel
F.W. Marlow, CAMC, ADMS MD Number 2 acting as Principal Medical Inspector in Respect to the CEF,
Canada’ 20 October 1916; LAC RG 24 Vol 1144 File 54-21-51-9, AG Circular Letter 26 August 1916;
LACRG 24 Vol 4311 File 34-1-59 Vol 1, AG Circular Letter 12 September 1916; Bruce, Herbert A.
Report on the Canadian Army Medical Service. (London: np, 1916) wrote extensively on the problem of
unfit soldiers in England.
116 Militia Order 372 of 17 August 1914 reproduced in Official History of the Canadian Forces in the Great
War 1914-1919: Vol II Appendice, p.43: King’s Regulations and Orders for the Canadian Militia (191 \)
article 260
117 General Order 1915 of 15 March 1915 reproduced in Official History of the Canadian Forces in the
Great War 1914-1919: Vol I. Appendices p,347
~
m LAC RG 24 Vol 1311 File 593-3-7 Vol 3, General Orders 13 August 1915 :
119 Official History ofthe Canadian Forces in the Great War 1914-1919: Vol I. Appendices p.58 Appendix
86 noted that 523 men from foreign countries other than the United States were attested in the First
Contingent. The total is likely understated since 1,032 men did not give their place of birth. The statistics
given in the Official History include officers, nursing sisters and other ranks.
120 LAC RG 24 Vol 4336 File 34-3-24, CGS to GOC 2nd Division 8 December 1914 noting that thirty-eight
men were repatriated from Glasgow on 17 November 1914. Thirty-two had been bom in Germany, AustriaHungary or Turkey. The remaining six (including four Americans) were thought to be German
sympathizers.
^ '
121 Section 95(1) of the Army Act, reproduced in Manual of Military Law. 1914 p.471
LAC RG 24 Vol 4336 File 34-3-24, AG to OC 2nd Division 24 February 1915
LAC RG 24 Vol 4593 File 20-10 Vol 10, AG to DOC MD 10 21 November 1914, DSA HQ MD 10 to
105-th Regiment 16 February 1915
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124LAC RG 24 Vol 4331 File 34-2-18, AAG 2"d Division to 38th Regiment 1 TJanuary 1915, AAG 2nd
Division to 19th Regiment 14 January 1915; LAC RG 24 Voi 4336 File 34-3-24, AAG 2nd Division to 5 1st
Soo Rifles 17 March 1915
125 Canadian Expeditionary Force: 37th Battalion, also 1st and 2nd Reinforcing Drafts: Nominal Roll of
Officers, Non-Commissioned Officers and Men. (Issued with Militia Orders 1915), Private Stawigky, a
Ukrainian from Kiev, sailed with the 2nd Reinforcing Draft on 17 August 1915 while Private Maki, a Finn,
sailed with the main body on 27 November 1915
126 Canadian Expeditionary Force: 59th Battalion and Reinforcing Drafts: Nominal Roll of Officers, NonCommissioned Officers and Men. (Issued with Militia Orders 1915). More than sixty Russians were
enlisted. Reinforcing drafts sailed on 27 August 1915 and 13 November 1915 while the main body sailed
on LApril 1916. More than half of the Russians sailed with one of the two reinforcing drafts.
127 Canadian Expeditionary Force: 57th Battalion and Reinforcing Draft: Nominal Roll of Officers, NonCommissioned Officers and Men. (Issued with Militia Orders 1915). Nineteen men sailed with the
reinforcing draft on 21 July 1915 while another forty-five sailed with the main body on 2 June 1916. The
proportion of those who sailed (60.4%) suggests that only naturalized men were retained.
*28 Morton, Desmond. .‘The short, Unhappy Life of the 41st Battalion, CEF’ in Queen’s Quarterly Voi
LXXXI, Spring 1974, Number 1. p.75
129 Canadian Expeditionary Force: 41st Battalion and Reinforcing Draft: Nominal Roll of Officers, NonCommissioned Officers and Men. (Issued with Militia Orders 1917). The reinforcing draft sailed on 17
June 1915 while the main body sailed on 18 October1915
130 LAC RG 150 acc 1992-93/166 Box 496 personnel file 416690 Kostos Bastas
131 LAC RG 24 Voi 4740 File 448-14-262 Voi 2, GOC MD 13 to Militia HQ 18 January 1917
132 LAC RG 24 Voi 4336 File 34-3-24, AG to OC 2nd Division 6 November 1915; LAC RG-24 Voi 4375
File 34-7-61 Vol 1, AAG 2nd Division to OC 198th Battalion 2 March 1916 concerning citizenship
requirements for the 213th (American Legion) Battalion
133 LAC RG 9 III B1 Vol 1188 File A-42-5 Vol 1, PC 1177 of 26 April 1917 ,
134An Act Respecting Military Service [29 Augustl917] article 2(1). There are numerous examples of nonBritish subjects being accepted in 1918 while draftees were discharged if they were aliens; LAC RG 24
Voi 6566 file 1064-30-34 Vol, PC 111 of 17 January 1918 which provided that immigrants who had not
been naturalized could be drafted but only for non-combatant service.
135 St Marys and District Museum Larsson Fonds, certificate of naturalization for Adolf Gottffid Larsson, a
Swede living on St Marys, Ontario, granted 18 October 1916
136 Wartime Elections Act [20 September 1917] article 2(g) concerning those naturalized after 31 March
1902 and article 2(h) concerning those had joined the CEF or who had been turned away as unfit.
137 DHH 74/672 (Edwin Pye Fonds) Box 4 Folder 14 File ‘Recruiting’, AG circular letter 4 January 1916
concerning Italian citizens; LAC RG 24 Voi 4552 File 125-1-14, MD 6 Chief Recruiting Officer circular
Ietter2 February 1916 repeated the AG circular letter; LAC RG 150 acc 1992-93/166 personnel file 829485
Frank Mark who was discharged from the 144th Battalion in Winnipeg as an Italian reservist on 29 May
1916; LAC RG 24 Voi 425 File 54-21-1-48 Voi 1, Colonial Secretary to Governor General 3 January 1916
concerning Montenegrins, Colonial Secretary to Governor General 24 January 1916 concerning Serbs.
Curiously, the caveat concerning recall does not appear to have been passed on to districts. See AG to HQ
3rd Division 28 January 1916 concerning Serbs.138 LAC RG 9 III D3 Voi 4996 Reel T-10835, War Diary 5th Field Company, 14 January 1915
139LAC RG 9 III B1 Vol 416 File E-6-1, OC A Company to OC 5th Battalion 1 December 1914 noting that
French reservists with the CEF were subject to court-martial on arrival to France, British Ambassador to
France to Foreign Office 13 January 1915 noting that the French government was satisfied if the men were
serving with an allied contingent
140 LAC MG 30 E406 (Likacheff-Ragosine-Mathers Collection) Vol 11 Reel 7601 File 339, Russian '
Embassy in Washington to Russian Consul in Montréal 17 October 1914; File 340, Russian Consul to
External Affairs 25 October 1914 [old style?] and 10 November 1914, External Affairs to Russian Consul
24 November 1914; DHH 74/672 (Edwin Pye Fonds) Box 4 Folder 14 File ‘Recruiting’, AG circular letter
21 November 1914; LAC RG 9 III B 1 Voi 416 File E-6-1, DMO War Office to GOC Canadian Division 11
December 1914 repeating a request from the Russian Attaché.
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141 LAC MG 30 E406 (Likacheff-Ragosine-Mathers Collection) Vol 11 Reel 7601 File 341, Maurice
Dunsford, Humboldt Recruiting Officer to Russian Consul 1 March 1915, Consul to Dunsford 4 March
1915
U1 LAC MG 30 E406 (Likacheff-Ragosine-Mathers Collection) Vol 11 Reel 7601 File 400, SergeantMajor Haynes of Roblin, Manitoba, to Russian Consul in Winnipeg 9 June 1915 and Consul to Haynes 16
June 1915
143 LAC MG 30 E406 (Likacheff-Ragosine-Mathers Collection) Vol 11 Reel 7601 File 344, Consul to
External Affairs 23 July 1915; LAC RG 24 Vol 4331 File 34-2-18, AG to OC 2nd Division 2 July 1915
144 LAC MG 30 E406 (Likacheff-Ragosine-Mathers Collection) Vol 11 Reel 7601 File 344, Consul to CGS
[1] November 1915
145 LAC MG 30 E406 (Likacheff-Ragosine-Mathers Collection) Vol 11 Reel 7601 File 344, Russian
Consul to CGS [1] November 1915 confirming the substance of a conference on 29 October 1915,
146 LAC MG 30 E406 (Likacheff-Ragosine-Mathers Collection) Vol 11 Reel 7601 File 344, CGS to
Russian Consul 5 March 1916 and Consul to CGS 17 March 1916
147 LAC RG 24 Vol 4320 File 34-3-24, 213th Battalion to HQ MD 2 23 November 1916
148 LAC MG 30 E406 (Likacheff-Ragosine-Mathers Collection) Vol 11 Reel 7601 File 344, CGS to
Russian Consul 20 March 1916 saying in part, “...at Militia HQ we gratefully recognize the fact that your
one object is to safeguard our interests by preventing the enlistment of alien enemies who may pass
themselves off as Russian subjects.”
149 LAC RG 150 acc 1992-93/166 Box 6127 personnel file 2776923 George Morris Merkel, Box 328
personnel file Rudolph C. Bach; LAC RG 38 A-l-a Vol 5 reel T-2060 personnel file 7606 Rudolph C.
Bach
150 LAC RG 150 acc 1992-93/166 Box 5257 personnel file 722021 Reinhold Krinke, Box 6137 personnel
file 808337 personnel file Adolf Messerschmidt, Box 1090 personnel file 12675 Andi William Brod
151 CEF recruiting statistics for other ranks only taken from Nicholson The Canadian Expeditionary Force
1914-1919 p.546; The sample was drawn from published embarkation rolls supplemented by a search of
the Library and Archives Canada website Soldiers of the First World War 0914-1918) using surnames and
first names supplemented by ‘wild cards’. The samples are obviously not complete but probably represent
the vast majority of men who were enlisted. Unless otherwise noted, all statistical information presented
concerning immigrant soldiers is based on a sample of 18,694 men from seventeen countries. These
samples vary in size from Albania (13 men) to Russia (6,485 men).
152 LAC RG 4375 file 34-7-61 Vol 1, AAG MD 2 to K.A. Wee of Leonia, New Jersey 27 April 1917
153 LAC RG 24 Vol 4547 file 79-1-1 Vol II, Military Service Branch Miscellaneous Circular No. 22 of 22
August 1918
154 Wong, Marjorie. The Dragon and the Maple Leaf: Chinese-Canadians in World War II (Toronto: Pirie
Publishing, 1994) pp. 3-7 contain a quick survey of World War I. Of the names mentioned, James Delbert
Harold Chew was obviously Caucasian while Hanson Lee, Yee Chong Leong, Y.C. Lee and Wee Tan
Louie cannot be traced. Wong also claims that the 52nd Battalion at Port Arthur, Ontario, enlisted more than
sixty men. The claim is doubtful since the 1911. Census showed only 162 men in the Thunder Bay-Rainy
River Districts who had been bom in China; see also Canadian Expeditionary Force: 52nd Battalion, also 1st
and 2nd Reinforcing Drafts: Nominal Roll of Officers. Non-Commissioned Officers and Men. (Issued with
Militia Orders.1917). About 1,500 other ranks are listed. None were bom in China.
155 LAC RG 150 accl992-93/166 Box 5522 personnel file 687931 Frederick Lee, Box 5750 personnel file
2323392 Wee Hong Louie, Box 5750 personnel file 3206975 William Thomas Louie, referred to by
Marjorie Wong as Wee Tan Louie.
156 LAC RG 150 acc 1992-93/166 Box 4475 personnel file 2250839 Tung On Hong and Box 3173
personnel file 1069777 Victor Fong
t57 Hugh Guthrie speaking to the House of Commons 29 April 1920 quoted in Walker, James W. St. G.
‘Race and Recruitment in World War I: Enlistment of Visible Minorities in the Canadian Expeditionary
Force’ in Canadian Historical Review Vol LXX Number 1 (March 1989) p.4
158 Japanese Contribution to Canada: A Summary of the Role Played bv the Japanese in the Development
of the Canadian Commonwealth. (Vancouver: Canadian Japanese Association, 1940) pp.27-28. A survey
carried out in 19124-1926 by the Continental Daily News of Vancouver is cited as the source for the
proportion of Japanese immigrants who could not read, write or understand English; LAC RG 24 Vol 1397
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File 593-6-2 Vol 8, AG circular letter 9 September 1915 concerning language ability; LAC RG 24 Vol
4427 File 26-5-64-3 Vol 1, AG circular letter 14 September 1916 concerning language ability.
159 LAC RG 24 Vol 1256 File 593-1-94, CGS to AG 29 March 1917 in commenting on the enlistment of
Japanese in the 191st Battalion in Alberta; Adachi, Ken. The Enemy That Never Was: A History of the
Japanese Canadians. (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart Limited. 1976) p.102
160 Toronto Star 14 March 1916 p.2. See also Toronto World 15 March 1916 p.4
161 LAC RG 9 IIA2 Vol 33 ‘Minutes of the Militia Council 1916’, p.60 19 April 1916
162 LAC RG 24 Vol 4642 File 99-4-57, CGS to OC MD 11 22 April 1916 in connection with the Japanese
battalion noting that “...the services of a smaller unit, a company for example, could not be conveniently
utilized.”; Adachi The Enemy that Never Was p.102
163 LAC RG 24 Vol 1256 File 593-1-94, DAAG Militia HQ to GOC HQ BCRM 4 April 1918; 2007157
Frank Kasino, 2768007 Samey Nagano, 3236549 Masahito Nishioka, 2007981 Hatustaro Okita, 2501096
Suny Tanaka and 2768270 Takeji Tsuge were all Japanese-born while 3032176 Lee Young Chung had
been bom in Korea, then a Japanese possession. Two were Nisei: 2507423 Thomas Nash and 3032811
John Sasaki.
164 Based on a sample of 226 Japanese or Nisei men.
165 Fifth Census of Canada: Vol II Table XII ‘Origins of the People’ pp.368-369 notes that 2,315 Hindu
men lived in Canada with British Columbia accounting for 2,289 or 98.9%; For a succinct summary of
British Columbia’s treatment of East Indians, see Manak, Sonia ‘The Sikh Immigrant Experience’ in B,C.
Historical News Vol 31 Issue 4 (Fall 1998); LAC MG 26 II 1(c) (Sir Robert Borden Fonds) Vol 196
p.109546, Major (retired) R.O. Montgomery to Sir Richard McBride 10 February 1915 noting that a
number of British Columbia Sikhs had returned to India in order to enlist
166 LAC RG 73 Cl Vol 49 file 1-1-65 Part 1, W.P. Archibald to Minister of Justice 11 September 1914
167 LAC MG 26 II 1(c) (Sir Robert Borden Fonds) Vol 196 p. 109532, Sir Richard McBride to Prime
Minister Borden 21 December 1914
!68 LAC MG 26 II 1(c) (Sir Robert Borden Fonds) Vol 196 p. 109533, Prime Minister Borden to Sir Richard
McBride 23 December 1914, p.109545 Borden to McBride 3 February 1915 noting that the CGS had
objected because of the problem finding reinforcements
169 LAC MG 26 II 1(c) (Sir Robert Borden Fonds) Vol 196 p.l 09544 McBride to Borden 2 February 1915,
p.109558, Borden to Governor General 22 February 1915
70 Walker, James W. St. G. ‘Race and Recruitment in World War I: Enlistment of Visible Minorities in the
Canadian Expeditionary Force’ in Canadian Historical Review Vol LXX Number 1 (March 1989) p.4
171The number identified includes one man who enlisted twice claiming to have been bom first in
Singapore and then in India.
172 LAC RG 150 acc 1992-93/166 Box 3971 personnel file 3328986 Abdul Hamed, Box 3671 personnel
file 65400 Sunta Gougersing
173 LAC RG 150 acc 1992-93/166 Box 2969 personnel file 2137823 Silas Ezra, enlisted by the BCRM, Box
8947 personnel file 2074282 Sewa Singh, Box 8947 personnel file 4080094 Ram Singh
174 LAC RG 150 acc 1992-93/166 Box 8405 personnel file 827025 Harry Robson whose real name was
Hamon Singh. Robson enlisted at Vancouver in October 1916. He claimed to have been bom in Mexico
and that his next of kin lived in Singapore, India. His complexion was described as ‘Malay’.
175 TNA CO 42/1007, PC 1459 of 12 June 1918 noted that ACI 1771 of 12 September 1916 exempted East
Indians in Britain from conscription and directed that natives of India would not be called up.
176 LAC RG 24 Vol 1206 file 297-1-21, AG to T.J. Stewart of Hamilton: 16 October 1915
177 Walker, James W. St. G. ‘Race and Recruitment in World War I: Enlistment of Visible Minorities in the
Canadian Expeditionary Force’ in Canadian Historical Review: Ruck, Calvin. Canada’s Black Battalion:
No. 2 Construction Battalion 1916-1920. (Halifax, Society for the Protection and Preservation of Black
Culture in Nova Scotia, 1986); Foyne. Underside of Glory: Africanadian Enlistment in the Canadian
Expeditionary Force. 1914-1917.
178 LAC RG 150 acc 1992-93/166 Box 1992 personnel file 721010 Curley Christian, Box 2793 personnel
file 5085 Miles Smith Dymond, Box 7919 personnel file 144214 James A. Post, Box 3721 personnel file
442664 John Granito
179 LAC RG 24 Vol 4375 file 34-7-61 Vol 1, Minister of Militia and Defence to OC 2nd Division 18
November 1915 and District Commander to Minister 18 November 1915
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180 LAC RG 24 Vol 4375 file 34-7-61 Vol 1, AAG 2nd Division to Toronto Recruiting Depot 19 November
1915, OC Recruiting Depot to GOC 2nd Division 22 November 1915 1 . ■;
181 LAC RG 24 Vol 1400 file 593-6-2 Vol 16, AG to OC No. 1 Construction Battalion 10 July 1916. The
original complaint is not on file.
182 DHH 74/672 (Edwin Pye Fonds) Box 8 file 74/672-11-36 ‘Enlistment of Colored Men in the CEF\
J.R.B. Whitney to Minister of Militia and Defence 24 November 1915, Minister to Whitney 3 December
1915; LAC RG 24 Vol 1206 file 297-1-21, J.R.B. Whitney of Toronto to Minister of Militia and Defence
19 January 1916, AG to OC 2nd Division 3 February 1916
183 LAC RG 24 Vol 4387 file 34-7-141 Vol 1, AAG MD 2 circular letter 3 April 1916. Forty-five battalions
were queried but only thirty-seven replies are on file
184 Canada, Department of Militia and Defence. Canadian Expeditionary Force Units: Instructions
Governing Organization and Administration. (Ottawa; Government Printing Bureau, 1916) P.4
185 See Canadian Observer Vol 3 Number 5 (8 January 1916) p.4 concerning the benefits of a formed
platoon to the black community.
*86 LAC RG 24 Vol 1206 file 297-1-21, Military Secretary to John T. Richards of Saint John 11 October
1915 noting that Richards’ suggestion that blacks could not enlist was incorrect.
,
187 Canada. Department of Militia and Defence. Canadian Expeditionary Force; No 2 Construction
Battalion: Nominal Roll of Officers. Non-Commissioned Officers and Men, (issued with Militia Orders,
1917) shows a total of 605 other ranks. A composite nominal roll has been compiled of 440 men born in the
Caribbean or Central America who were probably black based on the description of complexion, eyes and
hair on the reverse side of the attestation form. Those who joined No. 2 Construction Battalion have been
excluded from this roll. There are also 45 men who joined units other than No. 2 Construction Battalion
and were probably black. In all, there are 1,090 blacks in these nominal rolls. The estimate given is
probably understated.
188 LAC RG 24 Vol l833 File GAQ 9-34A ‘Labour Units’, AG to GOC MD 1 30 April 1918 discussing a
proposal from MD 1 to recruit American blacks through the BCRM.
.
389 LAC RG 24 Vol 1221 file 593-1-7 part 1, OC 1st Divisional Area to Militia HQ 8 August 1914, AG to
OC 1st Division 8 August 1914. The draft reply is on file and bears a note ‘OK’ followed by Hughes’
initials; Archives of Ontario, Alexander Emerson Belcher Fonds, FI 8 Reel MS 93, MU 5813-5814,
Military Secretary to Lieutenant-Colonel A.E. Belcher, Parliament Buildings, Toronto 8 August 1914
■ advising that “any of our good friends of the Chippewas” who wished to enlist in the First Contingent
should apply to the 32nd Huron Regiment; The telegram was first published in Wilson. Ontario and the First
World War 1914-1918. p. cx. Wilson cited the document as ‘Adjutant General to Colonel L.W. Shannon’.
This was clearly an error the telegram was addressed to ‘OC 1st Division’ and not to a specific individual.
Shannon was the AAG as a major at the time and did not become the district commander as a colonel until
January 1915 when Brigadier-General W.E. Hodgins was posted to Ottawa as the AG. Gaffen used the
same citation as Wilson which suggests he did not consult the originals.
190 Data taken from Fifth Census of Canada: Vol II Table VII ‘Origins of the People by sub-districts’ .
191 LAC RG 24 Vol 1221 file 593-1-7 Vol 1, OC 2nd Division to Militia HQ 23 November 1915 requesting
permission to enlist Indians in the 114th Battalion and alluding to a previous request which was turned
down by Militia HQ 1 February 1915. This letter has not been found.
I
192 LAC RG 10 Vol 6767 file 452-13, Deputy Minister Militia and Defence to Indian Affairs 22 October

1915;
. i - 193 LAC RG 24 Vol 1221 file 593-1-7 Vol 1, OC 2nd Division to Militia HQ 23 November, 27 November
and 3 December 1915, OA 1st Division to Militia HQ 2 December 1915 noting that Hughes had already
granted verbal authority for the 135th Battalion to recruit natives; AG circular letter 10 December 1915
advising that Indians could be enlisted provided they were medically fit.
194 LAC RG 9 IIB5 Vol 5 file ‘CEF: 18th, 19th-22nd, 24th-27th Battalions’, Examination - Board of Officers.
Canadian Expeditionary Forces. Report on 20th Batt. 29 January 1915 commenting that the Indian company
from the 37th Regiment had been a failure. The two officers concerned were Lieutenant A.G.E. Smith of 13
Platoon and Lieutenant C.D. Smith of 14 Platoon; Toronto World 14 November 1914 p.2 noted that the
contingent from the 37th Regiment that joined the 20th Battalion included ‘Indian braves’,
195 LAC RG 24 Vol 1221 file 593-1-7 Vol 1, OC 2nd Division to Militia HQ 23 November 1915 requesting
permission to enlist Indians in the 114th Battalion and alluding to a previous request to enlist Indians which
was turned down by Militia HQ 1 February 1915. This letter has not been found; LAC RG 24 Vol 4380 file
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34-7-89 Vol 1, OC 114th Battalion to AAG 2nd Division 6 December 1915 noting that there were a number
of natives serving with the CMR Depot who should be transferred to the 114th. Two of these men have been
identified: 225517 George Frederick Anderson (enlisted 22 October 1915) and 225608 Abraham Maracle
(enlisted 27 October 1915). Canada, Department of Militia and Defence. Canadian Expeditionary Force:
Nominal Roll 114th Battalion: Officers. Non-Commissioned Officers and Men. (Issued with Militia Orders
1917) includes five natives who enlisted in MD 2 in August, September and October 1915 and were
transferred to the 114th: 142257 John Barefoot, 158525 Leonard W. Martin, 453787 Harold Dean Powless,
163226 Newton Yellow and 142337 Thomas York.
196 Gaffen, Fred. Forgotten Soldiers. (Penticton: Theytus Books Ltd., 1985), pp.93-108
197 Dempsey, L. James. Warriors of the King: Prairie Indians in World War I. (Regina: Canadian Plains
Research Centre, 1999) p.viii suggests 3,500 native enlistments; Summerby, Janice. Native Soldiers.
Foreign Battlefields. (Ottawa: Veterans Affairs Canada, 1993) p.5; Gaffen, Forgotten Soldiers, p.20
claimed that about 3,500 natives enlisted plus others who were living off the reserve. He did not disclose
the basis for his estimate; Scott, Duncan Campbell. ‘The Canadian Indians and the Great World War’ in
Canada in the Great World War: Vol III. (Toronto: United Publishers of Canada Limited, 1919) p.288.
Scott noted that more than 3,500 Indians enlisted according to records of the Department of Indian Affairs
while there were many more of whom the Department was unaware. At the time he wrote the article, Scott
was the Deputy Superintendent General of the Department of Indian Affairs.
198 LAC RG 150 acc 1992-93/166 Box 7506 personnel file 715070 August Otoon. Bom in Alaska.
Attestation paper is franked ‘Eskimo’. .Otoon’s physical description supports the designation; LAC RG 150
acc 1992-93/166 Box 3185 personnel file 1007034 John Ames Ford and 1007035 Abram Ford. Both men
(apparently unrelated) were Moravians from remote settlements in northern Labrador. Their physical
description suggests they may have had Inuit ancestry. I have been unable to confirm their ethnicity.
199 Gaffen. Forgotten Soldiers, pp.93-108
200 Gaffen’s roll includes two militiamen, one man from the Newfoundland Regiment, three Englishman
and twenty-seven who died after demobilization, mainly from ‘phthisis’ or tuberculosis.
201 Fifth Census of Canada: Vol II. Table XII pp.368-369. The Yukon Territory has been included in the
overall total of native males because Boyle’s Machine Gun Battery and the Yukon Infantry Company
within the Territory. The British Columbia Regiment also accepted draftees from the Yukon in 1918.
202 LAC RG 24 Vol 6566 file 1064-30-34 Vol, PC 111 of 17 January 1918 authorized Indian agents to
make application on behalf of their bands for exemption from combatant military service; Despite the
wording of PC 111, there was a belief Indians were exempt from compulsory service. See LAC RG 10 Vol
6767 file 452-15 Part 1, Deputy Superintendent General of Indian Affairs to Militia HQ 20 February 1918
noting PC 111 and requesting that all Indians drafted should be discharged; LAC MG26H (Sir Robert
Borden Fonds) Reel C-4331 Item 53796 noting that PC 111 had been amended and Indians were exempt
from the MSA since they did not have the franchise. I am grateful to Professor Brock Millman of the
University of Western Ontario for his notes from the Borden Fonds.
203 Holt, Richard. Cenotaphs of South-Western Ontario, (unpublished mss, 1996). The data was collected as
part of a project to identify all cenotaphs and war memorials in the vicinity of St Marys, Ontario. At the
time, the author was a member of the St Marys Museum Board.
204 LAC RG 10 Vol 6766 File 452-13. Kwawkewlth Agent to Indian Affairs 7 January 1916
205 LAC RG 10 Vol 6767 file 451-16 part 1, Indian Affairs to Militia HQ 29 May 1917
"
206 RG 10 Vol 6766 File 452-13. BC Inspector of Indian Agencies to Indian Affairs 8 January 1917
207 LAC RG 150 acc!992-93/166 personnel file 2184374 John James Simple [Semple]
208 LAC RG 10 Vol 6766 file 452-13, C.M. McCarthy to Reverend R.J. Renison 14 April 1917 with details
concerning McCarthy’s proposed recruiting expedition. The attestation papers of those who joined were
signed by McCarthy.
209 Fifth Census of Canada: Vol II. Table XII (Origins of the People) pp.368-369.1 have chosen to use
Table XII rather than Table XVII (Birthplace) because many of those who were bom in India and joined
the CEF, for example, were the sons of British expatriates.
2 i° Qjjpj 74/672 (Edwin Pye Fonds) Box 1 Folder 3 ‘’Disposition on Discharge’
211 DHH 74/672 (Edwin Pye Fonds) Box 1 Folder 3 ‘Diseases’
212 King’s Regulations and Orders for the Canadian Militia 0910) paragraph 322. See also the 1917
edition, paragraph 393.
213 Bryce, P.H. Conservation of Manpower in Canada: A National Need. (Ottawa: np, 1918) p.13 Table 14a
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214 48th Highlanders of Canada Regimental Museum, Box ‘CDF’ with recruiting forms of those who had
been rejected. These are unofficial forms printed by the 48th and contain the information needed to
complete the CEF attestation form.
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Chapter 5
The Manpower Pool

During the First World War, 598,020 other ranks joined the CEF, a tremendous
achievement for a small nation o f only 3,859,183 men .1 But not all of these men could
reasonably be expected to join the CEF: some were too old or too young, others were
needed for essential industries and some were medically unfit. In all, an estimated 820,
637 men were available for military service with only 652,820 fit for overseas service.
The manpower pool therefore was severely limited and was able to sustain the CEF only
with difficulty. Not surprisingly both official and unofficial efforts were made to modify
enlistment criteria and tap alternative sources. Some of these efforts were successful
while others were not. But, in the process, long-standing prejudices were challenged,
peacetime shibboleths discarded and the employment of manpower rationalized with the
result that by 1918 many thousands of men were eligible for military service who would
have been turned away at the beginning of the war.

There was no fixed order of battle for the CEF throughout the war, although by
1917, there was a general understanding that Canada would maintain four divisions and a
cavalry brigade in France together with ancillary troops and the 5th Division in England.
In terms of an establishment, Sir Robert Borden announced in his New Year’s message
on 1 January 1916 that the strength of the CEF would be maintained at 500,000 men. The
order o f battle (i.e. number of divisions or units) was not specified and there is no
evidence that Borden considered the number o f men required to maintain this
establishment before he made his announcement.

)
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-Prime Minister Borden may not have considered the limitations of the national
manpower pool, but others had grave concerns. In June 1915, when only two divisions
were contemplated, Sir George Perley, the Canadian High Commissioner in London,
suggested to Borden that additional divisions should be raised only if the requisite
number o f soldiers, together with reinforcements, were available. The CGS, Gwatkin,
also had doubts and in the fall of 1915, predicted the CEF would have difficulties
maintaining more than three divisions in the field. Implicit in both comments was the
notion that the CEF should be tailored to the available manpower pool. Others shared
their concerns. In Montréal, Lord Shaughnessy, President of the Canadian Pacific
Railway, spoke to the Board of Trade in March 1916, saying that “the raising of 500,000
men seemed an almost unbearable burden for the country when it was taken into
consideration that more than 300,000 were already engaged in war industries.”3 In
Parliament, Senator James Mason addressed his colleagues in April 1916, and warned
them that the nation could not sustain a force o f 500,000 men .4
All of these concerns revolved around the size of the national manpower pool.
In round numbers, about 15.5% or 598,020 of the 3,821,995 males reported in the 1911
census served in the CEF .5 The proportion is understated, however, since enlistment was
open (officially) only to British subjects between the ages of eighteen and forty-five. If
only these men are considered, then 39.1% of the potential manpower pool joined the
CEF.
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Table 27
Canadian Manpower
Age 18-456
¡
Province
<
(1)

Canadian
Born
(2)

British
Born
(3) ,

Foreign
Born
(4)

Total
Males

Foreign
Naturalized

ill

Total
Eligible
(7)

16,792
16,868
43 :
16,592
157
119
PEI
98,493
1,504
95,850
8,437
4,147
Nova Scotia
85,909
68,710
780
67,339
64,188
2,371
2,151
New
Brunswick
390,897
9,448
374,297
341,783
23,066
26,048
Québec
23,341
541,234
582,246
410,896
106,997 64,353
Ontario
122,762
101,675
12,001
39,806
33,088
Manitoba
49,868
21,342
121,406
158,907
Saskatchewan 61,193
38,871
58,843
19,410
88,810
122,915
37,446
31,954
53,515
Alberta
158,272
22,504
118,730
41,508
54,718
62,046
British
Columbia
1,526,133
1,109,383 306,377 304,310 1,720,070 110,373
Totals
Notes: (1) Data excludes the Yukon and Northwest Territories.
(2) Germans, Austro-Hungarians and those bom in the Ottoman Empire have
been deducted from the totals shown in Column 4 to produce a revised total of
188,672 o f whom an estimated 110,373 (column 6 ) had been naturalized and were
therefore eligible to join the CEF.
(3) The total number of eligible males in column 7 is the sum of columns 2, 3 and
6.
Not all of the eligible men shown in Table 27 were available to the CEF: essential
V
services and industries, especially munitions plants, needed labour despite the need for
recruits. However, the Canadian government did not designate essential industries and
the number o f essential workers is therefore unknown. How many were there?
A postwar compilation of Empire recruiting statistics by the War Office noted that
it was difficult to compare British and dominion recruiting rates because of staple
industries in the dominions that “did not lend themselves readily to the substitution of
female labour.” 7 The comment is apt. Loggers, foundry workers and miners not only
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needed specific skills, but also brute strength. Industries that employed relatively few
women therefore can serve as a useful proxy for essential occupations.
Table 28
Major Industries
Workers Eligible for Military Service?
Occupational
G roup
(1 )
Building trades
Fishing and
hunting
Forestry
Mining
Iron and steel
manufacture
Vehicle
manufacture
Shipbuilding
Wood working
Steam railways
Water transport

Total
W orkers

265

246,201
34,812

Female
Proportion
(5)
0 . 1%
0 .8 %

42,901
62,706
58,976

13
61
426

42,914
62,767
59,402

> 0 . 1%
0 . 1%
0.7%

21,312

63

21,375

W orkers
W

m

m

Female
W orkers
(3)

245,990
34,547 '

211

0.3%
/

3,225
35,829
86,116
24,367
615,969
443,498

7
1,593
190
78
2,907

3,232
37,422
86,306
24,445
618,876

0 .2 %

4.3%
0 .2 %
0.3%
0.5%

Workers of
military age 9
Notes: (1) The 917,848 agricultural workers have not been included because many of
these jobs could have been done by women, teenagers, old men and those who
were unfit for military service.
(2) Wood workers included basket makers, many of whom were probably
women.
If anything, the total of essential male workers shown in Table 28 is probably
understated because the number of wage earners in the manufacturing sector almost
doubled during the war, from 395,681 workers in 1915 to 693,116 in 1918. In part, the
increase was due to women joining the work force but most were employed in the
clothing and textile industries and were therefore not essential workers. 10 Heavy industry
and the production o f staples remained the purview o f men. Assuming that the total of
industrial workers in Table 28 represents the minimum number of men who could not be
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spared for military service, the national manpower pool shown in Table 30 should be
reduced to about 1,082,635 potential recruits.11
How many o f these 1,028,635 potential recruits were medically fit? There are no
comprehensive statistics available of the proportion of Canadian men who were fit for
military service, although there is some evidence that a significant proportion did not
meet the minimum medical standard. In 1917, a CAMC doctor in Windsor examined
more than eight hundred recruits and found that 47.9% were fit for general service,
19.8% were fit for limited duties either in Canada or overseas and 32.3% were unfit for
military service o f any description .12 In May 1917, the GOC MD 3 reported that from
1914 onward, 31.3% o f all applicants in Eastern Ontario had been rejected, mainly
because they were medically unfit. In the same district, between 1 January and 1 April
1917, 3,197 men volunteered for the CEF and 1,266 or 39.6% were found to be unfit for
military service . 13 However, these results were specific to MD 3 only and may not have
been typical for the country as a whole.
In the fall o f 1917, medical boards under the direction of the Military Service
Branch o f the Department of Justice examined all single males between the ages of
twenty and thirty-five who were eligible for conscription. The results were not entirely
consistent. Saskatchewan boards, for example, found almost 60% of all men fit for
combat duty overseas whereas Québec boards found only 36% fit for combat duty.
Barring any evidence that Québec men were not as healthy as the rest of the country, the
results provide a good snapshot of the general fitness of Canadian males in 1917.14
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Table 29
MSA Medical Board Results 1917
Men Aged 20-35 15
M edical Category
Fit for combat duty
overseas
Fit for limited duty
overseas
Sub-total: fit for
overseas duties
Fit for limited duty
in Canada only
Unfit for any
military service
Total Examined

N um ber Examined
128,974

Percentage
46.8%

37,192

13.5%

166,166

'

■

60.3%

42,581

15.5%

66,733

24.2%

275,480

h

How accurate were the results of the MSA medical boards? In Britain, National
Service medical boards examined 2,425,184 Britons in 1917 andl918 and found that of
every nine men, three were fit for general service, and two were fit for non-combatant
service. O f the remaining four, three were ‘physical wrecks’ capable of little exertion and
the last was “a chronic invalid with a precarious hold upon life .” 16 In summary, only
55.5% of all men examined in 1917-1918 were fit for some form of military service, a
figure roughly comparable to the results of the Canadian boards.

v

Assuming that the level of fitness was uniform across the country, the revised
manpower pool by province has been calculated as shown in Table 30.

I
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Table 30
Revised Manpower Pool
Canadian Males 18-45
Province

Eligible Males
Í I í l |¡ ! ! ¡ |! I I P Í S l S l l I i |

(1 )

(2 )
16,792
95,850
67,339
374,297
541,234
101,675
121,406
88,810
118,730

Fit for
Overseas
'

(3) '
7,859
44,858
31,515
175,171
253,298
47,584
56,818
41,563
55,566

Fit for
Canada
Only
(4)
2,267
12,940
9,091
50,530
73,067
13,726
16,390
11,989
16,029

Fit for
M ilitary
Service
(5)
10,126
57,798
40,605
225,701
326,364
61,310
73,208
53,552
71,594

Unfit for
Military
Service
_ (6 )_

PEI
6,666
38,052
Nova Scotia
26,734
New Brunswick
148,596
Québec
214,870
Ontario
40,365
Manitoba
48,198
Saskatchewan
35,258
Alberta
47,136
British
Columbia
1,526,133
Sub-total
/
Less essential
443,498
■
workers
167,808
Total
1,082,635
820,637
261,998
652,829
Notes: (1) The sub-total of eligible males in column 1 is taken from column 7 of
Table 29.
(2) MSA medical board rates have been used to calculate the number of
men shown in columns 3, 4 and 6 .
(3) Column 5 is the sum of columns 3 and 4.
(4) O f those fit for service overseas, 506,673 were fit for service at the
front while 146,156 were fit for non-combatant duties only.

Whether or not district and unit commanders were aware of the intricacies of the
manpower pool seems doubtful. On the other hand, manpower in general was a matter of
concern at all levels, particularly after .1 January, 1916 when Borden announced arf
establishment of 500,000 men for the CEF. The upshot was that consistent efforts were
made both nationally and locally to modify, augment or, on occasion, ignore recruiting
standards in order to expand the pool of potential recruits.
The manpower pool was also expanded by recruiting outside of Canada. Strictly
speaking, this was not illegal. Enlistment in the CEF was restricted to British subjects but
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Canadian residency was not a requirement and about 10% of all those who joined the
CEF were residents o f the United States, Bermuda, England, Greece, France and : •
Belgium.
The PF and CEF garrisoned Bermuda for two years, from September 1914 to
September 1916. During this time, at least forty-six islanders were enrolled, thirteen by
the 38th Battalion and thirty-three by the 163rd Battalion. 17 There was no real need to
enlist these men; Bermuda was not a theatre of operations, both battalions were near full
strength and reinforcements were readily available from Canada . 18 Furthermore, by
recruiting Bermudians, the CEF was directly competing with efforts in the colony to raise
two small company-size contingents, one of which was attached to the 38th for training. 19
s

Remarkably, there were no objections by Bermuda’s House of Assembly or the public at
large .20
All thirteen Bermudians who enlisted in the 38th Battalion were expatriates and it
is possible that these men, with no ties to Bermuda, preferred to take their chances with a
formed unit rather than an independent Bermudian company, or perhaps they preferred
.

.

V

CEF pay scales.21 The 163rd Battalion also enlisted a few expatriates but most of their
recruits were blacks from Bermuda or the British West Indies who were enrolled as
officers’ mess waiters to free Canadians for training with their parent companies.
However, the idea of local blacks serving in a white battalion upset local sensitivities and
the governor registered a stiff protest with Militia HQ in Ottawa.23 The 163rd therefore
stopped enlisting islanders and in September 1916, left Bermuda without, apparently,
discharging the offending mess waiters.24
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- The CEF also enrolled recruits in operational theatres such as Salonika, where, in
1917, the 5th Canadian General Hospital enlisted a twenty-four-year-old blacksmith who
claimed to be from Montréal.25 There were also at least thirty men enlisted in France or
Belgium. The majority were British subjects by birth, fourteen Canadians and thirteen
Britons, one of whom claimed to be a Canadian resident. O f the remaining three, one was
a Belgian with former service in a militia unit, the 65th Carabiniers, and gave his next of
kin as his wife who was living in Montréal.

In contrast, neither of the two Frenchmen
th

who were enlisted had any discernable connection with Canada when they joined the 8

Canadian General Hospital.27 Most of these men were probably enrolled with permission
from HQ, although only one example is known when Canadian HQ in London authorized
the 4th Canadian Stationary Hospital at Saint-Cloud near Paris in January 1916 to enlist a
Parisian with Canadian parents.28
Enrolling recruits in France and Belgium may have been unusual, but was not
unheard of. Certainly the Canadian Section, GHQ 3rd Echelon was willing to accept
recruits and in some cases, to frank the attestation papers of those who were enlisted in
France.29 HQ OMFC was also aware that men were enlisted on the continent and in June
1918 readily agreed to a proposal that Canadians serving with the Royal Engineers in
France be allowed to join the CEF, provided, o f course, the British Expeditionary Force
[BEF] had no objections.30
The CEF also recruited in England and in 1919 HQ OMFC reported that 1,733
men had been enlisted in the United Kingdom.31 None of these recruits, of course, were
part of the Canadian manpower pool.
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Recruiting in the United Kingdom started in October 3914 when the RCD were
given permission by Divisional HQ to recruit twenty-three men to bring the regiment up
to strength.32 A month later in November 1914, the 17th Battalion and the Divisional
Cyclist Company, both of which were under-strength, placed ads in British newspapers
without the approval o f Divisional HQ.33 Neither recruiting campaign was overly
successful (the Cyclists enlisted three men and the 17th eighty-seven), but the ads drew
the attention of the War Office which ruled on 19 November 1914 that the CEF was
permitted to recruit only in Canada.34
The War Office ruling was understandable given the need to build up the BEF,
but could not be sustained in practice. Admittedly the CEF in England was over-strength
/

by 4,500 men, but the haphazard mobilization at Valcartier meant there was a shortage of
artificers, farriers, shoeing-smiths and saddlers, skilled tradesmen who were not available
from Canada because there was no coherent reinforcement system.

The War Office

position was also illogical since the BEF tapped the 1st Division for more than a hundred
men and commissioned them in the British army.36 Faced with the illogic of the original
V

policy and the pressing need to find skilled specialists, especially for the 1st Divisional
artillery, the War Office reluctantly gave permission on 19 January 1915, for the CEF to
recruit thirty skilled tradesmen in England.
More than 250 Britons joined the CEF in England before the 1st Division sailed to
France in February 1915. About a hundred of these men were enlisted after the War
Office gave permission to recruit thirty specialists.38 Thirty-five joined the artillery, ten of
whom were skilled tradesmen.

Forty-two cavalrymen enlisted, but only nine had
/

civilian experience that was relevant.40 The CAVC took in twenty-seven recruits, but

t
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only two had previous experience working with animals.41 At least twenty-five men also
joined HQ 1st Canadian Division including six grooms, two cooks and two footmen.
These men may have been specialists, but were hardly the skilled tradesmen envisaged by
the War Office.
In February 1915, the 1st Division sailed to France and recruiting in Britain
virtually stopped, leaving expatriate Canadians with no alternative but to join the BEF.
However, in June 1915, the minister’s representative, Major-General J.W. Carson,
obtained permission from the War Office to enlist bona fide Canadians living in the
United Kingdom.42 The question of what constituted a bona fide Canadian was a thorny
one, and after some deliberation, Canadian HQ decided that a genuine Canadian was a
s

British subject who had been previously domiciled in Canada for an unspecified period of
time.43 ■
iThis definition was apparently too elastic^ however, and in May 1916, Canadian
HQ ruled that potential recruits had to provide documentary evidence of three years’
residence in Canada.44 The following year, in April 1917, the rules were relaxed when the
United States entered the war and ‘friendly or neutral’ aliens became eligible to join the
CEF. But this policy was short-lived and from September 1917 onwards, recruits had to
be bona-fide Canadians temporarily domiciled in Britain (i.e. visitors).45 The definition of
‘Canadian’ was also tightened up and in June 1918, OMFC directed that prospective
recruits in Britain or France had to produce a certificate of Canadian citizenship issued by
the High Commissioner in London.46
Recruiting in England was tolerated but not encouraged and prospective recruits
were expected to make their own way to a CEF unit willing to accept them.47 Despite
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this, there was a steady flow of recruits. Pay must have motivated some of the applicants;
a private in the BEF received the princely salary of a shilling a day (about 250) while his
CEF counterpart received four times as much. But there were other factors as well.
Members of the Canadian Munition Workers Unit who were employed at Dalton-inFumess in England, for example, were anxious to join the CEF when their contracts
expired, but preferred to enlist in England to avoid the return trip to Canada.48
There were also Canadians with the BEF who wished to transfer to the CEF. In
May 1915, thirty-one Canadians with the 2/6th (Cyclist) Battalion, Royal Sussex
Regiment requested a transfer to the Canadian Reserve Cyclist Company at Hounslow.
The request was approved by the War Office and the men transferred, together with
fourteen unruly Rhodesians, men that the 2/6th Royal Sussex were glad to be rid of.49 But
this was an exception and the general policy was that “Transfers from the Imperial to the
Canadian Forces are not permissible .”50 But as always, the rules were modified and in
June l918, HQ OMFC notified the Canadian Section GHQ 3rd Echelon that applications
to join the CEF would be accepted from those serving with the BEF, “but only where the
men are Canadians enlisted in North America in technical units [mainly men with the
Inland Water Transport] and are now being transferred compulsorily by the Imperial
Authorities to the Infantry .”51 It seems unlikely that many were transferred to the CEF. In
April 1918, eighteen men serving with the Royal Engineer Inland Water Transport were
drafted to the BEF’s Durham Light Infantry and asked HQ OMFC to intervene. Their
petition was unsuccessful despite a moving appeal: “We therefore ask you to claim us as
Canadians. We only ask to be with our own countrymen.”
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Table 31
Sample - Enlistments In Britain
Proportion
13.7%
6.9%

Quarter
October-December
January-March

Year
1914
1915

Enlistments
207
104

April-June
July-September

1915
1915

13
45

0.9%
3.0%

October-December
January-March
April-June

1915
1916
1916

137
341
219

9.1%
2 2 .6 %
14.5%

July-September
October-December
January-March
April-June
July-September

1916
1916
1917
1917
1917

113
42
46
62
37

October-December
January-March
April-June

1917
1918
1918

20

July-September
October-December
Total

1918
1918

23
13
1,511

25
64

Remarks
Recruiting forbidden
War Office allowed 30
skilled tradesmen to be
enlisted
Recruiting allowed for bona
fide Canadians.

Documentary evidence of
three years of Canadian
residency required

7.5%
2 .8 %

3.0%
4.1%
2.4%

1.3%
1.7%
4.2%

Bona fide Canadians
temporarily domiciled in
UK
‘
Citizenship certificate
required

1.5%
0.9%

Notes: (1) The period January to March 1916 was the peak recruiting period for
the CEF as a whole and the CEF in England.
(2) The mean enlistment date for the CEF in England was the beginning of
April 1916, about two weeks later than the CEF as a whole.
In terms of numbers, the men enlisted in England, France and Belgium were not a
significant extension to the manpower pool although the men who joined the 1st Division
in 1914-1915 must have been a welcome addition. Only one in five was a native
Canadian although all were required to have some connection with Canada. Whether this
connection was genuine or imagined is immaterial. The care taken to enlist only
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Canadians (however the term was defined) meant that those who wished to serve with
other Canadians were given the opportunity to do so.
In contrast to Bermuda and Europe, the United States made a. very significant
contribution to the manpower pool. The number is uncertain but it is estimated that more
than 57,000 Americans served in the CEF from start to finish. These recruits were
American residents, although most had been bom elsewhere .53 They enlisted in two
distinct groups: those who crossed the border on their own initiative to join up in Canada;
and those who were recruited by the British Canadian Recruiting Mission (BCRM) in the
United States.
Recruiting Americans was fraught with legal difficulties. American citizens who
'

y

joined the CEF were deemed to have expatriated themselves or, in other words, forfeited
their citizenship .54 Foreign armies, including the CEF, were also forbidden by the
P e n a l C o d e

U S

to recruit within the United States or to enter the United States with the

intention of enticing men to leave in order to enlist elsewhere.55 Both provisions were
reinforced in August 1914 by President Wilson’s proclamation emphasizing American
V

neutrality .56 In Canada, CEF regulations and the M

ilitia A c t

specified that recruits had to

be British subjects, thereby excluding American citizens.
Despite these obstacles, there was a steady trickle of enthusiasts from 1914
onward who travelled to Canada to enlist in the CEF. At Beebe Junction in the Eastern
Townships of Québec, 123 men crossed the border in September 1914, all bound for
Valcartier.57 At Windsor, Ontario, four men entered Canada on 21 September 1914
declaring their intention to enlist. Included in this group was James Groesbeck, who
claimed to be a native Californian planning to enlist in Montréal. Presumably this was the
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same man who enlisted in the 23rd Battalion at Québec City in November 1914, claiming
to have been bom in Winnipeg . 58 This was only the beginning and by the end of
December 1914, forty-four men had entered Canada through the Windsor border point
after declaring their intention to join the CEF .59 Results were similar elsewhere and up to
May 1916, 248 men entered Canada at Niagara Falls with the stated purpose of joining
the CEF .60 The majority of these men had been bom outside of the United States.
The steady trickle o f men travelling north to join the CEF was o f interest to
recruiters who sought likely prospects at major border stations. In 1915-1916 the 99th
Battalion based in Windsor, Ontario, concentrated its efforts on the border crossings and ;
was able to recruit a substantial number of American residents, a resource to which
/

inland battalions did not have access.61 Another Windsor-based battalion, the 241st,
recruited 821 men in 1916-1917, of whom 517 or 63% were American residents.62
Similarly, more than a quarter of those who joined the 176th Battalion at Niagara Falls in
1916-1917 were American residents. In London, the 63rd Depot Battery maintained a
recruiting office in Windsor with the result that almost a third of those who joined in
¿•l

1916-1918 were American residents.
Recruiting offices near the border gave units a distinct advantage and there was
considerable jostling at major border crossings. Windsor, Ontario, was particularly
popular and at one point in October 1916, there were fifteen unit detachments vying for
recruits from Detroit.64 Surprisingly, there were no complaints from the American
government. The 213th Battalion, however, went too far when it opened a battalion
recruiting stand in Niagara Falls with British and American flags at the Canadian end of
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the international bridge. In this case, the State Department lodged a formal complaint
with the British Embassy in Washington.65
Some units advertised for recruits in American newspapers. In March 1916, the
99th Battalion committed a spectacular gaffe by placing ads in papers owned by Josephus
Daniels, the U.S. Secretary of the Navy. In this case, Militia HQ had no choice but to act
and in March 1916, banned all advertising in American papers .66 But some units chose to
ignore the unequivocal ban imposed by Militia HQ. In April 1916, the Grand Rapids
News o f Michigan noted CEF advertisements and reported that “Information has been
received from American consuls that the Canadian Government is conducting a campaign
to lure prospective recruits across the border on promises o f work.” There were other
complaints as well, and in November 1916, Militia HQ repeated the prohibition on
advertising in the United States and added that district commanders would be “held
personally responsible for observance of these instructions and any officer disregarding
•

•

•

same will be subject to immediate dismissal.”

¿o

There were a few cases where units actively recruited on American soil. In
V

February 1916, three men from Rochester, New York, claimed that an NCO in plain
clothes from the 139th Battalion enticed them to Cobourg, Ontario, where they were
delivered to the battalion recruiting office instead o f being provided with the lucrative
jobs promised. A few months later, in June 1916, Lieutenant Austin of the 211th
Battalion, accused o f recruiting in Seattle under an assumed name, was incarcerated in a
local prison. In October 1916, three NCOs from the 141st Battalion were arrested in
Duluth after interviewing prospective musicians for the battalion band .69 It is important to
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note, however, that these units were in a distinct minority and most units were careful to
pay lip service to American neutrality.
There were also cases where measures were taken to assist potential recruits to
cross the border. The 7th Field Company in London maintained a recruiting office in
Windsor, Ontario, but also hired a Detroit crimp to find likely recruits in pool halls and
taverns and then escort them to Canada past immigration agents who obligingly looked *
the other way.

The cooperation extended by these agents at Windsor was not an isolated

example. In November 1915, the Department of the Interior instructed immigration

;

officials at Niagara Falls and St John’s, Québec, to admit potential recruits and escort
them to the nearest recruiting office .71 Similar instructions were also given to
immigration officers in Victoria, Vancouver and Sarnia.

There were unofficial

arrangements as well. In Winnipeg, the secretary of the Bohemian National Alliance of
America (Canadian Branch) advised the Russian Consul in Montréal in 1916 that “The
arrangements we [Bohemians] have made with the Emigration authorities are very
satisfactory, and so far we have had no trouble getting [Bohemian] men across the
border.”73 The arrangements made by the secretary of the Canadian Branch, Sergeant
August Fibiger of the 223rd Battalion, could not have been a secret and were probably
done with the tacit approval of the CO.
American neutrality ceased to be a problem on 6 April 1917 when the United
States declared war on the German Empire. The mood of the country was distinctly proAllied and after the Ambassador in Washington cleared the way, Brigadier-General W. A.
White, an officer with the British Mission to the United States, lost no time in soliciting
congressmen for permission to enlist recruits from the 700,000 British subjects in
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America who were neither citizens nor declarants.74 The results were almost immediate
and on 7 May 1917, Congress amended the

U .S . P e n a l C o d e

to allow Allied nations to

enlist residents who were not American citizens or declarants and had been bom in the
Allied nation concerned ;75 The amendment, which allowed foreign armies to enter the
United States and actively seek recruits, was a remarkable act of generosity and
cooperation even though the potential recruits were not eligible to serve in the American
Expeditionary Force (AEF ) .76
By 6 June 1917, the British Recruiting Mission, later renamed British Canadian
Recruiting Mission (BCRM), had started operations in New York .77 Developing the
infrastructure and importing staff took some time, however, and in the interim, US Army
/

recruiting offices assisted the BCRM by receiving applicants, conducting medical exams,
providing subsistence and forwarding men to the nearest CEF depot in Canada or, in the
case of Britons, Jews and Australians, to the Imperial Recruit Depot at Windsor, Nova
Scotia.78
From a modest start in New York City, the BCRM expanded steadily. The
headquarters was located in New York City and for organizational purposes the country
was divided vertically into three divisions: the Eastern Division based in New York City,
the Western Division in Chicago and the Pacific Division in San Francisco. By
November 1917, twenty-seven recruiting depots had been established as well as mobile
detachments that visited urban centres in the Western and Pacific Division. Canadians
were part o f every division, but the Western Division was staffed entirely by Canadians
with a militia officer, Lieutenant-Colonel J.S. Dennis, in command.

70
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. The BCRM also received civilian assistance. British consuls were instructed to
assist the mission and seventy-two recruiting committees were formed by prominent
Britons and Canadians living in the United States.80 Border crossing problems were non
existent. In June 1917, the Superintendent of Immigration noted that “for months past our
inspectors have, all along the Boundary, admitted such men as applied for entry to enlist
and were believed to be suitable .”81
Special efforts were made to recruit French Canadians and in June 1917, Major
J.J.O.L. Daly-Gingras of the 258th Battalion was posted to the BCRM in the hopes of
enlisting a sizable number of French-Canadian immigrants in the New England states.
The results were disappointing and in August 1917, a Catholic priest, Captain F.C.D.
s

•

Doyon, reported that many had already joined the AEF as translators and the remainder
anticipated being drafted in the near future. In summary, said Father Doyon, a concerted
effort to recruit these men would be a waste of time.
BCRM recruiting in the United States encountered some obstacles. Most U.S.
■i
Army recruiting stations cooperated with the BCRM, but a few were reluctant to provide
assistance or tried to entice BCRM recruits into the American Army .83 Local draft boards
were also loath to lose potential recruits for the AEF and in Boston, an Irish declarant
who tried to join the CEF was instructed to remain in the United States or be charged
with desertion from the AEF .84 In Buffalo, a BCRM recruit from the Engineer Depot at
Brockville was jailed for draft evasion when he returned home on leave in uniform .85 But
others were more cooperative and in Chicago,1Judge Stelk ordered non-U. S. citizens held
in the Cook County Jail to be taken to the BCRM recruiting office for attestation and;
o/

transport to Canada.
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- BCRM recruits were documented and examined in the United States and then
forwarded to a Canádian depot for attestation. But the men were not subject to military
law until they were attested and there were no legal means of preventing them from
deserting. In March 1918, about 5% of all BCRM recruits vanished before they arrived at
a depot in Canada while in August 1918 HQ MD 2 reported that more than 9% had
disappeared while in transit.

To stop this, Militia HQ directed in April 1918 that men

would be attested by BCRM recruiting detachments.88 But since only one of the three
BCRM divisions was controlled by Canadians, it is unlikely that the revised procedure
had much effect.
Judging by attestation papers, BCRM medical examinations were carried out by
y

CAMC or RAMC medical officers or, on occasion, by civilian physicians. The number of
applicants who were medically unfit is unknown although returns from New York City
for July 1917 show that 32.8% were rejected89. Those who had been passed as fit were
reassessed by medical boards on arrival in Canada. Results probably varied by district,
but in MD 2, for example, 4% of all arrivals were turned down by medical boards.90 In
all, it is estimated that about 63% of all BCRM applicants were fit for some form of
military service, a rate comparable to the MSA medical boards.
Not all districts benefited equally from the BCRM. MD 2 received the lion’s share
with 12,390 recruits by 7 September 1918, more than a third of all those recruited by the
BCRM .91 The reasons seem fairly obvious. The Western Division HQ was located in
Chicago which had direct rail connections to Toronto and the division covered a huge
area, from Pennsylvania to the Rocky Mountains. A detailed breakdown of the allocation
to each district has not been found, but partial returns illustrate the disparity.
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Table 32
BCRM Recruits
Allocation by District 21 July 1917-4 August 191792
District
1
2
3
4
5

Proportion
3.9%
52.3%
0 .6 %
7.8%
N/A
5.2%
13.5%
12 .2 %
N/A
4.6%

Recruits
35
464
5
69

MD
MD
MD
MD
MD
0
MD 6
46
MD 10
120
MD 11
108
MD 13
0
New Brunswick
41
Total
830
Note: New Brunswick was later redesignated MD 7.
The issue of which corps the recruits were assigned to caused some difficulties.
Initially, BCRM recruiters promised applicants they could choose any branch of the CEF
they wished and, not surprisingly, most opted to avoid the infantry. It must have come as
a shock, therefore, that on arrival in Canada, most were assigned to the infantry. Not all
accepted their assignment and in MD 2 about

2 %

of all BCRM recruits refused to be

attested and were returned to the United States.93
Only 63.4% o f all BCRM recruits who arrived in Toronto up to 18 August 1918
were fit for combatant service .94 The rest were assigned to duties commensurate with
their medical category .95
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Table 33
Corps Allocation MD 2 as of 18 August 191896
Corps
Infantry
Artillery
Cavalry
Engineers
Service Corps
Medical Corps
Railway Troops
Dental Corps
Officer Training
Garrison duty in Canada
Base Hospital
Total

Total
5,306
332
290
2,071
215
233
2,616

Proportion
42.1%
2 .6 %
2.3%
16.4%
1.7%
1 .8 %
20.7%

6

26
1,475
48
12,618

0 .2 %

11.7%

'

:

By October 1918, the BCRM had provided more than 33,000 men for the CEF, a
very substantial contribution to the national manpower pool. But how many actually
served in France, especially with the infantry where the need for reinforcements was the
greatest? Almost half of all BCRM recruits were enlisted after March 1918.

Judging by

those who served in the 20 Battalion, it took twenty-eight weeks, or seven months, for
the average BCRM recruit to reach the front lines after being attested in Toronto.98
Assuming that all BCRM recruits took seven months to reach France, it is probable that
about 17,000 men were taken on strength before the Armistice of whom about 42.1% or
7,100 were infantrymen, a total that would be consistent with Table 33. But, had the war
continued into 1919, there is no doubt that the BCRM contingent would have made a
much more substantial contribution.
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Table 34
.
BCRM Reinforcements - Select Battalions"
Unit

March-May

18th Battalion
20m Battalion
72nd
Battalion
85th Battalion
PPCLI
Totals .

Total

Depot

148
94
156
32
47
260
156

MD 2
MD 2
MD 2
MD 10,
11 , 12
MD 1
MD 2
MD 11

14
1 (Note 1)
9
89
26

30
50
51

8
121

0

4

3

28
189

10
220

529

1918
2nd CMR
4tn CMR
4m Battalion
16th Battalion

SeptemberNovember
1918
99
75
118
26

JuneAugust
1918
28
18
24 - '
5

21
1

79

0

7
38
938

'

MD 6
MD 3

Note: Other than Private Fraser who was posted to the 16m Battalion on 16
February 1918, all BCRM reinforcements arrived between March and
November 1918.

The BCRM was useful but relied on voluntarism and was therefore limited since
non-declarant British subjects living in the United States who refused to volunteer for the
CEF, AEF or BEF could not be compelled to serve. Conversely, American citizens living
in Britain or Canada could not be drafted by the BEF or CEF. To resolve this problem,
Britain and the United States concluded a reciprocal convention that gave men a choice
between returning home where they could be conscripted or remaining in their country of
residence subject to local draft laws. The preliminary agreement was signed on 19
February 1918, but the American Senate insisted on amendments and it was not until 30
July 1918 that the reciprocal convention came into effect. 100 With the introduction of
conscription for those living abroad, there was no need to recruit volunteers in the United
States and on 12 October 1918, the BCRM closed its doors. 101
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. The.terms of the convention concerning Canada were simple and straight
forward. All American citizens domiciled in Canada and all Canadians living in the
United States between the ages of twenty and forty-four were liable to be conscripted in
their country of residence unless they returned home.

Both Americans and Canadians

had a sixty-day grace period in which to make a decision. For those who wished to return
home, both the Canadian and American Governments agreed to facilitate repatriation but
the men were required to pay their own way.
Whether or not the reciprocal convention had any effect on the manpower pool is
impossible to determine although it appears that the CEF had the short end of the stick. In
the United States, the Provost Marshal General estimated that about 20,000 potential CEF
recruits living in the United States chose to serve with the AEF rather than return home.
In Canada, 18,372 Americans registered with consular officials after 30 July 1918 and
were thus exempted from the MSA. No record appears to exist of the number of
Americans in Canada who were drafted into the CEF nor is there any record of the
number of Canadians who trekked north under the terms of the convention.

The CEF also accepted convicts, although initially the reason was patriotism and
not the need to fill the ranks. The first were eight prisoners at St Vincent de Paul
Penitentiary who volunteered for the CEF on 14 August 1914. Their applications were
reviewed by the Minister of Justice, but only one prisoner was released; in the event, he
failed to enlist and was returned to prison. Others soon followed and by December 1914,
sixty-five felons had been released from penitentiaries and jails in order to join the CEF.
Some were given unconditional pardons, but most were released on a ‘Ticket of Leave’,
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the precursor to the modem parole. About half of these ex-lags failed to enlist. Twentyfive simply vanished, one was deported, two were convicted of burglary after their
release and were returned to St Vincent de Paul, three were arrested for failing to enlist
while the last, George Juen, from Kingston Penitentiary, enlisted but refused to go
overseas and was returned to prison .104

'

For the first two years of the war, prisoners were released on the initiative of the
Justice Department and not the CEF. The Justice Department motives were moral: in
1915, for example, the Inspector of Penitentiaries recommended that Frank Jones, a
Kingston prisoner, be enlisted because “military discipline is exactly what he requires to
make a man of him .” 105 The Dominion Parole Officer also had faith in the uplifting
/

nature o f military service and in September 1915 recommended the release of a chronic
alcoholic from Dorchester Penitentiary: “I think if he were given a chance to go the Front
he would make an excellent soldier and would redeem himself by good conduct.”106
The CEF was not concerned with morality but manpower, and in 1916 started to
take an interest in retrieving men who had been incarcerated for desertion, of which there
were a substantial number. A single raid by military police on St Thomas, Ontario, in
November 1915 netted thirty absentees. The 176th Battalion on the Niagara Peninsula had
257 deserters in less than a year and in August 1916 there were 1,500 absentees from
Camp Borden, Ontario, alone .107 Initially deserters were tried by court martial, a
procedure that required testimony by witnesses. However, in many cases, deserters were
not apprehended before their unit, together with witnesses, had sailed to England. To
solve the problem, an Order-in-Council was issued in January 1916 declaring that
deserters would be tried under the

C r im in a l C o d e ,

documentary evidence could be
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substituted for sworn testimony and on summary conviction men could be imprisoned for
up to two years, with or without hard labour. 108
Not every deserter was caught, but there were enough to swell the prison
population. Under ordinary circumstances these men would not have been welcomed
back, but recruiting dropped off sharply in the latter half of 1916. An Order-in-Council
was therefore issued in November 1916 to allow magistrates to suspend convictions at
the request of the military providing the offenders agreed not to desert in the future. This
did nothing for those already incarcerated, however, and the Order-in-Council was
followed almost immediately by an amnesty allowing convicted deserters to be released
into the custody of the military . 109
y

In 1917, the CEF took an active interest in prisoners other than deserters and
began to recruit within the prisons. At Kingston, for example, the MD 3 Recruiting
Officer arrived at the penitentiary on the morning of Friday, 26 May 1917 with a small
team to process recruits. By noon, nine men, selected by the warden beforehand, had
been interviewed, medically examined, attested and issued with uniforms. At 1:40 p.m.
V
that afternoon, the draft, accompanied by an escort,;left for Halifax and early Monday
morning, was delivered to a troopship, less than seventy-two hours after leaving
prison. 110
The passage o f the M

ilita r y S e r v ic e A c t

in 1917 brought further changes. Nothing

in the Act prevented convicts from being conscripted, although men disqualified under
the Dominion Elections Act, a category that included prisoners, were exempt from
combatant service . 111 There is no evidence that this legal nicety was followed, however,
and virtually all of the convicts who are known to have been drafted served in the
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infantry. Despite the MSA, however, prisoners could only be released with a pardon or
ticket o f leave granted by the Justice Department.

Convict conscription was therefore

selective and only those deemed suitable by the Justice Department were called up.
The actual process of drafting convicts was carefully controlled. Traveling
medical boards visited penitentiaries and examined those considered suitable by prison
staff. In Kingston, Warden Creighton went so far as to measure potential recruits, so that
uniforms could be issued before the men left prison . 113 Convicts who were drafted were
not given their freedom, but simply acquired khaki-clad turnkeys. In December 1917,
prison staff from St Vincent de Paul escorted draftees from the prison directly to Peel ,
Street Barracks in Montréal. 114 In Halifax, a recently drafted prisoner was taken under
/

guard in May 1918 from the County Jail to the Nova Scotia Regiment Depot, where “He
will be kept under close confinement and placed on board transport as such, with orders
to the OC Troops to release him after the transport sails.” 113 The methodology may have
varied, depending on local circumstances, but invariably, convicts were kept under close
scrutiny until they were safely aboard the troopship.
There was some concern that hardened criminals might be enlisted in the CEF and
in May 1917, Militia HQ notified districts that “men who are found guilty of serious
crimes are not on any account to be accepted as recruits.” 116 The Department of Justice
also had concerns and in October 1917 issued instructions to exclude “serious cases in
which on account of the nature o f the crime committed or for repetition of offences it
appears impossible in the public interest to exercise any clemency.” 117 Despite these
concerns, the majority o f prisoners who enlisted seem to have been good soldiers despite
their civilian crimes. In New Brunswick, a convict from Dorchester Penitentiary who had
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been convicted o f statutory rape was drafted under the MSA and served satisfactorily
with the 18th Battalion in France until he was demobilized in 1919.118
However, there were a small number of unsavory recruits such as the twenty-three
convicts from Kingston Penitentiary who were serving with the 6 th Reserve Battalion in
England in July 1918. The group included one man serving a life term, two imprisoned
for ‘white slavery’, another convicted of manslaughter, one rapist and a bank robber
convicted of two counts of armed robbery and shooting with intent to wound. Two of the
men confessed that they were drug addicts and Sir Edward Kemp, the minister
responsible for the OMFC, thought that the sudden increase of robberies and assaults in
the vicinity of the 6 th Reserve Battalion could be traced directly to these ex-prisoners. " 9
/

The number of men released to join CEF is uncertain since most of the relevant
Justice Department files remain closed. Warden Creighton of Kingston Penitentiary
wrote in October 1918, that he had released more than eighty prisoners for military
service including thirty-one men drafted under the Military Service Act over a three-day
period m March 1918.

Since Kingston held about a quarter of all federal convicts, this

suggests that more than three hundred men were released from federal prisons alone. On
the other hand, annual reports submitted to Parliament show that from 1914 to 1918, 523
prisoners were given a conditional release in order to join the CEF.

These were

conditional releases, however, and if non-conditional releases (pardons) and MSA
draftees are considered, then it is probable that more than 700 felons served in the CEF, a
substantial number given that there were only 4,438 men in all penal institutions at the
end of 1916.

The estimate is not unreasonable and is comparable to convict enlistments
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in the. Second World War when 598 convicts were transferred from prison to the armed
forces between September 1939 and February 1943.

10

Although Militia HQ was able to enlarge the manpower pool by tinkering with
entry requirements and making more efficient use of manpower, the reluctance of the
i CEF to enlist non-English speaking immigrants was a significant loss of potential
recruits. Numbers in Table 35 are soft, but if immigrants had joined at the same rate as
Canadians born outside of Québec, the CEF would have gained an additional 26,900
men, or more, considering that many immigrants were males of military age. The loss of
potential recruits may be overstated since 14.6% of a sample of 16,319 immigrants lived
/•

in the United States and were not part of the national manpower pool. Still, the potential
loss was probably more than two months’ wastage for the CEF in France and Flanders. 124

c
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Table 35
Place of Birth
Male Population 1911125

Place of Birth . Males - All Ages

British
Subjects

CEF Recruits

Proportion

(1)
Canada
2,849,442
2,849,442
318,728
11 .2 %
British Isles
470,061
470,061
228,170
48.5%
British
16,967
16,967
9,416
55.5%
possessions
United States
168,728
98,706
35,599
2 1 . 1%
Foreign bom 303,137
177,335
Allied and
. - •- • ^•
neutral
Foreign b o m 104,488
61,125
enemy
Foreign bom 407,625
238,460
27,723
6 .8 %
s
other
Totals
3,626,621
3,912,823
619,636
15.8%
Canadian bom
1,872,039
250,836
13.4%
excluding
Québec
Notes: (1) There appears to be a mathematica error in the 1911 Census and the
number shown in column 2 exceeds the published summary by 445 men.
(2) Column 5 reflects the proportion of Column 2 that enlisted.
(3) Column 3 is based on the 1916 census of the Prairie Provinces which
showed that 58.5% of all immigrants had been naturalized.
(3) Column 4 includes American residents.
(4) The total number of enlistments includes officers, nursing sisters and
other ranks who joined between 1914 and 1920.
;

.

■

Not surprisingly, the enlistment rate for immigrants from non-English speaking
countries differed considerably. In general, the mean enlistment date for non-English
speaking immigrants was later than the CEF norm of March 1916, a difference that can
be attributed, in part, to the initial difficulties these men had in enlisting. Whether or not
the recruit’s parent country was engaged in the war also played a part; those from Italy,
Romania, Norway and Sweden (both neutral) were slow to join. On the other hand, the
enlistment date for those from Holland (also neutral) was not too far off the CEF mean.
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Enlistment, however, not only depended on the willingness of the CEF to accept the
foreign-bom recruit but also on the individual’s desire to serve. There were groups who
were reluctant to join, for whatever reason, and therefore had to be conscripted, provided,
of course, they were British subjects.

^

Table 36
Sample
Foreign Bom Enlistments
Birth-place

Sample Size .

Bulgaria
Belgium
Iceland
Holland
Montenegro
France
Serbia
Switzerland
Russia
Denmark

33
982
385
364
107
970
250
229
6,696
968

Enlistment
July 1915
April 1916
April 1916
May 1916
May 1916
June 1916
June 1916
June 1916
July 1916
August 1916

Japan
Greece
Sweden

226
334
1,679

September 1916
October 1916
November 1916,

MSA .
Proportion
21%
12.7%
34%
14.8%
3.7%
16.8%
6 .8 %
10.5%
15.8%
9%
', \
/
10 .2 %
15.9%
26.6%

Italy
Norway

1,531
1,481

December 1916
December 1916

25.7%
28.9%

Romania
Ottoman Empire
Albania
Germany
Austria-Hungary

350
290
13
203
1,612

Total - All
T otal-A llied
Total - Neutral
Total - Enemy
*.
,, CEF total

18,703
11,497
5,068
2,138

32.3%
17.2%
30.8%
62%
74.1%
liltllS
24%
August 1916
17.6%
June 1916
2 1 .6 %
September 1916
64.3%
April 1918
March 1917
April 1917
September 1917
April 1918
June 1918

Naturalized
Proportion126
4.3%
40.9%
^ 82.5%
29.6%
(Note 2)
50.6%
(Note 2 )
(Note 2)
45.5%
44.5%
:
(Note 4)
22.5%
18%
44.5%
(Note 4)
19.9%
44.5%
(Note 4)
46.1%
39.6%
(Note 2)
58.8%
50.2%

‘
March 1916

21%

>,
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'

. Notes: (1) The mean enlistment date is the month by which half of all men in the
sample had enlisted.
(2) Data on immigrants from these countries is not available.
(3) More than 27,700 men bom in non-English speaking enlisted. The
sample at Table 35 is not complete but probably represents the majority of
recruits from each country listed.
(4) Available data groups Scandinavian immigrants together.
Attitudes to non-English speaking immigrants were mixed. Clifford Sifton,

Minister o f the Interior from 1896 to 1905, thought that the Ukrainian immigrant, “a
stalwart peasant in a sheep-skin coat,” 127 was a decided asset to the nation, but others
were not as sure. J.S. Woodsworth, who was generally sympathetic to immigrants and
their problems, preferred a homogeneous people who were “in accord with our
democratic institutions and conducive to the general welfare.”

Similarly, Agnes Laut, a

popular Canadian author who was not opposed to immigration per se, wrote, “These
poverty-stricken Jews and Polacks and Galicians will be the wealth and power of Canada
tomorrow” but added “will Canada remain Canada when these new races come up to
power?”

There were also concerns that non-English-speaking immigrants were a

potential threat to peace and good order. In April 1914, for example, Major Vernon Eaton
of MD 13 wrote of “a large number of emigrants(sic) coming into the West who have to
be taught to respect, and to obey the laws of Canada”.

Immigrants, especially those

whose native language was not English or French, were viewed with suspicion and were
not regarded as true Canadians, regardless of their status as British subjects. In short, they
were not ‘one of us.’
The same attitudes prevailed in the CEF. In reply to a request from HQ MD 2 to
enlist naturalized Bulgarians, the AG wrote in October 1915 that “blood being thicker
than water, you should take no chances.” 131 A few months later in March 1916, a request
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from HQ MD 10 to enlist Persians, who were bitter about Turkish persecution, was
turned down because Persians “would not mix well with Anglo-Saxons.” 132 Greeks could
be enlisted but, the AG wrote in November 1917, “No special effort, however, should be
made to recruit them.”

However, Canadians were ambivalent. In November 1914, the

mayor o f Fort William, Ontario, thought that “little encouragement is offered to the
foreigners [to enlist], but if they could be persuaded to take up arms, there would be a
profound effect on the future generation.” 134 All of this must have been discouraging to
the immigrants themselves, many of whom “desire to be regarded as Canadians and to be
permitted as such to discharge their duty to their adopted country in this war.” 135
There were also concerns that men from enemy states concealed their origins
s

when they enlisted and represented a security threat. Some of the Ukrainians from the
Austro-Hungarian Empire, who claimed to be Russians, were suspected of maintaining
ties with the old country, while others were “reported to be sending money from Canada
to the United States to be forwarded from there to Austria.” 136 Other groups were suspect
as well. Germans were said to be passing themselves off as Scandinavians while
Austrians were suspected of claiming Serbian or Romanian citizenship .137
Security concerns with recruits bom in enemy countries or of enemy parentage
may have been exaggerated, but the concerns had some basis in reality. In England,
Private Ziegler of the 14 Reserve Battalion, who may have been from Germany, advised
his Polish-bom comrades in 1917 to claim they had been bom in Germany rather than
Russia to avoid being posted to an infantry battalion in France . 138 In 1916, the CGS
pointed to the case of Private Minot of German ancestry who was serving with the New
Zealand Expeditionary Force in France. Minot apparently deserted to the Germans and
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shortly afterwards, positions previously unknown to the enemy were heavily shelled. 139
In February 1917, Private George McDonald of the RCR deserted and warned the 6 th
(German) Reserve Corps that the Canadian Corps was making preparations for an attack
at Vimy Ridge. McDonald, whose true name was Otto Ludwig Doerr, had been bom in
Frankfurt-am-Main, Germany, although when he enlisted with the 212th Battalion at
Saskatoon in 1916, he claimed to have been bom in Kentucky. McDonald/Doerr
evidently had an accent but was able to account for this by claiming that he had been
raised in Mexico and lived in Texas. 140 :
Language presented a problem for immigrant recruits, many of whom spoke little
or no English or French. The number of these men who managed to join is unknown
/

although there were enough that Militia HQ found it necessary to issue repeated
instructions that “no men should be enlisted who have not a satisfactory knowledge of
either the French or English languages.’’141 The instructions were not xenophobic and
there were some very good reasons why non-English speaking men could not be
accepted. In 1916 Russian-born soldiers with the 39th Reserve Battalion in England made
little progress in training because they could not understand the English-speaking
instructors. The problem was serious and the OC 12 Reserve Brigade warned that these
men would only be partially trained on completion of the standard recruit course and
would be of limited value to battalions in France who would “be unable to handle them
owing to their want of English .” 142 In April 1916, the 11th Reserve Battalion reported
receiving a draft o f forty-five Russians, only six of whom could speak or understand
English. “These men would be unable to report their observations if they were sent out on
patrol [in France],” reported their company commander, and would “also [be] absolutely

t
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unable to transmit a verbal message.” 143 A year later in August 1917, the 5th Reserve
Battalion commented on a draft of men who could not speak English and warned that
“none o f them would be of the slightest use for front line work .” 144
Sporadic efforts were made by reserve units in England to accommodate men who
had difficulties with French or English. In April 1916, the OC 12 Canadian Reserve
Brigade recommended that all Russians be grouped for training under NCOs who were
fluent in both Russian and English.145 In November 1916, the 9th Canadian Infantry
Reserve Brigade noted that bilingual instructors were required for Russian-speaking
reinforcements while in June 1917 the 5 Reserve Battalion recommended that
instructors who spoke Greek should be used to train newly-arrived unilirigual Greeks
/

with the 241st Battalion. A different approach was taken by the Canadian Pioneer ‘
Training Depot and in 1916 a number of Russians were promoted to lance-corporal and
used to instruct non-English speaking Russians. The experiment was not a success,
however, because the instructors were no further advanced than their students. 146
The use of bilingual instructors was not a satisfactory solution. Admittedly the
immigrant soldiers would complete their training, but there was still the knotty problem
of speaking English or French sufficiently well to function with units in France. The
obvious solution was to conduct second-language classes. The 37 Battalion Base
Company in MD 2 suggested in 1915 that non-English speaking soldiers (mainly
Russians) be grouped together and given an opportunity to attend language classes, but
nothing came of this recommendation. 147
The American Expeditionary Force (AEF) had the same problem but on a much
larger scale. Almost 20% of the AEF were foreign-born and many spoke English poorly
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or not all. At Camp Gordon, Georgia, a major training base for infantry reinforcements,
for example, about 75% of all draftees in 1918 could not speak English . 148 The US War
Office was slow to recognize the problem, but in January 1918 the Intelligence
Department in Washington was enlarged with the addition of the Foreign-speaking
Soldier Subsection (FSS), intended to facilitate the training and integration of immigrant
soldiers. Under the direction of the FSS, non-English-speaking soldiers were grouped
into ‘development battalions’ with English-language training and military training under
instructors who spoke their language.149.
The AEF was able to do this, but only because it was highly centralized and took
in a large number of men in a relatively short period. In contrast, the CEF was
/

decentralized and recruited fewer men over a much longer period of time. As well, the
Canadian Forces were administered by a headquarters staff that was miniscule in
comparison to the AEF and barely able to keep up with routine administration, let alone
launch creative innovations. In short, a Canadian equivalent to the FSS was simply not
possible.
\

The failure to tap the pool of non-English speaking immigrants probably cost the
CEF about two months’ wastage for units in France and Flanders. Citizenship
requirements, the ability o f foreign states to control immigrants on Canadian soil, a
general mistrust of immigrants and security concerns all played a part. Language was also
an issue, not necessarily because men were turned away but because reserve units in
England, which were set up to train homogeneous blocks of reinforcements, could not
train the immigrant soldiers efficiently.

.
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. There was also considerable inefficiency because there was no uniform
description o f a soldier’s fitness, which meant the pool of serving men could not be
managed efficiently. For the first two years o f the war, a soldier’s fitness depended on his
corps and there was no way of determining if a healthy CASC driver was fit for the
infantry without a medical examination. Nor was there any way to determine if an
infantryman marked as ‘unfit’ by his battalion should be transferred to the CASC or
repatriated to Canada. However, with the introduction of medical categories, men could
be employed in jobs consistent with their physical abilities. Category A men, for
example, could be transferred to the infantry and replaced by Category B infantrymen.
The effect was to reduce the strain on the manpower pool by making more men available
s

for service in the trenches.
The War Office made several efforts to institute medical categories in 1915, but
these applied only to conscripts and men reported unfit by their units . 150 In general, unfit
soldiers, regardless of corps, were described as ‘PB’ (permanent base) or ‘TB’
(temporary base) if the individual was expected to improve. In May 1916, more than
12,000 soldiers were examined by CEF medical boards in England and 20.46% were
judged to be ‘PB ’. 151 But the results were unsatisfactory since there was no indication of
the limitations on employment.
The system was finally rationalized in May 1916 when the War Office
promulgated Army Council Instruction (ACI) 1023 which set out a universal system of
medical categories that reflected individual fitness and training regardless of corps.152
The CEF was slow to follow suit, however, probably because Canadian HQ in London
under Major-General Carson was not particularly efficient and did not recognize either
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the problem or the remedy. In November 1916, Colonel A.D. McRae of Canadian HQ
visited units in France and, together with Lieutenant-General Byng, the Canadian Corps
commander, discussed the results of the visit with the DCIGS at the War Office. In a
nutshell, the two recommended the use of common standards in both France and England
and urged that the same standards be adopted in Canada . 153 The creation of HQ OMFC
facilitated matters and by the end of November 1916, ACI 1023 was brought into effect
for the CEF in England and France. 154 The system was then adopted in Canada in May
1917, when Militia HQ issued Militia Order 50 to identify unfit men who might
otherwise be posted to England and “to utilize available material [manpower] to the best
purpose .” 155
The category system established by ACI 1023 with minor modifications
authorized in Militia Order 50 is summarized in Table 37.
Table 37
Medical Categories
Category
A

General Description
Fit for active service

B

Free from serious organic defects
and fit for active service on the
lines o f communication

C
D
E

Fit for service in Canada only
Temporarily unfit
Unfit for categories A, B and C

Rem arks
Ai - fully trained
Aii - recruits
Aiii - fully trained but required
hardening
A iv-m inors
Bi - able to march five miles
Bii - able to walk at least five miles to
and from work
Biii - sedentary duties only

Not expected to become fit within six
months
Note: Not all subcategories are listed in Table 37.
Once men had been categorized, the benefits of the system became obvious. In

January 1917, for example, HQ OMFC directed units in England to transfer all men with
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Category B or C to the Canadian Railway Troops Depot at Purfleet or to the Canadian
Forestry Corps, something that would not have been possible six months earlier without
mass medical boards . 156
Standard medical categories allowed fit men in non-combatant corps to be
weeded out and diverted to the infantry. As early as January 1917, a draft of 399 CASC
reinforcements from Canada, “of splendid physique, being above the average of Infantry
Battalions now arriving ,” 157 lost a hundred men to,the infantry on arrival in England.
Further transfers of Category A soldiers to the infantry followed: by 9 May 1917, a total
of 525 men had been transferred from the CASC Training Depot to reserve infantry
battalions. Others followed; 436 CASC men were transferred to the infantry in August
1917 and a further 313 in September 1917.158 Another 227 followed in OctoberNovember 1917.159 The results were dramatic. In January 1917, CASC personnel in
England were virtually all Category A but by July 1918, they were virtually all Category
B . 160 Other corps were expected to yield Category A men as well and in the first six
months of 1917, for example, 469 pay clerks at HQ OMFC were drafted to the infantry
and replaced by Category B and C men. 161

-

The system was not perfect. CAMC personnel in the forward areas in France were
required to be medically fit and in May 1917, the ADMS at HQ OMFC noted that the
CAMC Training Depot could not afford to surrender any more Category A men . 162
Similarly, the QMG reported in November 1917 that the CASC Training Depot had to
retain a pool of Category A horse transport drivers as reinforcements for divisional trains
in France, because “it is feared that under the trying winter conditions, the demand for
reinforcements will be exceptionally heavy if men of low category are employed.” 163
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Even.the reserve battalions were affected. In January 1918, HQ OMFC urged that
Category A NCOs should be posted to France although it was difficult to find competent
instructors with low categories. Still, OMFC added, the effort should be made . 164
The process of combing out non-combatants who were fit for the front was not a
reaction to periodic shortages of infantry reinforcements for France, but an ongoing effort
to make efficient use of available manpower. The general policy was set in May 1917,
when HQ OMFC directed that “all men of Category ‘A ’ of Units and Corps other than
infantry, who are surplus to the estimated requirements of reinforcements for the next 8
months, should be transferred to Infantry Reserve Battalions.” 165 In May 1918, the
process was further refined when a Board of Officers was established by HQ OMFC to
visit every unit in England and allocate men according to their medical fitness. The
Board’s work was difficult and time-consuming, but its efforts “resulted in effecting a
saving o f the greatest possible amount of Man-Power in the Overseas Military Forces of
Canada .” 166

r

Despite the apparent benefits of the combing out process, the effect appears to
have been negligible judging by the number o f CASC men posted to infantry battalions in
France.
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Table 38
,
Select Infantry Battalions
Non-Infantry Reinforcements 167
Corps

1917

1918

Total
3

2
1
CADC
91
9
100
CAMC
98
150
248
CASC
6
Vi! ■5 ......
11
CAVC
2
128
130
CFC
24
^
2
26
CRT
6
11
5
Remount Depot
.
9
3. - •
93 A ■
Signal Corps
622
123
499
Totals
Note: Table 38 lists non-infantry rein brcements posted to the 2nd CMR, 4th CMR,
4th Battalion, 16th Battalion, 18™Battalion, 20th Battalion, 72nd Battalion, 85th
Battalion and PPCLI. The table does not include men of the Canadian Labour '
Corps who arrived as reinforcements after their medical category was upgraded.

On average, each battalion listed in Table 38 received about 69 non-infantry
reinforcements which suggests that about 3,317 were posted to the forty-eight battalions
in the Canadian Corps. But the total number of transfers to combatant corps must have
been somewhat more if postings to the artillery, machine gun corps and the cavalry
brigade are also considered. The true significance of the use of medical categories lies in
the realization that the manpower pool not only had to be tapped, but had to be efficiently
managed.
Women could also have been used to replace men who were physically fit for
active service, a measure that would have helped to alleviate the shortage of manpower in
1917-1918. In England, HQ OMFC was more than willing to make use of British women
from Queen Mary’s Army Auxiliary Corps (QMAAC) as cooks, drivers and mess
waitresses, but there was no equivalent in Canada although more than 5,000 women were
hired as civil servants and worked as clerks and typists.
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It was not as though women had not served with the.CEF since the beginning.
A total o f 2,854 nurses were commissioned in the CAMC as well as ten other women in a
variety of units including the Canadian Field Comforts Commission and the CAMC.16There were also 342 Canadian women who served overseas with Voluntary Aid
Detachments;170 But there were no female soldiers with the exception of Maud Blake, a
Kingston dental mechanic who enlisted as a private in .1915 and was demobilized as a
sergeant in January 1919.

Blake, it must be pointed out, joined as a woman and made

no effort to conceal her gender.
Women were not unwelcome in the CEF. After all, QMAAC women served with
CEF units in England with no apparent problems. The subject was not seriously discussed
at Militia HQ, however, until December 1917 when a letter signed by an anonymous
‘Anxious and ‘Willin’-to-go’ Stenographer’ in Toronto suggested that the CEF form a
Canadian version of QMAAC. The letter was passed to the CGS who took the suggestion
seriously and directed the AG to broach the issue with the Minister’s military secretary.
HQ OMFC was then consulted on the proposal to form a Canadian equivalent to the
QMAAC, but reported in March 1918 that the War Office had rejected the idea because
there were enough British women to fill the demand and there was a shortage of shipping
to bring the women to England.

177

The matter did not end there. In May 1918, Colonel Machines at Militia HQ noted
that the Royal Air Force was recruiting women to serve with RAF units in Canada and
observed “Will this not, however, expose the Department to criticism, if something of the
same kind is not done in connection with the Canadian Forces?”173 Maclnnes’s
suggestion evidently struck a chord. The Militia Council considered the issue on 30 May
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1918 and formed a sub-committee headed by the QMG to study the matter. The sub
committee worked slowly, however, and it was not until 18 September 1918 that Militia
Council reviewed the final report and approved the formation of the ‘Canadian Women’s
Army Auxiliary Corps’ (CWAAC). However, Major-General Mewbum, the Minister of
Militia and Defence, deferred any action until the Prime Minister and Civil Service
Commission had been consulted. Nothing concrete emerged from these consultations (if
in fact, they ever took place) and the signing o f the Armistice on 11 November 1918
rendered the proposal moot.174
Would a significant number of men have been made available for overseas duty
with the creation of the CWAAC? In May 1918, there were approximately 90,600
/

soldiers serving in Canada.175 Many were MSA men waiting to go overseas, however,
while others were being cared for by the Military Hospitals Commission. In all likelihood
there were only a few thousand fit men employed in administrative positions who could
have been replaced by members of the CWAAC. As well, since the CWAAC had been
authorized in September 1918, only two months before the armistice, there would have
been little or no benefit to the CEF. Had the war continued into 1919, however, the
CWAAC would probably have made a significant contribution by adding several
thousand men to the reinforcement stream.
From start to finish, the CEF recruited about 616,636 officers and men. But many
of these men did not meet age and fitness requirements or were recruited outside of
Canada and thus were not part of the national manpower pool. All of this begs the
question o f how efficiently the pool was actually utilized.
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Table 39
Manpower Pool - Final Balance Sheet
Item
Medically unfit
Overage
Underage
Sub-total - debits
Recruits - convicts
Recruits - Bermuda
Recruits - Greece, France
and Belgium
Recruits - England
Recruits - US residents
Recruits - BCRM
Sub-total - credits
All recruits not part of the
manpower pool
All recruits from manpower
pool

Debit

Credit

81,449
9,198
24,369
116,016
700
46
'31
1,733
22,338
33,335 ;
58,183
173,198
443,438
v

'

••

In summary, about 54% of all men in Canada who were eligible for military
service enlisted in the CEF. However, the rate would have been somewhat higher if the
CEF had welcomed non-English speaking immigrants, natives and visible minorities and
encouraged them to enlist. On the other hand, modifications to recruiting criteria
discussed in Chapter 4 probably added several hundred thousand recruits to the CEF, men
who needed eyeglasses, dental care or dentures. The introduction of uniform medical
categories also affected manpower. The system did not enlarge the reservoir, but made
management o f the pool more efficient and allowed men to be retained who might
otherwise have been released. All in all, there may have been some shortcomings, but in
the end, Militia HQ was able to make good use o f the available manpower.
Numbers alone do not suffice to win battles and success depended on well-trained
reinforcements arriving at their units in a timely fashion. Training, then, was vital and
this forms the central theme in Chapter 6.
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- Annex A
Chapter 5
General Health
Canadian-born and Immigrant Recruits
As discussed previously, British National Service medical boards
examined 2,425,184 men in 1917-1918 and found that only 55.6% were fit for overseas
employment in one capacity or another. In contrast Canadian MSA boards examined
275,480 men in 1917 and found that 60.3% were fit for overseas duty.1 On the surface
therefore, Canadian males were somewhat healthier than their British counterparts.
However, this is contradicted by the fact that, in general, immigrants, with the exception
of those from non-English speaking countries, enlisted at a much higher rate than the
Canadian-born.
Table 40
Enlistments by Place of Birth
Place of B irth
Male Population
Recruits
Proportion of Males
2,819,442
Canada
318,728
11.3%
British Isles
228,170
48.5%
470,061
British possessions
30.3%
31,077
9,416
United States
21.1%
168,728
35,599
Other foreign bom
9.1%
305,029
27,723
Totals
3,794,337
619,636
16.3%
Notes: (1) Table 40 deals in relative proportions. No attempt has been made,
therefore, to reduce the number of recruits by the estimated number of
American residents. Nor has the number of those from enemy countries
been deducted from the total of foreign bom.
(2) Officers, nursing sisters and other ranks are included.
About 80% of the CEF were volunteers, and enlistment depended to a large
degree on motivation. Patriotism, love of adventure, boredom and unemployment all
played a part. In the case of the British-born some may have been homesick or
disenchanted with life in Canada and were seeking free passage home. But these
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explanations are not entirely satisfactory given the difference in medical fitness between
Britons and Canadians. A postwar study by the War Office claimed that “A very
considerable proportion of the population in the Dominions is composed of emigrants
from Great Britain who are for the most part of very good physical fitness.”3 Did medical
fitness play a role in recruiting?

:
Table 41
Recruits Processed in Toronto
Week Ending 10 February 19174

Place of Birth
Canada
British Isles
Other
All Immigrants
Totals

■''gmmwmsM
103
56
22
78
181

Total

Unfit
172
84
28
112
284

69
28
6
34
103

Proportion Fit
59.9%
66.7%
78.6%
69.6%
63.7%

The sample in Table 41 is too small and specific in terms of time and location to
provide proof o f the relative fitness of native-born Canadians and immigrants. However,
the results are reinforced by statistics from the 1911 Census showing place of birth of
males of all ages who were blind, deaf and dumb, insane or idiotic. Admittedly the
conditions listed are limited, but the data may serve as a proxy for public health in
general.
Table 42
Males o f All Ages
Infirmities 19115
Condition
Blind
Deaf and Dumb
Insane
Idiotic
Total Afflicted
Male Population
Proportion Afflicted

Canada
1,455
2,115
5,489
3,213
12,272
2,849,442
0.43%

British Isles
269
184
823
149
1,425
470,061
0.30%

Other
126
192
1,338
139
1,795
508,603
0.35%

All Immigrants
395
376
2,161
288
3,220
978,664
0.33%
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Not all who wished to immigrate to Canada did so. Arguably those who were sick, infirm
or otherwise incapacitated would have had little energy with which to raise funds and
arrange for passage to Canada. There were also rudimentary checks by immigration
doctors. From April 1903 to March 1914 a total of 4,529 men and women were refused
entry because they medically unfit. A further 2,334 were deported in the same time
frame, also for medical reasons. Causes were varied: insanity, mental deficiency,
tuberculosis, hernia, trachoma, poor eyesight, epilepsy, poor physique, general debility
and general infirmity. The fact that the lead cause for rejection was trachoma (infectious
eye disease) suggests that the inspections were, at best, hasty and superficial.6 But, the
/

combination of physical ability and means to organize ocean passage to Canada together
with medical checks at the port of entry probably combined to produce immigrants who
were somewhat healthier the Canadian-born.
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1 Great Britain, Ministry of National Service. Report: Vol I: Upon the physical examination of men of
military age bv National Service medical boards from November 1st. 1917 - October 31st. 1918 (London:
HMSO, 1920) pp.3-4; Machin. Report of the Director of the Military Service Branch, p.78.
2 DHH 74/672 (Edwin Pye Fonds) Box 5 folder 20 Statistics’, AG to CGS 9 December 1927 saying “The
above figures are official.”; Fifth Census of Canada Vol II p.440 Table XVII ‘Birthplace of the people by
provinces’
3 Great Britain, War Office. Statistics of the Military Effort of the British Empire during the Great War
1914-1920. (London: HMSO, 1922) p.380
4 LAC RG 24 Vol 4310 file 341-59J Vol 1 ‘Recruits Processed in Toronto for Week Ending 10 February
1917’
5 Fifth Census of Canada 1911 Vol II p.626 Table XLIII ‘Infirmities - Summary for Canada’
6 Canada Year Book 1914. p. 87 Table 33

